Civic Mind and Good Citizens
Comparative Perspectives

ANNAMARI KONTTINEN (ed.)

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TAMPERE
UNIVERSITY
PRESS

Myynti
Tiedekirjakauppa TAJU
Kalevantie 5
PL 617
33014 Tampereen yliopisto
puhelin (03) 3551 6055
fax (03) 3551 7685
taju@uta.fi
www.uta.fi/taju
http://granum.uta.fi

Kansi
Eeva Sivula

Graafinen suunnittelu ja taitto
Maaret Kihlakaski

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Preface

The initiative to write this book came originally from the Cinefogo Network of Excellence, and especially its Finnish representative, Professor Emeritus Raimo Blom from University of Tampere. The aim of Cinefogo, *The Network on Civil Society and New Forms of Governance in Europe – the Making of European Citizenship,* is to coordinate research on European citizenship, especially concerning civic participation, governance, and social protection, and also to initiate and facilitate debates among scholars, politicians, and general public.

The authors of the chapters of this book all have different relationships with the Cinefogo network. Some, like Blom himself and Harri Melin of University of Tampere, as well as Martti Siisäinen from University of Jyväskylä, are regular participants of and contributors to Cinefogo workshops on a wide range of topics. Annamari Konttinen from University of Turku is more focused on East Asian civil societies in her research but was involved in one Cinefogo-funded research project. Antti Kouvo from University of Turku and Mikko Lagerspetz from Åbo Akademi were invited to join the book project because of their sustained contributions in the field of citizenship studies.

All authors, however, equally share the most important goals of Cinefogo and wish to promote ever greater degrees of interaction between different fields of scholarly research, and between academia, decision-making elites, and citizens. We thank Tampere University Press

for giving us the venue, and especially Head of Publication Centre Outi Sisättö and Graphic Designer Maaret Kihlakaski for smooth collaboration as well as an anonymous reviewer for enlightened observations.

The compilation of this book has been made financially possible by Cinefogo network of excellence. We wish to thank especially coordinator Thomas Bøje for his encouragement and support. The Department of Sociology and Social Psychology of University of Tampere has hosted the administration of the Finnish Cinefogo sub-project, and together with the Finnish Social Science Data Archive facilitated the smooth progress of our work.

In Turku in April 2009

Annamari Konttinen

The Idea of Citizenship in a Globalized World

Annamari Konttinen

Active Citizenship and Democracy

Concern over the decline of citizens' social and political participation frequently arises in public discussion. The trend manifests itself in many forms, from the dissolution of community ties to decreasing voting turnout. Social scientists have studied these phenomena for a long period of time, and aspired to distinguish reasons behind them. The varied nature of different forms of participation, and the different conceptual and empirical tools pertinent for the study of them have produced many lines of study related to the subject, and perspectives applied range from study of civic skills and individual resources of citizens to socially valued civic virtues such as tolerance, interest in politics or concern for the underprivileged in society. Concepts employed by these studies, such as civic competence, civic culture (Almond and Verba 1963), civic experience (Schudson 2006) and civic participation (Putnam 2000) are also closely related. Notably, research on political alienation has for long surveyed citizens' sense of belonging and their notions on their ability to make themselves heard in the society, a notion in this tradition called sense of political efficacy.

Also trust that citizens feel towards social institutions has been central in the study of citizenship and political participation. It is, in particular, the combination of political efficacy and trust that has traditionally been assumed to explain and shape citizens' political participation. (Reef & Knoke 1999; Citrin & Muste 1999; Gabriel 1995,

357-61; Nousiainen 1998, 323-25.) For example, low institutional trust combined with high political efficacy is typical for the 'dissident' citizen, whereas the combination of low sense of political efficacy and high trust combine to form the foundation to political subordination (Paige 1971, 810-813; cf. Finifter 1970).

Lately, the concept of trust has become especially topical due to the lively debate concerning social capital. In this debate, the importance of trust has been emphasized as a force sustaining the society and generating cohesion. Observations concerning the "crisis of trust" have thus understandably been important for spurring this debate. For example, Putnam (2000) discusses the corrosion of trust and its consequences to the society, such as decreased communication between people and the subsequent weakening of the nations' social performance.

Interest in phenomena such as trust, civic competence and political efficacy is highly understandable for the functionality of the democratic system alone. The issues are always topical, even if they occur in different contexts in different times. Different types of trust, the trust between people and the trust in the political system of the society are related to citizens' sense of their political power, their political efficacy. In addition, citizens' own ideas of the nature of good citizenship guide their choices. Thus, the emergence of active political participation is a fundamentally multi-dimensional phenomenon.

Even if trust, as such, is a term with positive connotations, it should be asked, whether the citizens' trust in political institutions is always an entirely positive phenomenon. For the functionality of democracy it is desirable that citizens are free also to express healthy distrust towards political actors and institutions (cf. Nousiainen 1998, 324). According to some theories, increase of the level of democracy in fact increases the lack of interest and distrust towards political authorities, while the main focus of attention shifts to other social relationships. (Warren 1999, 1.)

The study of political alienation, or lack of sense of political efficacy in general, has relatively long traditions and established measures, and the phenomenon is thematically relevant for the assumed interactional

relationships within elements of social capital. Despite overlapping measures, the research tradition is not particularly visible in the wide variety of studies on social capital, even though several studies touch on the relationship between social capital and political power. (E.g. Svallfors 1999; Joslyn & Cigler 2001; Pattie et al. 2003; de Hart & Dekker 2003; Dekker 2003.)

Active citizenship is often considered a desired consequence of the accumulation of social capital. For theories concerning the mechanisms of social capital, an interesting observation concerns the relationship between generalized and institutionalized trust, when it is used to explain the variation in political efficacy. In addition to horizontal trust generalized in the entire society, institutions appear to have a focal role in supporting active citizenship, as well. On the basis of the analyses, it can be said that people experience themselves as having strong political power when they feel that the political, legislative and controlling institutions are able to create an environment in which social activity is rewarding. Thus, the vertical dimensions of trust also appear to have an important role in generating attitudes that promote participation and experiences such as political efficacy.

Measuring trust has often been confined within the boundaries of each nation state included in the study, and comparisons are conducted between states as units of analysis. Multinational actors have rarely been studied, and in the ever globalizing world, we are facing new challenges regarding conceptually capturing and measuring people's emerging ideas of multi-level belongings, loyalties and associating.

This book reports some core results relevant to the foundation of politically active citizenship by using the Finnish ISSP 2004 survey (sample size 2500, response rate 54,4) in its Nordic, EU and international contexts. The full ISSP 2004 data set[1] is used for international comparisons of citizenship beliefs. Our second focus is in the differences between the EU countries. The outer reference group consists either of some non-EU countries (the United States, Russia and Japan) or of all ISSP countries. Differences in citizenship beliefs and action in the different capitalism and welfare state regimes presented in the literature

are given special attention. Based on this analysis, tentative "citizenship regimes" are proposed and the unity of European conceptualization of citizenship is discussed.

We study different aspects of citizenship simultaneously from the perspective of the EU and its assumed unified foundations in terms of citizenship ideals, and Finland as a special, partly anomalous case within the EU framework and even more so within the framework of Nordic welfare regime: Finland seems different from its neighbors and, indeed, from any other country in our analysis. E.g. Finns put far less emphasis on the political citizenship in their conceptions of "the good citizen". The importance of political citizenship is lower in Finland than in other countries (see Blom in this volume). Also, Finnish citizen participation is very state-centered even if it is quite lively (see Siisiäinen in this volume).

For all these reasons, we will now spend a few moments studying the unique characteristics of Finnish Democracy.

Why Finland? The Special Character of Finnish Democracy

The roots of Finnish formal representative democracy on the national level go beyond her gaining of independence in 1917. General suffrage for men and women over the age of 24 was established already in 1906[2], and the unicameral Diet was founded the same year. Its predecessors, estate-based legislative bodies, had functioned throughout the 19th century during the semi-independent era of Finnish autonomy as a Grand Duchy under Russian rule. Despite this institutional stability, however, the history of 20th century Finland is marked by several dramatic social and political crises and transformations.

Finland declared herself independent from Russia in December 1917, only to enter a severe period of Civil War between the working class "reds" and the middle class/land owner "whites". The national trauma of the war gave way to political consensus only two decades later, when the country united in defense against attacks by the Soviet

Union, leading to two wars in 1939-40 and 1941-44. The economic depression of the inter-war period (the 1920s and '30s) and the hardships of the war time contrasted with the after-war reconstruction period, an era of optimism and rapid socio-political reformations.

The structural changes in Finnish society after the Second World War have been more profound and occurred within a shorter period of time than in most if not all highly developed industrial countries. Finland's predominantly agrarian society transformed into an industrial and service economy during a period called the "Great Migration" in the 1960s and '70s, characterized by depopulation of the countryside and growth of suburban residential areas. Throughout the political turbulence and great changes in life style in recent decades, the early and continual development of democratic institutions and the welfare state have nevertheless provided relative stability for the Finnish society.

The erosion of rural communities and traditional social ties has in most industrialized countries challenged the earlier foundations for feelings of solidarity and belongingness in society. In recent social science literature these changes have been addressed, among others, by the increasing body of literature focusing on the rediscovered concept of trust in society (e.g. Misztal 1996; Sztompka 1999) and that of social capital (e.g. Putnam 2000). These notions form the conceptual background to the treatise of Finnish citizenship and political participation in the following chapters.

The Social Faultlines of Finnish Citizenship Generation

The political generations discernible in the Finnish population reflect the contours of Finnish political, economic and social history briefly described above. In fact, it is possible to treat all political crises as demarcation lines between political generations: common experiences create common cultural and mental patterns (Sztompka 1999, 152). The generation effect is produced "when a particular age cohort responds to a set of stimuli (…) and then carries the impact of that response

through the life cycle" (Almond and Verba 1989, 400). Belonging in a political generation shapes the process of political socialization, the resulting values and a common generational habitus – the dispositions and classification systems for a way of life (Bourdieu 1984). Different generations have also experienced remarkably different levels and structures of opportunities for political participation in Finnish society (Berndtson 1992, 106-115).

Central experiences for the War Generation[3] born between 1900 and 1919 have been the Civil War, the Depression years, and the Second World War. Overcoming economic hardship in the context of an inadequate social security system dominated the experiences of the formative years – in the best case. Many members of this generation ended up wasting their youth – or losing their lives – in wars. Limited possibilities for schooling for a large proportion of the population resulted in meager prospects for upward mobility. For many, the after-war reconstruction period meant building new homes and raising families, and a new sense of optimism stemming from after-war social reforms, improved welfare, and expectations of better prospects for the next generation set in (Jääsaari 1986).

Typical for the After-war Generation, the generation of "reconstruction and growth" (Roos 1987) born in the 1920s and early 1930s, has been "life split in two". The members of this generation have experienced the hardships of wartime as children or young people, but have also been able to fully contribute to and benefit from the after-war economic boom, reconstruction and modernization beginning in their early adulthood. While the earlier stages of industrialization had already provided opportunity for organizing for workers and relatively progressive labor legislation for the earlier generations by the end of the 19th century, the postwar generations have been able to enjoy full social security – sickness pay, child benefits, schools, unemployment benefits, pensions – for most of their lives.

The Generation of the Great Transformation was mainly born during or soon after the war. The formative years of this generation were spent during the 1960s and 1970s, characterized by migration

from rural to urban areas, a swing in the political climate away from the conservatism, nationalism and conformity of the post-war period. This generation – the "baby boomers" – also consists of the largest cohorts in Finnish history, and it remains a powerful force in Finnish political life (Alasuutari 1996; Berglund 1990; Jääsaari & Martikainen 1991; Nousiainen 1971). It has also been called the generation of cultural shift or the "radical generation" due to the social movements and cultural transformations in the late 1960s. Eyerman & Turner (1998) describe the "1945 generation" as the Lucky Generation in most Western countries, having enjoyed peace and very high levels of employment backed up by economic growth and material affluence.

For the next two political generations, growing welfare, modern western lifestyle and consumption patterns as well as significant degrees of freedom regarding choice of career and way of life in general have been typical. These developments were, however, severely disrupted for those entering the labor market during the economic depression in the early 1990s, characterized by a sudden fall of the GNP and a historically unique fall in employment. The labor market became difficult to enter and job choices suddenly became extremely limited regardless of individual merit or effort. The whole decade of 1990 can be described as a crisis for employment (Kautto 2001, 17-20).

The suburban generation, or "rock generation", born in the 1950s and '60s is the first one with the experience of being born into a full-fledged welfare state. It has, however, also been the first generation having to question the foundation and consequences of continuous economic development due to environmental problems and new kinds of global concerns. The air of constant growth and progress has been replaced by feelings of insecurity, later materialized in recession, unemployment and growing income differences (Jääsaari & Martikainen 1991, 21). This generation, in response to the new challenges, also produced the new — in their beginning non-governmental — political and cultural forces such as the green movement.

The concept of "Generation X", referring to cynical, frustrated and unmotivated youth more oriented towards consumption, mass

entertainment and video games than social or political activities, has become a popular and stereotypical image in recent discussions about the changes in political participation among contemporary youth (see e.g. Coupland 1998). There seems to be more to the generation born in the 1970s and '80s, however: the emergence of a plethora of new kinds of social movements in the 1990s mobilizing mostly young people suggests a metamorphosis of interest in social and political issues, not a decline or disappearance of such interest among the young.

One distinct characteristic of the two youngest generations seems to be, however, the lack of shared experiences comparable to the magnitude of wars. The result seems to be that political orientations, and non-orientations, are much more individualized among these generations than among earlier generations. Earlier empirical research (Jääsaari & Martikainen 1991) suggests, however, that the political views of young people (in their study predominantly representatives of the "suburban generation") are not significantly different from those of the general population on average, even though their political interest is low, and they view the sphere of politics as contaminated with old-fashioned authoritarianism and pretension and thus distasteful.

In sum, the political generations in Finland can be presented as a set of five relatively distinct cohorts. These are listed in Figure 1, together with their approximate years of birth:

FIGURE 1. The political generations in Finland[4].

Generation	Year of Birth
The War Generation	1900–1919
The Generation of After-War Reconstruction and growth	1920–1934
The Generation of Great Transformation	1935–1951
The Suburban Generation	1952–1970
"the X-generation"	1971–

A genuinely intergenerational perspective is difficult to employ in social science research (Roos 1987, 153), as the effect of age and stage

of life are often indistinguishable from intergenerational differences. Furthermore, without panel data it is impossible to analyze changes in political orientations over time. Most recent empirical studies (Wass 2008) have, however, addressed this question with appropriate data and suggest that there are clear generational differences in voting activity. The general decline in voting turnout is partly – but not entirely – explained by generational replacement. Also life-cycle effects can be detected: the young assume more citizen responsibility alongside with other grown-up roles. Some of the following chapters concerning Finland in this book (Kouvo; Konttinen & Kouvo) will investigate the effects of membership in age groups coded to correspond to the above-noted generations on political orientation.

Class

For earlier generations, social class was a determining force in their lives. With the advent of the modern welfare state, and especially the increased educational opportunities in the post-war era, the life styles and ranges of choice earlier enjoyed exclusively by the upper classes have become attainable by the majority of members of Finnish society.

The income distribution of present-day Finland is remarkably equal by international comparison,[5] and the individual capital created by education and access to information is high. A strongly unequalizing factor, the cleavage between the employed and the unemployed, remains, however, a gloomy legacy of the economic recession of the 1990s.

The Finnish political system was for a long time based on a relatively stable stratification of society, including vertical as well as horizontal stratification. Typical, though by no means exceptional, for Finns has been that party support has been closely related to social class, professional status or the rural-urban divide. The other side of the coin is that parties have traditionally represented class interests, though these interests have become less clear-cut with the emergence and later dominance of the new middle class in society (Pesonen & Riihinen 2002).

The Centre Party has always relied on strong agrarian support, whereas the Social Democratic Party has traditionally derived most of its support from the working class. These two, traditionally based on mass membership, are losing their mass base as the new generation of citizens find the idea of "belonging" to a party alien. The National Coalition is the oldest and largest conservative middle-class party. Historically, the Centre Party and the Social Democrats have formed the core of most national coalition governments, but recently a "bourgeois" Centre Party – National Coalition combination and a wide-spectrum "rainbow" coalition government built around the Social Democratic Party – National Coalition axis, but excluding the Centre Party, have had considerable life spans, too.

On the municipal level, the collaboration between the Social Democratic Party and the National Coalition Party has historical roots. After the Second World War (1939-45) emphasis was put on maintaining political balance between the working class and conservatives in local politics. This was motivated and facilitated by the fact that these groups – earlier antagonistic due to the legacy of the bitter Civil War of 1918 – had joined forces to fight the Soviet Union in the Second World War. Especially in Finnish cities, where support for rural based Centre Party has been weaker than in the countryside, the union between the Social Democratic party and the National Coalition Party has a specific and commonly used name: "Brothers in Arms Axis" (Laine & Peltonen 2000). The "Brothers in Arms" coalition is one example of how generation structures political experience and political orientation, sometimes strongly enough to override class interests.

Gender

In most societies, the public and the political have traditionally been defined as "male" spheres of society, whereas the private and especially the home have been perceived as the appropriate domains for women. With the advance of gender equality, opportunities for both genders to realize themselves in all spheres of life have increased considerably,

but women still tend to be underrepresented in political life and in positions of power.

In Finland, the traditional gender segregation of society never became extreme: the harsh realities of agrarian subsistence made it essential that men and women worked side by side, and the division of labor remained relatively flexible. This innate relative gender equality was both illustrated and reinforced by the fact that general suffrage was granted in 1906, making Finland one of the first countries in the world to do so. At that time most of the male population also became eligible to vote for the first time as well, so the majority of the population – male and female – began a new era of political citizenship on an equal footing.

The next breakthroughs for Finnish women in the political arena were – ironically – the Second World War and the improvements in welfare of the late 1960s and early '70s. During the war, women of the home front bore the main responsibility for many "male" duties, and old gender boundaries were questioned. Political parties turned to women, many of whom had remained politically uncommitted even after gaining suffrage, for additional support. Women became more active voters, though they held only 12% of the seats in Parliament immediately after the war (Kuusipalo 1989). The Great Transformation of the 1960s and '70s brought more opportunities for education, employment and child care to women as well as new advances in consciously feminist thinking as well as a significant liberal shift in attitudes related to women's role in society.

Although women have since the mid-1980s voted more frequently than men in both local and national elections, Finnish political representatives are still predominantly men. Currently, 42% of the Members of Parliament are women, the figure being the all-time high, and in the Municipal Council elections of 2008 40% of the candidates and 41% of the elected Council members were women[6].

In terms of individual resources relevant for political participation, the picture is fragmented: in older generations, men tend to be better educated than women, but the differences are disappearing, since

among the youngest generations women are slightly better educated than men. As of 2007, the proportion of women of the After-war and Great Transformation Generations participating in the work force was equal to that of men, approximately 80%, and for the younger generations the lower employment levels for women are partly due to women being more likely to take parental leaves, but also increasingly to the longer time women spend on education. Despite trends toward equality in the workplace, the average income of women remains 15-20 % smaller than that of men.

Civic Mind and Good Citizens -- Perspectives

In this volume, Annamari Konttinen and Antti Kouvo examine the political orientations of Finns. Finnish citizens' political orientations are in this study viewed in the context of political culture, "an entity of knowledge, beliefs and assessments inherited from generation to generation". The findings are placed in comparative context by analyzing the relevant portions of the entire ISSP 2004 data.

An important finding is that even when several possible determinants were taken into account, the sense of political alienation is strongest among those who have least both financial and human capital. Simultaneously, the better resourced citizens are much more likely to be allegiant citizens with high levels of political trust and efficacy. These results suggest that those who lack both financial and educational resources do not expect much of either political system or themselves as political citizens.

In his chapter, Harri Melin examines the civic mind and the nature of Finnish democracy from the perspective of legitimacy. The results, quite intuitively, indicate that when government authorities treat everybody equally, and when politicians take into account the views of citizens, and when citizens have fair opportunities to participate, the legitimacy increases.

In the ISSP survey, dimensions of civic mind were measured by several items. First, how the respondents saw the importance of people's rights in a democracy. The second set of questions dealt with the role of political parties and referendums. Thirdly, the respondents were asked to evaluate how well the democracy works in their country today, ten years ago and ten years from now. The last item dealt with views regarding the political system of the respondents' country.

In international comparisons, Finland belongs to highly functional parliamentary democracies, the Nordic welfare state model, social corporatist countries and the least corrupt countries in the world. The image that the respondents have of their country in the Finnish ISSP survey on citizenship is, however, more critical. The respondents believe that the Finnish political system does not encourage people to take initiative in political matters, that too many politicians act only in order to gain personal benefit, and that there are no real choices between the political parties.

Martti Siisiäinen's chapter Differentia Specifica of Voluntary Organizing in Finland conducts a general analysis of voluntary organizing in Finland in a comparative perspective. Registered voluntary associations have played an exceptionally important role in Finnish society, for historical and social reasons. Indeed, there still are exceptionally many associations in Finland relative to the size of population; Finns have many association memberships, and collective action is, probably in a unique way, channelled into voluntary associations and because there are less real alternatives to associations.

Associations should be studied in their social and historical environment and as parts of the totality of political system and culture. Associations and networks should also be weighted relative to other fields in actors' lives.

Antti Kouvo notes in his chapter Missing Link between Trust and Participation? A Country Comparison that possible benefits of associations have puzzled scholars of the sources and mechanisms of social capital. The reciprocal relationship between trust and civic engagement, the so-called Tocquevillean model has been an often-presented supposi-

tion in the social capital literature. Besides indicating the vitality of civil society in general, associations are believed to bring about a multitude of possible beneficial outcomes such as bringing together people from different backgrounds, enhancing trust in others and in public institutions and thus supporting political involvement and awareness.

The analyses show that the relationship between association membership and generalized trust varies to a great degree between different countries. Results also confirm the previously known fact that at the individual level this relationship may be relatively weak. However, institutional confidence seems to predict generalized trust well in almost all countries in the sample. The mechanism through which associations promote generalized trust in society is situated between macro and micro levels of society. Even when controlling for institutional trust, living in a nation with dense associational network seems to increase the likeliness of trust for fellow citizens.

In his chapter, Raimo Blom studies Divergent Citizenship by investigating different conceptions of citizenship. The ISSP survey included a set of questions concerning the respondents' perceptions of good citizenship.

The main result is that there is a relatively clear cluster of Nordic countries that share perceptions of good citizenship. The analysis of political citizenship, which is also the most important dimension of the 'good citizen', results in a tight group of Nordic countries in connection with Social citizenship. The other two analyses that combine the study of Political citizenship with that of Law-abiding citizenship, and Political citizenship with Participation, result in an even larger gathering of countries around the Nordic focus.

All in all, the results reveal many differences between countries with different welfare regimes. However, much depends on the criteria of citizenship. From the European point of view, and especially in the Nordic countries, a critical question is the low perceived importance of Social citizenship and helping people worse off. The EU countries are weaker in Social citizenship that the non-EU countries, and in the Nordic countries, the situation is worse than in the other EU countries.

Mikko Lagerspetz investigates some of the ways in which specificities of Post-Communism can be thought of being revealed by an international comparison of the ISSP 2004 survey results, and also presents some interesting paradoxes. Despite democratisation, citizens of post-communist countries continue to distrust their state and the new democratic institutions. They see civil disobedience as an important democratic right; this parallels the importance that the "dissidents" and revolutionary movements of the 1980s attributed to direct civic participation. At the same time, relatively few people do in fact involve in such activities, at least less than in West Europe; and the idea of a pluralist society in which different interests can be expressed still gains less acceptance than it does in the West. Explanations to these phenomena are manifold and related both to history, to the present social situation, and to global trends.

A multitude of studies on different forms of participation, networks, social movements and associations as well as various aspects of social capital, attitudes and values have appeared during the boom that started in the 1990s. The chapters in this book contribute to this research tradition by providing an extensive portrait of citizenship covering phenomena such as citizens' notion of the significance of citizenship and the characteristics of a "good citizen", trust of political institutions and the functioning of the entire democratic system, as well as a variety of forms of social and political participation and association activity.

Globalization has brought about changes in the notion of citizenship: the nation state, while still is an important locus of political identity, has lost some of its significance as the guarantor of citizen rights. These ideas resonate with the work of a number of contemporary writers such as Heater on 'world citizenship', Falk and Urry on 'global citizenship', Soysal on 'post-national citizenship', and Kaldor and Keane on 'global civil society' in that they see identifications, networking and mobility that crosses national borders as a force that is permanently going to change the way we conceptualize citizenship.

Overcoming the dualism of nation-based or global citizenship and seeing alternative notions of belonging, and of exercising rights and obligations is a remarkable challenge both for theoretical and empirical social research.

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Endnotes

1. ISSP is an annual cross-national survey program with 45 member countries. The theme for 2004 survey was Citizenship. For more detailed information about the data, see Appendix 2.
2. This was early even compared to the other Scandinavian countries. For example, Denmark granted universal suffrage in 1918, and Sweden in 1921.
3. The labeling of the generations in this section relies on Roos' (1987) presentation.
4. Adapted from Roos 1987.
5. Measured by Gini-coefficient, a common indicator of income inequality reflecting the distribution of income throughout the population, Finland achieved a very low .23 in 1995, and 0.25 in 2000. Sweden, known for great equity, had a Gini-coefficient of 0.22, and the other Scandinavian countries slightly higher. Most European countries range from .25 to .35, while for the US it is .36.
6. Election statistics available on the Statistics Finland www-page: www.tilastokeskus.fi.

Political Orientations and Active Citizenship in Finland[1]

Annamari Konttinen & Antti Kouvo

Political Orientation

This chapter examines the political orientations of Finns as defined by the combination of the degree of institutional trust and feeling of political efficacy experienced by our respondents. Finnish citizens' political orientations are in this study viewed in the context of political culture, "an entity of knowledge, beliefs and assessments inherited from generation to generation" (Almond & Verba 1989). We also pay, however, close attention to the *dis*continuities in the ways political orientation is handed down from one generation to the other by studying differences between generations. In addition, we investigate potential gender differences and socioeconomic stratification effects in political orientation. More specifically, we study how different social characteristics – generation, education, income, employment and gender – are related to political orientation types.

In post-industrial societies, the traditional foundations for collaboration and social solidarity, common ideologies and shared values no longer offer sufficient guidelines for increasingly complex decision-making situations that individuals are facing (Giddens 1991; Misztal 1996). In circumstances of uncertainty and risk, the notion of trust as a medium of interaction between the individual and complex systems has

1. The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution by Riley Dunlap in drafting an earlier version of this chapter.

re-entered sociological discussion. Trust, together with communication and shared meanings, is also a key component of social capital, an essential prerequisite for the functioning of democracy, good governance, and economic performance (Putnam 1993; 2000; Stolle 2003).

High levels of social capital have been associated with types of political orientation that promote active civil society, political participation and a sense of belonging in society. At the same time, changing patterns of political participation, especially the decline in voting turnout have been observed with concern. It is becoming increasingly clear that a sense of political alienation is growing, and that this alienation is a fundamentally multi-dimensional phenomenon.

This shift in citizens' political orientations has been empirically studied by Inglehart (1999a), among others, who suggests that despite the decline in the traditional ways of political participation such as voting, *elite challenging forms of participation* are becoming more common. Underlying this trend is a multifaceted transformation of the political sphere: in industrial societies the support for political authorities is generally declining, while the support for democratic regimes per se is rising.

The original conceptualization of this trend is formulated by Easton and Dennis as the so called *two-part paradigm* that distinguishes between two types of political support: *diffuse support*, or general trust and confidence in a political system and *specific support* based on the evaluation of particular politicians and policies (Fansworth 2001; Inglehart 1999a; Easton and Dennis 1969). Conversely, the incongruences might work the other way around: trust may be vested in persons, but distrust felt for the institutions that they represent (Sztompka 1999, 173).

While the concept of political trust involves perceptions of the political system's and authorities' responsiveness to the public's interests and demands, or the system's *output*, the concept of *efficacy* attempts to complete the picture by directing attention to the *input*: individual's sense of competence in influencing the political system (Reef & Knoke 1999, 414). Together, these two represent crucial dimensions of political orientation of individual citizens.

Political Trust

Trust is a crucial component of social capital, facilitating the smooth functioning of society in the form of horizontal trust, i.e. the trust people feel towards one another, and vertical trust, the trust people extend to public institutions (Sztompka 1999, 15). Inglehart (1990; 1999b) emphasizes the cross-culturally observable correlation between the presence of generalized trust and the quality of life and subjective well being at the individual level as well as economic development and the stability of democracy at the general level.

The general level of trust felt and expressed in a given society, the trust culture, varies according to factors like normative coherence, the stability of the social order, and the transparency of social organization. The feeling of trust is, however, unevenly distributed among different segments of society. (Sztompka 1999, 122-123 and 171.)

Level of vertical trust (in this case, more particularly political trust) was in the ISSP 2004 questionnaire measured by asking respondents to indicate whether they felt they could "most of the time trust people in the government to do what is right", and by asking whether they thought that "most politicians are in politics only for what they can get out of it personally" (Table 1). These represent two aspects of political trust, i.e. trust in government and the political regime (Citrin & Muste 1999, 465-466), and they also closely relate to notions of diffuse support in the political system (here conceptualized as "people in the government") and specific support in politicians as individuals. In addition to these two questions we included an approximate to vertical trust through items concerning the respondents' view of the level of honesty of last national elections[1] and personal opinion of public service involvement in corruption[2]. Though there was no question directly asking the level of trust in authorities, these both indicate respondents' view of the trustworthiness of the political system and public authorities. As a scale measuring vertical trust, the four items achieved together a fairly high level of reliability (Cronbach's α = 0,622).

Table 1. Levels of political trust (percentages)

% (N)	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	No answer
Trust in people in government	3,7	39,8	28,5	18,4	3,8	5,8
Politicians in politics only for personal profit	18,3	31,3	24,5	17,4	1,5	7,0
	Very honest	Somewhat honest	Neither honest or dishonest	Somewhat dishonest	Very dishonest	No answer
Last national elections: level of honesty	67,3	23,7	3,5	,3	,5	4,8
	Hardly anyone is involved	A small number of people are involved	A moderate number of people are involved	A lot of people are involved	Almost everyone is involved	No answer
Public service involvement in corruption	15,5	41,2	19,8	5,2	1,1	17,2

The following figures compare some aspects of national trust cultures while presenting frequency distributions of responses to questions related to political trust. In general, the Nordic countries seem to have a strong trust culture, indicated by agreement with the first statement "most of the time we can trust people in the government to do what is right" and disagreement with the second: "most politicians are in politics only for what they can get out of it personally". Top countries include Denmark, Finland, Ireland (first statement) and Denmark, Norway, Netherlands (second statement). In general, the Nordic average indicated stronger trust culture than total ISSP 2004, total EU or total non-EU. Differences between the Total ISSP, EU, and Non-EU countries are markedly small.



Figure 1. Trust in people in government. ISSP comparison

Other studies conducted roughly at the same period with ISSP 2004 (Konttinen et al. 2003; Yhdyskuntatutkimus 2001, 35) also report low levels of trust in political institutions in Finland, even when compared with other social institutions. For example, according to the Good Government survey, the most trusted social institutions are the police, the Defense Forces and the educational system: 74.3%, 66.8% and 65.3% of citizens, respectively, express "very much" or "quite a bit" of trust in these institutions. The least trusted are the political parties (8.3% trust them "very much" or "quite a bit"), the parliament (23.6%) and major companies (28.4%). It is especially noteworthy that trust toward



Figure 2. Politicians in politics only for personal profit. ISSP comparison

the parliament, the "most obvious symbol of democracy" (Sztompka 1999, 181), is low compared to that for the other institutions, and lukewarm at best: only 1.8 percent express "very much" trust in the elected parliament. (Konttinen et al. 2003.)

There are several possible explanations, both long-term and short-term by nature, for the phenomenon. A long-term explanation points to the special characteristics of Finland in terms of her political culture. Nousiainen (1998, 23-26) has interpreted current Finnish political culture as being rather individualistic and critical towards authorities. This could be seen as a backlash after a long period of a relatively (in Nordic perspective) hierarchical and authoritarian political culture.

On the other hand, a shorter-term explanation might be found in the aftermath of a severe economic recession of the 1990's. In addition to the impacts of far-reaching cutbacks in the welfare sector during the recession, the unemployment rate was still on a relatively high level when the data was collected (8.8 % in 2004 [3]). The inability of politicians to solve these critical social problems has likely created distrust in political authorities (Blomberg & al. 2002; Newton 2001, 209-210; Mattila & Sänkiaho 2005; Bäck & Kestilä 2008).

The possibility of uneven distribution of the experiences on political trust in different demographic groups poses a major challenge for active citizenship. In addition to strengthening the trust culture, questions concerning the position of different demographic groups are crucial for the cohesion of society.

From the results of the analysis of variance for Finland (presented in Table 2), it can be seen that explaining variation in political trust in Finland is difficult. In the first models, age has a very significant effect as the youngest age group stands out as having the highest levels of trust while the second and third age groups (earlier conceptualized as the Generation of Great Transformation and Generation of After-War Reconstruction and Growth; the Introduction to this volume) express clearly lower levels of trust. The oldest age group (earlier conceptualized as the War-Generation and set as a reference group) expresses the lowest levels of trust. However, when we take into account the impact of other determinants, only the membership in the youngest age group remains as an almost significant predictor of political trust.

Gender has little effect on political trust, as there are no significant gender differences in any of the models. Of all predictors of political trust, education stands out as the most clearly significant. It also maintains its significance, even when economic and political variables are entered. The effect of education is perfectly monotonous: the higher educated the respondent, the more likely to express high levels of political trust. Employment status is significantly related to political trust, with the retired having very significantly lower levels of trust than do the other classes. Interestingly, the level of political

Table 2. Analysis of variance predicting political trust by F-values (in bold) and parameter estimates (β)[4].

	Main effects	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Age	**12.299*** **	**12.299*** **	**12.298*** **	**9.187*** **	**2.828***	**2.219**	**3.777***
-33	1.97***	1.97***	1.97***	1.56***	.95*	.90	1.22*
34-52	1.21**	1.21**	1.20**	.80*	.41	.42	.70
53-69	1.08**	1.08**	1.08**	.76*	.579	.30	.40
70-	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
Gender	**0.002**		**.035**	**.269**	**.377**	**1.395**	**1.650**
Male	0.01		.03	.08	.09	.19	.20
Female	(a)		(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
Education	**26.970*** **			**22.709*** **	**21.750*** **	**10.735*** **	**10.214*** **
Primary	-1.78***			-1.64***	-1.62***	-1.30***	-1.27***
Secondary	-.94***			-.95***	-.92***	-.64**	-.63**
Tertiary	(a)			(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
Employment	**9.168*** **				**2.667***	**1.428**	**1.352**
Out of mkt.	.04				.02	.47	.35
Retired	-.81***				-.44	-.07	-.10
Student	.83**				.64*	.75*	.75*
Unemployed	-.68				-.55	.01	.02
Employed	(a)				(a)	(a)	(a)
Income (OECD)	**3.518** **					**2.289**	**2.309**
1. Lowest quintile	-.88***					-.88**	-.87**
2.	-.64**					-.49	-.53*
3.	-.56*					-.37	-.40
4.	-.30					-.30	-.40
5. Highest	(a)					(a)	(a)
Party preference	**8.320*** **						**7.283*** **
No answer	-.98***						-.71**
Would not vote	-2.21***						-1.78***
Other party	-.70*						-.19
Green League	-.02						-.30
Left Alliance	-1.17**						-.57
SDP	-.37						.11
Center	-.03						.62*
National Coalition	(a)						(a)
Adjusted R Squared		.032	.031	.071	.077	.065	.112

* p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001; (a) = set to zero as a reference class.

trust among students is clearly the highest. It is also the only predictor whose significance does not disappear when the economic and political variables are entered in Models 5 and 6. Income[5] is weakly related to political trust. The analysis of all socioeconomic variables suggests that in general, the better-resourced members of Finnish society tend to experience higher levels of political trust.

Party affiliation is a highly significant predictor of political trust, although the effect is mostly produced by the difference between non-affiliated ("would not vote" and "no answer") and affiliated respondents. Those identifying with the main government party at the time, Centre, show slightly higher levels of political trust than others. To a non-significant extent, the same concerns the SDP, another member of the coalition government at the time of the survey. Since the Greens and Left Alliance have traditionally been highly critical of several institutions in Finnish society, their lower levels of institutional trust is understandable.

In general, explaining variation in levels of political trust among Finnish citizens is difficult. Although a majority of the variables employed in Table 2 are important predictors of institutional trust when considered individually, when all of the variables are studied together in Model 6, only age, education and the political variables remain significant. Furthermore, all of the variables combined explain only 11 percent of the variance in trust.

The hypothesis presented by Sztompka that the well-resourced members of society enjoy higher levels of trust because of being more "protected" by their individual capital in the form of relative autonomy, wealth, social networks and professional expertise (Sztompka 1999, 171) is only partially addressed by the present analysis, as social networks and professional expertise are not included. It is noteworthy, though, that the elements of individual capital that are included have some relation to levels of political trust (cf. "Luke theorem") but that these relationships, except for education, lose most of their statistical significance when they are studied together with other factors.

Political Efficacy

The views presented above suggest that individual capital, at least to an extent, protects citizens from risks of unwarranted trust; but it is clear that in a complex system of interdependencies, more than individual resources is needed to make a civilized life possible. The notion of efficacy refers to the feeling that the individual can influence the political system when necessary. This sense of efficacy forms an essential foundation of political orientation practiced in everyday citizenship. In situations where the political system fails to respond to the individual's interests, feeling of efficacy becomes particularly important as it implies that there is a possibility of change to the unsatisfactory situation.

In measuring political efficacy, one of the most widely used scales is the ANES Political Efficacy Scale by Campbell, Gurin and Miller (1954). The ISSP 2004 survey used an abbreviated version of this scale. In the original scale, political efficacy was defined as "the feeling that political and social change is possible and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change" (Reef & Knoke 1999, 424). The original 5-item scale included two items measuring the perceived impact of voting, but these were not used in the ISSP 2004 survey. Here we followed the example of Agnello (1973), who employed the three non-voting items from the original ANES Political Efficacy Scale to form what he called an "index of powerlessness". Though we still make use of the original designation of political efficacy, dropping the voting-related items shifts the focus of the scale away from the *means* of bringing about social change and thus produces a scale that emphasizes the evaluation of the individual's political potency in general. Moreover, political scientists often distinguish between *external* and *internal* political efficacy. Internal efficacy refers to the requisite skills and resources to influence the political system and external efficacy to the perception that government institutions are responsive to citizen's attempts to exert political influence. (Borg 1995; Clarke & Acock 1989). Along with this classification, it is important to note that indicators used in our study are mostly measuring internal political efficacy.

However, internal efficacy is in two items understood in relation to responsiveness of governmental institutions and thus include also an external element.[6]

Table 3. Levels of political efficacy (percentages).

% (N)	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	No answer
People like me don't have any say in what the government does	23,8	28,2	18,7	21,3	3,6	4,4
I don't think the government cares much what people like me think	18,2	27,1	21,4	25,3	3,7	4,2
I think most people in Finland are better informed about politics and government than I am	8,3	20,6	26,1	29,8	7,4	7,8

Table 3 presents the items used in the efficacy scale and the distributions of responses to them from the Finnish sample. Of the three efficacy items used, the first two focus on the respondent's evaluation of institutional responsiveness to citizens like the respondent her-/himself. As expected, the statement "People like me don't have any say in what the government does" is strongly agreed with by Finns (52% either strongly agree or agree). Strongly disagreeing with the statement would border on lacking a realistic conception of political reality: individual citizens can seldom directly influence the day-to-day decision-making of government. The assessment of responsiveness of the government is quite negative, too: 45% of respondents either strongly agree or agree with the statement "I don't think the government cares much what people like me think", again a response indicating a low level of

efficacy. As the neutral categories receive a large number of responses in all questions, clearly more respondents agree than disagree with these statements. The third item addresses more directly the respondent's evaluation of his or her political competence (knowledge about politics, ability to understand important issues in politics) compared to their fellow citizens. The responses show more confidence: nearly 30% disagree and more than seven percent strongly disagree with the statement "I think most people in Finland are better informed about politics and government than I am".

Overall, these results suggest that Finns tend to have a low sense of efficacy, especially in terms of the evaluation of system responsiveness. Assessment of the respondent's own personal political competence is on the positive side for more than a third of respondents, so this low sense of efficacy is not necessary related to a poor political self-esteem. This discrepancy is especially interesting in a welfare society with a stable democratic legacy, well-developed educational system and free media: does this combination produce well-resourced but critical citizens? This also raises a question of whether it is possible to predict feelings of efficacy by variables traditionally associated with individual "political resources": education, employment and income? How about the impact of gender, still an unequalizing factor in society? And finally, is the feeling of efficacy related to the (other) political views (i.e. party preference) of the respondent? A summated rating scale was constructed from the three items measuring political efficacy to examine the distribution of efficacy among different segments of society. The scale achieves a satisfactory level of reliability ($\alpha = 0.672$).

TABLE 4. Analysis of variance predicting political efficacy by F-values (in bold) and parameter estimates (β)[7].

	Main effects	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Age	**5.853*** **	**5.853*** **	**5.862*** **	**2.435**	**1.728**	**.861**	**.856**
-33	1.44***	1.44***	1.44***	.97*	.12	.31	.54
34-52	1.61***	1.61***	1.61***	1.02**	.29	.45	.66
53-69	1.30***	1.30***	1.30***	.96*	.57	.58	.67
70-	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
Gender	**.07**		**.115**	**.665**	**.561**	**1.465**	**2.989**
Male	.04		.05	.12	.11	.20	.28
Female	(a)		(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
Education	**62.559*** **			**57.254*** **	**51.077*** **	**29.122*** **	**23.078*** **
Primary	-2.70***			-2.62***	-2.52***	-2.14***	-1.95***
Secondary	-1.52***			-1.51***	-1.46***	-1.23***	-1.08***
Tertiary	(a)			(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
Employment	**9.732*** **				**3.363** **	**1.395**	**1.437**
Out of mkt.	-.33				-.15	.16	.05
Retired	-1.22***				-.82*	-.38	-.45
Student	-.31				.31	.60	.53
Unemployed	-.62				-.31	-.03	-.05
Employed	(a)				(a)	(a)	(a)
Income (OECD)	**13.172*** **					**4.436** **	**3.707** **
1. Lowest quintile	-1.59***					-1.02***	-1.00***
2.	-1.25***					-.74**	-.70**
3.	-1.35***					-.92***	-.82**
4.	-.49					-.33	-.36
5. Highest	(a)					(a)	(a)
Party preference	**11.449*** **						**6.267*** **
No answer	-1.52***						-.79**
Would not vote	-2.41***						-1.74***
Other party	-.63						.05
Green League	.11						.26
Left Alliance	-.85*						.16
SDP	-1.05***						-.18
Center	-.78						.27
National Coalition	(a)						(a)
Adjusted R Squared		.012	.011	.098	.106	.110	.143

* p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001; (a) = set to zero as a reference class.

As is evident from the results of the three first models reported in Table 4, membership in an age group (earlier conceptualized as "generation") is a strong predictor of political efficacy. Younger citizens on average have higher levels of efficacy than do their older counterparts. The effect is the strongest in the second age group (34-52 years; the "Suburban generation"). Previous findings from Finland (e.g. Borg 1995) also confirm the existence of a link between age and efficacy. Young people feel themselves more efficacious than do older people. It is obvious that the phenomenon is at least partially related to the effect of education furthering political efficacy, as the younger respondents are on average better educated than their older counterparts. Indeed, when level of education is taken into account (models 3-6) the effect of age loses a lot of its significance.

An alternative explanation for age group differences can be found in the generation-specific processes of political socialization. For example, Finnish studies on voting turnout have shown that generation has an impact on voting behavior (Wass 2007). According to this view, older people who are used to participating collectively through political channels feel more readily deprived when those channels appear blocked than do their younger and more individualistically oriented counterparts. It might also be that negative perceptions of one's efficacy simply increase with age and experience, when people gradually become more aware of limitations of the responsiveness of the political system. Lastly, the results might also partially reflect the interconnectedness of feelings of efficacy and active participation in society through working life. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the significance of age as a predictor of efficacy loses significance when employment is added to the model.

In contrast, gender has a complex pattern of effect on efficacy. The effect of gender actually gradually becomes stronger when other variables are entered in the model. Though not statistically significant, the effect of gender is consistent in the sense that men consistently express stronger feelings of efficacy. Education has very significant effect on efficacy, as the better educated express higher levels of efficacy. The effect

is monotonous and remains highly significant when other variables are taken into account. Income has a very significant effect also: those with higher income tend to express stronger feelings of efficacy. The effect is not perfectly monotonous, however: the low middle income group (second quintile) express higher feelings of efficacy than the middle income group (third quintile).

Employment status is significantly related to efficacy at the outset, as the retired, the unemployed, students and those voluntarily out of the labor market all have lower levels of efficacy than those currently employed. The effect is the strongest for the retired. However, this variable has no significant effect on efficacy after the other demographic and socioeconomic variables, especially income, are taken into account. Overall, the results for education and income clearly indicate that political efficacy increases with individual capital, or political resources, as one would expect to be the case.

Party preference is very significantly related to political efficacy. The significant effect of party preference in Model 6 stems mainly from the difference between non-affiliated ("would not vote" and "no answer") and affiliated respondents. Of the non-significant effects, it is notable that those affiliated with the Greens with their strong grass root tradition feel higher levels of efficacy, whereas even the voters of the main government party Centre feel lower sense of efficacy than other affiliated respondents. The very significantly (for Social Democratic Party) and almost significantly (for Left Alliance) lower sense of efficacy of voters of the main opposition parties is understandable. However, the only difference that remains significant after the other factors are included in the model is the difference between affiliated and non-affiliated voters.

The overall results in Table 4 indicate that the socioeconomic and political variables are fairly good predictors of political efficacy, as indicated by the adjusted R square of .14. The socioeconomic variables of education and income remain at least significant predictors of efficacy when other variables are entered in the model — and in each case political efficacy increases with socioeconomic status as would be

expected. Also, income, education and employment status have a very significant effect when studied separately. In addition, party preference is very significantly related to efficacy when the other variables are taken into account.

International comparison of efficacy

When levels of efficacy are compared cross-nationally, Japan shows, rather surprisingly, top results in terms of evaluation of government responsiveness, followed by the Nordic Countries. The statement presented in Figure 3 read: "People like me don't have any say in what the government does". Strong disagreement with this statement is not logically necessary for a positive evaluation of system responsiveness: individual citizens can seldom expect to directly influence the decision-making of government. Non-EU countries rate higher than EU countries in this respect, partly because of the strong influence of Japan. Nordic countries as a group are positioned between them. Figure 4 presents responses to another statement related to government responsiveness: "I don't think the government cares much what people like me think". Here, again, disagreement shows high level of efficacy, and the results are very similar with Figure 3 with the exception of Japan standing out less, and the Nordic countries faring even better in country group comparison next to EU countries and non-EU countries.

Figure 3. Evaluation of Government responsiveness #1. ISSP comparison FIG 36b



When evaluating their own personal competence in terms of understanding important political issues[8], respondents in Denmark and the US rate the highest. Slightly surprisingly, Ireland and Spain do very well, too. Country groups are very equal in this respect.

Despite high levels of institutional trust, the Finns show lower levels of interpersonal trust and political efficacy than any other Nordic country. This challenges the assumption of a united Nordic political

Figure 4. Evaluation of Government responsiveness #2. ISSP comparison Fig. 36c



culture. Explanation cannot be found in differences in level of education, welfare system or stability of democracy as there are very small differences in these respects among the Nordic countries. This leads one to conclude that there is an element of political culture not immediately tied to the functioning of central institutions in any given society.

Figure 5. Evaluation of personal political competence. ISSP comparison



Political orientation types

Political efficacy and trust can also be seen as two conceptually orthogonal dimensions of political orientation as J.M. Paige (1971) suggested in his study of riot participation. Paige distinguished four types of political orientation based on levels of trust and efficacy, and the typology he developed is shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6. A typology of political orientations by J.M. Paige

Trust	Efficacy	
	Low	High
Low	Alienated	Dissident
High	Subordinate	Allegiant

Paige (1971) labeled the high trust – high efficacy orientation "*allegiant*", to describe active supporters of the existing political structure who trust that the government will be run in their best interests and that they can influence it when necessary. The low trust – low efficacy situation leads to an "*alienated*" orientation, likely to discourage political participation even when significant discontent might be felt. The high trust – low efficacy combination also suggests passive adjustment, though this time via loyal and unquestioning "*subordinance*". Finally, having a high sense of political potency while at the same time feeling distrustful towards government produces, according to Paige, a "*dissident*" orientation. Subsequent studies (e.g. Sigelman & Feldman 1983) have shown that correlations between orientation types and levels of political participation that Paige suggested do, indeed, exist but that in international comparison they are relatively weak.

The measures employed in this study differ considerably from those of Paige, so some important modifications in the descriptions presented above are necessary. We use an efficacy scale that is less specific than the measure Paige used[9], one that is not completely independent from system responsiveness, a concept closely related to trust. For the purpose of mapping the political orientations of the general public, however, the items used here appear to have content validity. The applicability of the typology is, however, an empirical question.

Table 5 presents the frequency distributions of different political orientation types. The variables for the analysis are organized so that the higher the mean value is, the higher the level of political trust or political efficacy. Following Paige, the clusters constructed are identified as allegiant, alienated, subordinate and dissident political orientations.

From the table is possible to see that the sizes of the four categories differ significantly from one another. Notably, the alienated and allegiant groups are similar in size, and twice the size of subordinated and dissident groups.

Table 5. Alienated, subordinated, dissident and allegiant political orientations (number of cases and percentage of total)

		Political efficacy		
		Low	**High**	
Political trust	Low	alienated 318 33,3%	dissident 155 16,2%	473 49,5%
	High	subordinate 151 15,8%	allegiant 332 34,7%	483 50,5%
	Total	469 49,1%	487 50,9%	956 100,0%

Table 6. Predictors of political orientations. Logistic regression

	Alienated Expβ	Dissident Expβ	Subordinated Expβ	Allegiant Expβ
Age				
-33	.543	.491	1.553	3.231
34-52	.537	.636	1.181	3.357
53-69	.779	1.119	.719	2.168
70-	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
Gender				
Male	.946	.935	.854	1.235
Female	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
Education				
Primary	4.951***	1.016	1.526	.164***
Secondary	2.305**	.994	1.570	.451***
Tertiary	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
Employment				
Out of mkt.	.595	1.468	1.835	.819
Retired	.960	.822	1.680	.828
Student	.179	1.750	2.277*	1.573
Unemployed	.943	.761	.573	1.454
Employed	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
Income (OECD)				
1. Lowest quintile	2.629**	.958	.457*	.661
2.	1.507	1.172	.866	.693
3.	2.053**	1.146	.720	.565*
4.	1.441	1.169	.739	.804
5. Highest	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
Party affiliation				
No answer	1.566**	.768	1.152	.674
Would not vote	2.905***	1.201	.968	.204**
Other party	.871	1.369	1.151	.809
Green League	1.158	1.106	.513	1.168
Left Alliance	1.153	1.925	.716	.616
SDP	.938	.733	1.349	1.051
Center	.602	.975	.949	1.617
National Coalition	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
Nagelkerke Pseudo R^2	.153	.033	.061	.168

**p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001;(ns) =*p > 0.05; (a) = set ti one as a reference category.*

In table 6 are presented the results of multinomial logistic models (MLR) for each type of political orientation. The effects of the independent variable(s) in the models are presented with the odd ratios

(Exp b). The pseudo-coefficients of the explanation proportions of the models are also reported (Nagelkerke's Pseudo R^2). From the results we may see that the two most common groups of political orientation are also those that are most easily explained by background variables.

Table 7 shows that whereas belonging to dissident and subordinated groups is apparently something that is determined by factors not included in this analysis, the probability to belong to either allegiant or alienated group of political orientations is more dependent on the level of education and political activity. Passive voters with low education and income are much more likely to feel themselves politically alienated than active voters with high education and income. Correspondingly, those with tertiary education are nearly four times more likely to feel themselves politically allegiant compared to their fellow citizens with only primary education. Besides education, also any party affiliation seems to remarkably promote feelings of allegiance.

Overall, socio-economic factors such as education and income together with voting seem to have a great importance when explaining the membership in certain orientation category. A key finding is that the risk of political alienation (feelings of low political efficacy and low levels of institutional trust) seems to grow with low education, and correspondingly, the membership in the allegiant group with high feelings of both efficacy and trust is more common among those with higher education. Low income also increases the probability to be politically alienated, although compared to the highest income quintile, the lowest and third income quintiles are nearly identical in this respect. In the dissident and subordinate clusters the differences between different socio-economic groups are not as remarkable.

Overall, also age group seems to have a great importance when explaining the membership in certain orientation category, while education likely functions as an important mediating factor. A key finding is that the risk of political alienation (feelings of low political efficacy and low levels of institutional trust) seems to grow with age, and correspondingly, the membership in the allegiant group with high feelings of both efficacy and trust is the more common the younger the respondent is,

although the two youngest groups are nearly identical in this respect. In the dissident cluster the differences between age groups are not monotonous as the dissident political orientation is particularly low among the oldest and youngest generations. Subordinate orientation, however, (see Table 7) is most common among these groups.

Table 7. Political orientations by sociodemographic characteristics and support for political party

	Alienated	Dissident	Subordinated	Allegiant	Total
Age					
-33	25,6%	13,9%	19,8%	40,7%	100%
34-52	32,3%	15,7%	15,2%	36,8%	100%
53-69	39,7%	19,5%	11,4%	29,4%	100%
70-	54,3%	14,3%	22,9%	8,6%	100%
Gender					
Male	35,4%	14,6%	14,8%	35,2%	100%
Female	30,9%	18,1%	16,9%	34,1%	100%
Education					
Primary	51,8%	17,1%	15,9%	15,2%	100%
Secondary	34,0%	15,6%	17,4%	33,0%	100%
Tertiary	15,3%	15,8%	11,5%	57,4%	100%
Employment					
Out of mkt.	27,4%	21,9%	21,9%	28,8%	100%
Retired	46,9%	17,3%	15,4%	20,4%	100%
Student	13,5%	14,6%	27,1%	44,8%	100%
Unemployed	40,8%	18,4%	8,2%	32,7%	100%
Employed	32,9%	15,2%	14,0%	37,9%	100%
Income (OECD)					
1. Lowest quintile	38,7%	15,3%	13,9%	32,1%	100%
2.	31,4%	15,7%	19,6%	33,3%	100%
3.	39,9%	15,3%	16,0%	28,8%	100%
4.	27,7%	15,3%	14,7%	42,4%	100%
5. Highest	21,7%	14,7%	16,8%	46,7%	100%
Party affiliation					
No answer	40,2%	13,4%	18,2%	28,2%	100%
Would not vote	56,0%	14,0%	16,0%	14,0%	100%
Other party	34,2%	21,9%	15,1%	28,8%	100%
Green League	22,5%	18,0%	11,7%	47,7%	100%
Left Alliance	37,0%	23,9%	10,9%	28,3%	100%
SDP	32,7%	14,2%	19,8%	33,3%	100%
Center	31,1%	14,9%	14,2%	39,9%	100%
National Coalition	24,7%	17,7%	15,2%	42,4%	100%

Summary

This chapter set out to examine the political orientations of Finns by analyzing the Finnish portion of the ISSP 2004 survey data. This was carried out by studying the levels of political trust and feelings of political efficacy among the respondents, focusing especially on differences between different segments of the population in this regard. The findings were placed in comparative context by analyzing the relevant portions of the entire ISSP 2004 data.

The results of the analysis of variance show that explaining variation in political trust is difficult. Age has a significant effect, although after the other variables are taken into account only the youngest cohort stands out as having higher levels of trust. It is noteworthy, though, that the elements of individual capital that are examined have very little relationship to levels of institutional trust, except for education. Trust (or distrust) seems to be a relatively equal social entity in Finnish society.

The results also suggest that Finns tend to have a low sense of political efficacy, regardless of what particular aspect of efficacy is measured: the evaluation of system responsiveness or assessment of the respondent's own personal political competence. Socioeconomic variables such as education and income are significant predictors of efficacy, and in each case, political efficacy increases with socioeconomic status as expected. In addition, party identification is significantly related to efficacy as well but this is produced by the difference between those having a party preference and those not having one or not intending to vote.

Finally, four types of political orientation were distinguished in the data, following a typology by Jeffery Paige. The largest categories represent the alienated and allegiant orientations. The implication of this is that low trust– high efficacy combinations or high trust – low efficacy combinations are relatively rare among Finnish citizens. An important finding is that even when several possible determinants were taken into account, the sense of political alienation is strongest among those who have least both financial and human capital. Simultaneously, the better

resourced citizens are much more likely to be allegiant citizens with-high levels of political trust and efficacy. Even though public concern for the political passivity of, for example younger generations, may be well founded in certain specific situations, our results suggest that those who lack both financial and educational resources do not expect much of either political system or themselves as political citizens.

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Endnotes

1. "Thinking of the last national election in Finland, how honest was it regarding the counting and reporting of votes?"
2. "How widespread is corruption in the public service in Finland?"
3. According to Statistics Finland (http://www.stat.fi/tup/maanum/taulukot.html) the standardised unemployment rates differed crucially within the EU in the year 2004. Compared to the mean unemployment within the EU (EU-15: 8,1%; EU-25: 9,0%), Finland's unemployment rate was average. In the Nordic context, however, Finland fared rather poorly. The unemployment rate for Denmark was 5.6 %, and for Sweden 5.5 %. In comparison, the figures for the US and Japan, respectively, were within the "Nordic" range: 5.5% and 4.7%
4. The tables (2 and 4) are based on the same multivariate analysis. Table 4 reports the parameter estimates (β) when the dependent variable is political efficacy and table 2 when the dependent variable is trust. The models are constructed in a similar fashion.
5. Income is self-reported net-income of a household divided by the equivalence scale taking into account the number of adults and children in the household. We used the so-called OECD scale with factors 1 for the first adult, 0.7 for each additional adult and 0.5 for each child. As an example, the net-income of family with two adults and two children is divided by 2.7. The formula used is $a / (b+c)$ in which a = self-reported net-income, b = equivalence factor for adults, and c = equivalence factor for children.
6. See for example Clarke & Acock 1988, 555.
7. The tables (2 and 4) are based on the same multivariate analysis. Table 4 reports the parameter estimates (β) when the dependent variable is political efficacy and table 2 when the dependent variable is trust. The models are constructed in a similar fashion.
8. Note that this measure of personal political competence is different from the one presented in Table 3 and used for the summated rating scale in Table 4.
9. In fact he, frustrated with the lack of conceptual independence of the existing "efficacy" scales from "trust", stripped the measure of efficacy to the bare minimum, and ended up measuring the level of political knowledge of his respondents to approximate "efficacy" (Paige 1971, 814-815).

Civic Mind and the Legitimacy of Finnish Democracy

Harri Melin

In this chapter, I shall analyse the civic mind and the nature of Finnish democracy from the perspective of legitimacy. Social scientists have been discussing the legitimacy of political power since the days of Max Weber (1978). According to Claus Offe (1984, 130), the maintenance of legitimacy is still one of the main tasks of modern democracies.

The concept of civic mind is very diffuse. It covers a wide range of issues from culture to participation. When social scientists talk about civic mind, theoretical thinking dates back to the 1960s and to a classical study by Almond and Verba (1963). The concept of civic mind refers to issues related to communities' relations and civic action. It covers concepts such as public meetings, elections, the underprivileged, communities on the web and churches, among others. In the United States, the concept of civic mind refers, not only to voluntary associations and political action, but business, as well. A wide variety of economic activity is focused around civic mind, mainly related to legal issues and the media.

The concept of civic mind has not been widely explored in the literature. One can say that it is an aspect of the analysis of citizenship. Civic mind is related to citizenship duties and citizenship rights. For this purpose we may define civic mind as combination of civic skills (active participation) and civic virtues (tolerance, interest in politics etc.) (e.g. Warren 2000)

Civic mind is closely connected with civic competence, civic culture (Almond and Verba 1963), civic experience (Schudson 2006) and civic participation (Putnam 2000). In their classical study, Almond and Verba compared the civic competence in five countries. They were interested in people's subjective evaluations of the extent of their possibilities to influence political decisions. One of the major findings in the project was that civic competence increases along with the increase of political activity. In the 70´s, the elements of political action were revisited by a new comparative project. According to Almond and Verba, civic culture is pluralistic, and "based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that [permits] change but [moderates] it". (Almond & Verba 1963, 8. See also Barnes and Kaase 1979; Pesonen & Sänkiaho 1979).

Civic Mind

In the ISSP survey, civic mind was measured by several questions. First, how the respondents saw the importance of people's rights in a democracy. This theme was analysed with several questions, such as: should all citizens have an adequate standard of living, should government authorities respect and protect the rights of minorities, should government authorities treat everybody equally regardless of their position in society, and should politicians take into account the views of citizens before making decisions? The second set of questions dealt with the role of political parties and referendums: political parties should encourage people to become active in politics, political parties do not give voters real policy choices, referendums are a good way to decide important political questions. Thirdly, the respondents were asked to evaluate how well the democracy works in their country today, ten years ago and ten years from now. The last item dealt with views regarding the political system of the respondents' country.

Equal opportunities and material well-being are important components in democracy. It is extremely difficult to build democracy

without certain economic preconditions. In the European context, it is widely accepted that an adequate standard of living is also an important democratic right. This kind of an assumption is also dominant in the ISSP 2004 survey on citizenship.

A clear majority of all the respondents find that, in democracy, all citizens should have an adequate standard of living. More than two out of three rate it as very important. The figure is highest in Norway (74 per cent). There are only a few deviations. The figures are lower in Japan

Figure 1. All citizens have an adequate standard of living*.



*There are different opinions about people's rights in a democracy. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it: That all citizens have an adequate standard of living.

(51 per cent), Germany (55 per cent) and the Netherlands (56 per cent). Finland represents the ISSP average in all aspects but one. None of the respondents found adequate standard of living entirely unimportant.

Minority rights are becoming an increasingly important social and political issue, but what do we mean when we talk about minorities? In the political context, minorities are most often understood as ethnic or religious minorities. However, today, we are faced with a world of minorities claiming their rights. In minority issues, Finland is an interesting example because it has no minority problems, and, yet, the political debate on minorities is lively. Historically, the Swedish speaking minority has been the only real minority in Finland. At the end of the year 2007 there were about 289 600 Swedish-speaking Finns, that is 5.46 % of the total population. International comparisons have shown that there is only one minority in the world that has no complaints about their situation and that is the Swedish-speaking Finns. More recent minority debates often deal with immigrants, Russians being the most important group, and with sexual minorities (gays and lesbians). Today there are some 40 000 people of Russian origin living in Finland. Russian minority has been growing steadily, there are two main causes: marriages and work related mobility.

It may be not fully correct to say that Finland has no minority problems, but the scope has been, at least this far, quite limited. The amount of immigrants has increased dramatically in Finland. At the beginning of the 90´s there were only 26 000 foreigners in the country and last year the figure was 143 000. In less than 20 years the figure has increased more than seven times. In spite of rapid growth, only 2.6 % of the total population are of foreign origin. This far immigrant population has not been any issue. We have two ethnic minorities Roma people and Saame people. There are about 10 000 Roma people and about 8 000 Sami people in the country. Both of these minorities are integrated into the Finnish society.

From the perspective of civil society minorities in Finland do not make any big issue. Rights of Swedish-speaking Finns and Sami people are protected by laws. Both groups have their own organizations,

Swedish speakers have their own political party. What come to other minorities their social organisation are quite weak. It is more ore less in the process of making. In the future we may have more active civil society in this respect.

In international comparison Finnish people place less emphasis on minority rights than the ISSP countries in average. Only a half of

Figure 2. Government authorities respect and protect the rights of minorities*.



*There are different opinions about people's rights in a democracy. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it: That government authorities respect and protect the rights of minorities.

the respondents consider them very important. This is understandable because of reasons mentioned above.

Close to 60 per cent of all the ISSP respondents find it very important that the government authorities respect and protect the minorities' rights and close to 90 per cent find it important. Only one per cent finds the question unimportant.

The variation is considerably greater here than in the previous question. The Spanish, only one per cent, and Portuguese, about 68 per cent, respondents place more emphasis on minority rights than the other countries. Danish people are in the third place. The figure is lowest in Japan, where only 15 per cent find it important that the government should respect and protect the rights of minorities.

The Netherlands is an interesting case. We have learnt that the Netherlands is "the" tolerant society, in which minority rights are highly valued, as well as protected. The figures were the lowest in Europe. The result may partially be explained by the ethnic disputes in the country at the time when the survey was conducted.

The very idea of citizenship is a product of modern capitalism. The French revolution and the declaration of independence of the USA stressed that all people should have equal political rights and they should be treated equally regardless of their position in society. Since then, all capitalist democracies have agreed with this idea. There is a global understanding that government authorities should treat all citizens equally.

This idea is shared by the vast majority of respondents in all countries that participated in the ISSP 2004 survey on citizenship. Only three people out of 100 find the issue unimportant, while three quarters consider it very important. There is some variation between the countries. The figures are highest in Sweden (85 per cent very important) and in the USA (82 per cent) and lowest in Japan (60 per cent very important) and in Great Britain (63 per cent). In general, the idea of equal treatment is widely accepted in the Nordic countries. Among the Nordic countries, the figures were lowest in Finland.

It is said that political parties are transmitting the interests of different social forces. Political parties represent their members and

Figure 3. Government authorities treat everybody equally regardless of their position in society (Q35c)*.



*There are different opinions about people's rights in a democracy. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it: That government authorities treat everybody equally regardless of their position in society.

supporters in the governmental decision-making processes. In these processes, politicians are the most important actors, and they are provided with the mandate to act by the citizens. This kind of classical thinking also implies that politicians should very carefully take into account their supporters' views before making any political decisions. Politicians should follow the "voice" of the people. However, during

Figure 4. Politicians take into account the views of citizens before making decisions*.



*There are different opinions about people's rights in a democracy. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it: That politicians take into account the views of citizens before making decisions.

the past few decades, this line of thinking has been heavily criticised. Nowadays, it is said that there is a growing distance between the electorate and the decision makers.

More than two thirds of all respondents find it highly important that the politicians take into account the views of the citizens before making decisions. Again, only three per cent consider it unimpor-

tant. The variation between the countries is small. The figure "very important" is highest in Japan and in the USA, 75 per cent in both countries and lowest in Finland (58 per cent). Combining the positive categories, the difference between the countries disappears entirely. We may conclude that all around the world people share the idea that, in a democratic society, politicians should take into account the views of the citizens before making decisions.

In modern democracies, citizens participate in public decision-making by voting. We vote in local and general elections. After the elections, city councils and parliaments are responsible for the actual decision-making. During the past 15 years, the public sector has adopted practices from private enterprises. New public management thinking places a lot of emphasis e.g. on efficiency and accountability. The public decision-making is becoming increasingly professional. It is often said that the problems are so complicated that ordinary people are unable to master them. What is people's take on this, then, would they like to have more opportunities to participate in the public decision-making?

A half of the respondents consider it important that people have more opportunities for taking part in decision-making and only four per cent find it unimportant. There are interesting differences between the countries. People in the non-EU countries are more in favour of new opportunities than people in the EU countries. In the Nordic countries, the support is at the lowest level. In our sample of countries, the figures are highest in Spain and Portugal (60 per cent very important) and lowest in Finland (38 per cent) and Denmark (40 per cent).

How can this result be interpreted? One line of argument is that, in the Nordic countries, we have long traditions of political democracy and active voluntary associations. People find that the existing systems provide enough means for participation as it is. On the other hand, in countries where the democratic tradition is younger, people are more eager to gain more opportunities for participation.

During the past 10 years, new forms of political action have rapidly increased on a global scale, including those of civil disobedience. The phenomena can be seen in connection with extensive demonstrations

Figure 5. People should be given more opportunities to participate in public decision-making*.



* There are different opinions about people's rights in a democracy. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it: That people are given more opportunities to participate in public decision-making.

against the IMF, WTO and similar organizations. In the Unites States, opposition against the war in Iraq is also a good example. This kind of civil disobedience is by no means a new phenomenon. Similar phenomena can be found in the 1960s. However, an entirely new characteristic of civil disobedience is the global scale.

Figure 6. Citizens may engage in acts of civil disobedience when they oppose government actions*.



*There are different opinions about people's rights in a democracy. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it: That citizens may engage in acts of civil disobedience when they oppose government actions.

Slightly over one quarter (29 per cent) of the respondents consider it very important for people's rights in a democracy that the citizens may engage in acts of civil disobedience in opposing government action. Altogether, 61 per cent find this important and 24 per cent unimportant.

Here, the differences between countries are considerable. In Russia, (38 per cent very important) people are more than twice as often in favour of civil disobedience as in Norway (16 per cent). In Great Britain, almost a half (44 per cent) of the respondents find it unimportant, while in Portugal only 15 per cent share this opinion. All Nordic countries belong to the group in which people do not place much emphasis on civil disobedience.

The debate concerning the role of political parties since the late 1970s has been lively. In his classical study about the security state, the German sociologist Joachim Hirsch (1980) presented the idea that political parties are not collective organizers anymore as much as apparatuses of mass integration. By this Hirsch means that political parties are no more mediating the interests of social classes but trying to integrate voters to the current political system. As a consequence of this political parties do not encourage people to become active in politics anymore. Hirsch's prognosis has been quite correct at least in the Nordic context, where we have had real mass parties compared with most of the Europe. In the Nordic countries there have been real differences between the political agendas e.g. the social democratic parties and the conservative parties. Meanwhile, we have witnessed the decline in the membership figures and decline in voting rates.

Today, only very few people strongly agree with the statement that political parties encourage people to become active in politics. In fact, slightly more often people find the opposite to be true. About one quarter have a neutral opinion in this respect. Again, the differences between countries in comparison are significant. Surprisingly, people in the United States find that political parties encourage people to become active in politics more often than the rest of the world. From the Nordic perspective this is slightly strange, since the political parties in the USA are only active during elections. The figures are lowest in the Netherlands and Great Britain. In the Nordic countries, the Danes are the most optimistic in this respect, whereas the Swedes are the most pessimistic. All in all, people in the non-EU countries have a more positive attitude towards political parties than people in the European Union.

Figure 7. Political parties encourage people to become active in politics*.



*Thinking about politics in [your country], to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? a) Political parties encourage people to become active in politics

One ideal model of democracy suggests that all important political questions should be solved by referendums. However, referendums are not widely used in contemporary world. Switzerland is perhaps the best example of a country in which referendums are used on a regular basis. In the rest of the world, referendums are very rarely used. A good example is the vote on whether a country should join the European Union. Those who speak in favour of referendums are often accused of populism.

Figure 8. Referendums are a good way to decide important political questions*.



*Thinking about politics in [your country], to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? c) Referendums are a good way to decide important political questions.

One quarter of all respondents strongly agree with the statement that referendums are a good way to decide on important political questions. Another 45 per cent agree with the statement. Only slightly over one tenth disagrees. The Danes are the most often in favour of the idea, while people in Finland have the greatest doubts. In comparison, the differences between the different country groups are not significant.

The comparisons have shown that the elements of civic mind, such as competence, active participation and tolerance, that were already proposed in the 1960s (Almond and Verba 1963) can also be found in the contemporary world. People, for example, think that in a democratic society all citizens should have an adequate standard of living, and that, in a democracy, government authorities should respect and protect minority rights and treat everybody equally regardless of their position in the society.

There are, however, clear differences between the countries. If we wanted to name the countries where we can find "developed civic minds", the Nordic countries would be at the top. Denmark is the best example here while Finland has a number of contradictory elements. The figures are also high in Spain and Portugal and the United States. Japan and Russia both have different political traditions and clearly deviate from the standard pattern. In Europe, the figures are in many respects critical in the Netherlands and Great Britain.

Our analyses have shown that the European Union is, by no means, a homogenous political entity. There are tangible differences between the EU countries. It seems that people in the old EU countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, are more sceptical towards the political system than other EU countries.

Legitimacy of Finnish Democracy

With the term legitimacy social scientists usually refer to Max Weber's analysis on the sources of legitimate authority or power (Weber 1978). Weber talks about charismatic, traditional and rational/legal authority. The legitimacy of charismatic authority is based on the charisma of the leader. In the case of traditional authority, legitimacy is based on tradition. People accept the government because of the length of the period it has been in power. Rational authority is typical of modern societies. Legitimacy is based on the perception that the government's

power derives from a set of procedures, principles and laws. Representative democracy is a proper example of legal authority.

Many social scientists have proposed that in the contemporary world we can see a process of the erosion of citizenship and crisis of legitimacy (Balibar 1988, Habermas 1998). The crisis is caused by the post-national world of corporate globalism, increased migration, Internet revolution and multicultural states (Scobey 2001, 13). In this respect Finland is an interesting case for analysis. Finland has long traditions of democracy, active civil society and the country has been shaped strongly by economic globalisation during the past 15 years.

Figure 9. Most of the time we can trust the government to do what is right.



The most common source of legitimacy today is the perception that a government is operating under democratic principles and is subject to the will of the people. Governments often claim a popular mandate to exercise power; however, how this mandate is obtained can vary greatly from regime to regime. Liberal democratic states claim democratic legitimacy on the grounds that they have regular free and fair contested elections. The Finnish democracy meets all the formal requirements mentioned above. How do the Finnish respondents in the ISSP survey perceive the state of the art at the time of the 2004 survey?

Trust in government is an important aspect of legitimacy. According to a number of surveys, for example ISSP and ESS, the Finns have high trust in political institutions. This holds true for the parliament, judiciary and the police, as well as the politicians. According to the 2000 ESS survey, 82 per cent of Finns trust the Finnish parliament and 69 per cent trust politicians. In international comparisons, the figures are rather high. However, the trust in institutions does not equal trust in that the government does what is right.

Most of the respondents are sceptical about the actions of the people in the government. Merely three per cent of all respondents strongly agree with the statement that most of the time we can trust the government to do what is right. One quarter agrees with the statement. About the same number have a neutral opinion. More than 40 per cent express a differentiating opinion.

There is no clear division between the countries. People in the Nordic countries have a more positive orientation than the ISSP average. People in Denmark and Finland have the highest trust in the government to do what is right. On the other hand, the German (62 per cent disagree) and Japanese (63 per cent disagree) respondents are highly critical and the Russians are somewhere in the middle.

All politics is about interests. Political parties are supposed to mediate the interests of the members and supporters. On the other hand, citizens think that politicians should act without promoting any personal interests. However, we all know that politicians are human beings, too, and they do not differ from anyone else, they have their

Figure 10. Most politicians are in politics only for what they can get out of it personally.



own reference groups and interests. Politicians in all countries are a part of national elites, and according to a common understanding, they, at least partially, make their decisions based on their personal interests.

More than a half of all respondents agree with the statements that most politicians are in politics only for what they can get out of it personally. One quarter of the respondents strongly agrees with this

statement. Only a total of 20 per cent disagree, the same number holds a neutral opinion.

People in the non-EU countries are more willing than people in the EU to believe that the politicians are selfish. In the Nordic countries, more often than in other countries, people consider politicians to have other interests besides gaining personal benefits. Finland is an exception. Here, more than a half believes that most politicians are in politics solely for personal gain. In Norway, the corresponding figure is merely 26 per cent. In the EU context, the Portuguese are the most critical towards politicians, more than 80 per cent of the respondents believe that politicians are in politics mainly because of personal reasons.

When people cast their votes in general elections, they make political choices. They choose between different parties and it is assumed that the parties promote different goals. Socialist parties support the welfare state and are critical towards unrestrained market forces. Christian parties trust the Christian values and place a lot of emphasis on family politics. Greens are concerned with environmental issues. Conservative parties, on the other hand, rely on individualism and private entrepreneurship.

The differences between political parties seem clear. However, a half of all respondents find that political parties do not provide the voters with real policy choices. Only 22 per cent disagree with this statement and one quarter is of neutral opinion.

People in Portugal and in Ireland are the most critical towards political parties in this respect. In both countries, at least 60 per cent believe that parties do not give voters real policy choices. In the Nordic countries, the Finns are the most critical ones. People in Denmark have the highest trust in politics. More than one third finds that different policy choices are available for the general population, while in Japan only 12 per cent share this opinion.

Research has shown that in the Soviet Union, close to 100 per cent of the electorate always voted in the general elections and candidates nominated by the communist party were always elected to the parliament and various councils. Social scientists were highly critical towards

Figure 11. Political parties do not give voters real policy choices.



these results. The results were, without a doubt manipulated. Today, we closely follow the elections around the world. Independent monitor reports on how honest the counting and reporting of votes is.

Three quarters of the respondents believe that the counting and reporting of votes in the last national elections in their country was honest and 14 per cent believe the opposite to be true. In the Nordic countries, most of the respondents consider the elections to have been honest. In Finland and Denmark, none of the respondents believed in

Figure 12. Thinking of last national election in Finland, how honest was it regarding the counting and reporting of votes.



dishonest practices and in Sweden and Norway only a few believed in dishonesty. The United States, on the other hand, is the other extreme. More than a half of Americans are of the opinion that the counting and reporting of votes in the last national election was dishonest, and a quarter believes it was highly dishonest. On the other hand, in Russia, with the Soviet traditions still alive, 39 per cent consider the election to have been honest and one third considers them dishonest.

Figure 13. Considering the latest national election in your own country, how fair was it regarding the opportunities of the candidates and parties to campaign.



The nature of political campaigns varies from country to country. The variation between the campaigns is also great between the political parties and between the candidates in a given country. In some countries, the political opposition is more or less forbidden. In some countries, there are strong restrictions for the opposition. In some countries,

Figure 14. How widespread corruption is in the public service in Finland.



room for operation for the opposition parties is limited, for example, by media. In many countries elections are, thus, highly unfair.

How do the respondents perceive the situation in their own country? A clear majority find that the campaigning opportunities for the candidates and parties were at least somewhat fair. One fifth believes

that the election was fair in this respect. Another one fifth finds that the elections were at least somewhat unfair. In Ireland, 80 per cent of the respondents consider that the candidates and parties had fair chances in the last national election. Meanwhile, only a third of the Russians share this opinion.

In this respect, Finland is an interesting case. People in the Nordic countries typically consider the political system fair for all the parties and candidates. Figures are high especially in Norway and Denmark. In Finland, only 55 per cent believe that the system is fair and one third finds the system at least somewhat unfair. This figure is clearly the highest among the EU countries. In principle, the Finnish system is fair and all parties have equal opportunities, though there is an ongoing debate concerning the economic opportunities, voting districts ect. It is possible that respondents in Finland have taken into account the economic resources of the candidates. As it turns out, the differences in Finland are, indeed, considerable in this respect.

Thus, we have to remember that even if the elections are formally and in practice as fair as possible, the economic possibilities to run the campaign are not equal. The parties and candidates with considerable economic resources at their disposal have considerably better opportunities than those with limited resources.

Transparency International (see www.transparency.org) has monitored corruption on a global scale for years. According to the 2006 data, the five least corrupt countries in the world are Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Denmark and Singapore. On the other hand, the three most corrupt countries are Haiti, Myanmar and Iraq.

A third (31 per cent) of all respondents believe that only a small number of people working in the public sector are engaged in corruption in their country. At the same time, 39 per cent claim that a considerable number of people in the public sector are corrupt.

Differences between the countries are great. In Russia, less than ten per cent of the respondents believe that only a small number of people are not involved in corruption whereas more than two thirds are. In the neighbouring Finland, the situation is the other way around. Two

Figure 15. How well does democracy work in Finland today.



thirds say that only a small number of people is corrupt and less than ten per cent claim the opposite to be true. In general, people in the non-EU countries perceive corruption as more common than people in the EU. In the Nordic countries, corruption appears to be at the lowest level.

In the ISSP survey there was a three item scale measuring how well the democracy is perceived as working in different countries. The first

Figure 16. How well did democracy work in Finland 10 years ago.



question dealt with how well the democracy works today, how well it worked 10 years ago and how well the respondents estimate it to work ten years from now. The respondents were asked to use a scale from 0 to 10 and locate their own country on the scale. In the tables, we have divided the answers into three classes indicating whether the democracy is perceived as working well, whether the respondents' opinion is neutral or if whether it is perceived as working poorly.

Figure 17. How well does democracy work in Finland 10 years from now.



The figures show that the respondents have a positive opinion about the development of the democracy in general. In the following table, we have the figures – democracy works well and poorly – for Finland, Russia and the ISSP as a whole:

Table 1. Views on the development of Democracy in Finland, Russia and all ISSP countries.

	Finland	Russia	ISSP
10 years ago	Well 52 Poorly 9	Well 10 Poorly 68	Well 41 Poorly 22
Today	Well 53 Poorly 6	Well 18 Poorly 33	Well 44 Poorly 16
10 years from now	Well 55 Poorly 14	Well 42 Poorly 25	Well 51 Poorly 17

We can assume that Finland represents a country with long democratic traditions and the Finnish democracy works considerably well in international comparisons. On the other hand, Russia has experienced rapid social changes and a deep socio-economic transition. The roots of the current Russian democracy are not deep grown.

Slightly more than a half of the Finns find that the Finnish democracy has been working well so far, currently works well and will be working well in the future, as well. It is, however, interesting that the future expectations in Finland are at the same time more critical. A growing number believes that in the future, democracy will not work as well as today. People's perceptions of the development of the Russian democracy are highly positive. If everything continues as expected, Russia is likely to take a giant leap towards democracy within the next 10 years.

What can, then, be said about the legitimacy of the Finnish democracy on the basis of the previous empirical analysis? In international comparisons, Finland belongs to highly functional parliamentary democracies, the Nordic welfare state model, social corporatist countries and the least corrupt countries in the world. The image that the respondents have of their country in the Finnish ISSP survey on citizenship is, however, more critical. The respondents believe that the Finnish political system does not encourage people to take initiative in political matters, that too many politicians act only in order to gain personal benefit, and that there are no real choices between the political parties.

Democracy is not an easy and simple concept. Peoples' perception of democracy varies greatly. On one hand, the political elite may be under the impression that the status quo in our country is as it should be. On the other hand, the general population is highly critical towards the political practices. At least from the perspective of active citizenship and strong civil society, the results indicate that, in Finland, there is still room for improvement in many respects. The results indicate that when government authorities treat everybody equally, when politicians take into account the views of citizens and when citizens have fair opportunities to participate the legitimacy increases.

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www.transparency.org

Differentia Specifica of Voluntary Organizing in Finland

Martti Siisiäinen

This chapter conducts a general analysis of voluntary organizing in Finland in a comparative perspective. Comparison in this study means, on the one hand, analysis of the present situation of associational activity and its changing character in relation to earlier times; and, second, defining the specific features of Finnish associational activities in international comparison (based on the ISSP-data). These comparisons make it possible to offer some general comments about the possibilities and the restrictions of comparisons based on international surveys.

The changing voluntary associations at the turn of Millennium: changes in associational activities in Finland since early 20th century

It can be argued that registered voluntary associations have played an exceptionally important role in Finnish society, for historical and social reasons, which will be discussed later in this paper. During the Russian rule in the first part of the 19th century, the Finnish nationalist movement acquired a very well organized and state-centred character (see Stenius 1986; Alapuro et al [ed.] 1987). The leadership was in the hands of intelligentsia and state-officials that both were quite dependent on the state. Developing voluntary associations connected parts of the bourgeoisie, state-officials, clergy and wealthy peasantry and, at the end of the century,

parts of the working class. Formal voluntary associations had at the same time a mobilizing and moderating influence on the movements.

The dominance of the form of voluntary association was also realised in the workers' and peasants' movements. Since the Finnish independence in 1917 the registration of associations has become a rule in all major movements from communist and populist to conservative ones. Registration of an association makes it a legal subject, which – in most cases – is a precondition for becoming an acknowledged partner in negotiations with state or municipal authorities etc. Being registered has meant at least a partial acceptance of "the rules of the game" by the association but it has also created in many cases a more or less effective channel for influencing the political decision making (e.g. via neocorporatist mechanisms). The other side of the extensive state-centeredness of Finnish collective action has been the scantiness of alternative forms of influencing political and social institutions. As the proper mass-mobilization by associations started after mid 19th century it spread quite quickly covering quite evenly almost the whole country during the first decade of the 20th century. Figure 1 describes the formation of new registered associations after Finnish independence:

Figure 1. Registration of new voluntary associations in Finland 1920–2005



More than 170,000 associations were registered between 1919 and 2006 (approximately 2,000 per year). Approximately 80,000-90,000 of them are still active. Sweden and Finland have the highest number of associations relative to population (see the Johns Hopkins study: Salamon et al. 1999; Helander & Laaksonen 1999). Most peaks of registrations were concurrent with active periods of protest (rightist: 1928-1932; leftist: 1944-1948; 1966-1972; leftist & populist: 1959-1961; green: 1979-1984): this refers to the fact that protest movements (the kind that were not included into components of **positive** social capital by Putnam in his Italy study 1993) have been very central in the creation of networks of social capital in Finland. An exception to "the rule": 1996-1998 (10,000 new associations, no large protest movements) (see Siisiäinen 1999; 2002; 2007).

Within the system of voluntary association, proportions of different types of association have changed quite dramatically during the last decades (see Table 1):

Table 1. Registration of different types of associations 1919 – 2002

Type of Assoc.	1990-1994		1995-1999		2000-2002		1919-2002	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Political	550	5	300	2	150	2	30430	19
Econ/prof	1395	14	2265	14	1005	13	41655	26
Welfare	870	9	1205	8	695	9	9955	6
Culture	2230	22	4625	29	2465	32	22800	14
Sports	2280	22	3680	23	1715	22	20075	12
Other hob	1855	18	2470	16	1260	16	20190	12
Religious	185	2	295	2	205	3	3770	2
War/peace	65	1	115	1	45	1	5625	4
International	190	2	225	1	80	1	2265	1
Other	565	6	525	3	200	3	6200	4
Total	10185	100	15705	100	7820	100	162965	100
Assocs/year	2037		3141		2607		1940	

The most important general conclusions that can be drawn from the table are, first, the decline in (party) political organizing from 19 per cent (during the whole period 1919-2002) to two per cent (2000-2002). The change is even more striking if the comparison is made to the most political decades: from the 1950s to the 1970s more than one fourth of all associations were linked to a political party. After the exceptional times between two world wars (and after the civil war of 1918) and the time of recovery from the hardships of World War II, Finnish civil society could not develop into its proper modern forms before the end of the 1950s. The exceptionally fast modernization of various fields of industry after the war was reflected in the steady proliferation of various interest organizations, economic and occupation associations and political organizations for various constituencies (party, women's, children's, youngsters' associations).

All decades till the 1970s were characterized by the strong influence of class to voluntary organizing. Social tensions – often clearly of class origin – coloured the formation of associations in many fields outside party politics: temperance, sports, adult education, choirs etc. The other side of the shifting of the point of emphasis away from economic and political fields is the mushrooming of cultural (32 per cent), sport (22 per cent) and other hobby associations (16 per cent) (together 70 per cent of all new associations founded in 2000-2002; cf. 38 per cent in 1920-2002). A great part of these new associations fulfil interests of self-development or self-realization or can be understood as parts of individual ego-projects aiming at developing person's physical or mental abilities. Also the share of economic/professional associations has dropped whereas religious, social welfare and international associations have more or less been able to keep up their proportion.

In closer examination the most central changes in the social contents of associational activities and characteristics around the turn of the century are (see Siisiäinen 2003; Siisiäinen (ed.) 2002):

(1) Specialization and differentiation proceeding from general associations of – for example music, literature or dance – to very specialised ones (e.g. associations for different types of ethnic

music, different types of combat sports or for hundreds of breeds of dogs or cats). This means that members only need to invest a very small part of their personality in the membership role (c.f. Bauman 1995).

(2) "Wildness" & light organizational structures: In the city of Jyväskylä, more than 80 per cent of associations registered before 1995 reported that they are members of central federations/unions whereas the corresponding proportion was only 40 per cent of those registered in 1995-2001 (Siisiäinen 2003). This change means that the possibilities of utilizing new associations as means of "system integration" tend to decrease. Many of the associations established during earlier periods could channel discontent and protest potential into forms that could be utilized in the development of the social political cohesion of the social system. Thereby "non-political" associations (in the narrow meaning of the word political) could, on certain conditions, be turned into forces supporting the system integration (see Lockwood 1964) of the hegemony (see Gramsci 1967). Wildness of many new associations is expressed in the cutting loose of the ties to ideological subcultures, too: only very seldom new associations belong to associational subcultures based on ideologies anymore. New associations do not have as tense relationship with municipal or state authorities or institutions as do the older ones.

(3) Smallness: The average size of associations has diminished (memberships, budget) (see Siisiäinen [ed.] 2002)

(4) New associations have less interaction with municipal institutions and the state which is a good indicator of the fact that the voluntary organizations of the turn of the Millennium are not any more as state- (or municipality-) centred as the older ones. This holds true for both social movements and voluntary associations.

(5) Growing importance of local and international factors at the expense of national factors in the new formation of associations. For example the proportion of association names in Finnish was 94 per cent among associations registered 1940 – 1979 but only 78 in 1990-1990 whereas the proportion of English names rose from zero to ten per cent (Siisiäinen 2007).

These changes mean that the role of especially those associations that have been central in the traditional system integration has decreased at the turn of the Millennium. These include associations that have required an extensive investment of members' personality in the associations. Many of the association types that tend to die out have been collective and ideological organizations (as distinct from individual "ego projects") purporting to create solidarity and act as "collective intellectuals" (see Gramsci 1967) whereas many of the new ones form arenas of individual action. These new associations follow rather the logic of consumption than the logic of production of some collective good (c.f. Bauman, op.cit). These new associations fit better as parts to the development of forms of governance at a distance based on behaviour of individuals who understand themselves as entrepreneurs of their own life (see Rose 1999). The older system of governance relied more on the rule of individuals as members of associations and the relationship between participating individuals and the state was intermediated by associations and other civil society organizations. In the new system of governance actors are integrated as individuals making consumer-like choices, not so much as members of social collectives.

On the other hand, this kind of cultural and hobby associations are among the most important actors in the creation of generalized trust in Putnam's idea of "rosy circle" of social capital (see Putnam 1993), a kind of perpetuum mobile formed by associations and trusting mutually reinforcing one another. It goes without saying that there is no unanimity about the causal relations between (different types of) associations and generalized trust.

The conclusion that no general crisis of associational social capital exists in Finland is backed by the examination of the development of association memberships in Finland (see table 2):

Table 2. Number of association memberships 1972–2005

Memberships	1972	1975	1981	1986	1988	1994	2000	2005
0	38	27	28	25	21	23	17	13
1	37	34	39	36	35	30	29	18
2	25	22	16	24	20	21	25	22
3	-	9	8	10	11	12	16	19
4	-	8	4	3	6	7	8	12
5	-	-	2	1	3	8	4	8
6-	-	-	3	-	4	-	4	9
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	994	1124	1436	2291	2008	1788	1616	1000

(Allardt 1976; Pesonen & Sänkiaho 1979; Luokkaprojekti 1984; Siisiäinen 2002; Kankainen 2007)

The proportion of those who have no memberships at all has declined quite evenly during the 34-year period and the share of those having four or more memberships has grown. However, results concerning the development after the turn of the Millennium give inconsistent results about the participation of Finns in associational life (c.f. Kankainen 2005; Borg 2005). A general conclusion is that social group differences in association activity have to some extent decreased (for example between men and women). However, there still is a correlation between the level of education and income and the number of memberships. Old and young people are more passive than their middle aged fellow citizens. Further inconsistencies can be found between Finnish surveys and international surveys (which, also, give inconsistent results as compared to each other).

Finnish association memberships in international comparison

Finns have belonged to the international top group of association activists as measured by association memberships as long as large comparative surveys have been conducted (see. e.g. Morales 2001; Curtis & Baer & Grabb 2001; Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Wallace 2005; Morales & Geurts 2007). The ISSP surveys reinforce the results given by earlier surveys (see table 3):

Table 3. The number of association memberships among citizens in various countries in 2004 (ISSP)

Number of Memberships	0	1	2	3	4	5
All	35	31	19	10	4	1
Finland	12	25	30	23	8	1
Sweden	9	24	33	24	9	2
Denmark	3	16	29	32	16	3
Norway	11	25	27	22	11	3
Germany	27	37	25	8	2	0
Holland	19	31	28	15	5	1
England	37	31	21	7	2	1
Ireland	13	31	27	20	8	2
Spain	53	27	13	5	1	0
Portugal	54	30	11	4	1	0
Russia	66	25	7	1	0	0
USA	18	29	22	16	10	4
Japan	60	28	9	2	0	0
Nordic countr.	9	23	30	25	11	2
EU countries	35	31	20	10	4	1
NON-EU	36	33	18	9	3	1

The proportion of those without any memberships varies between 3 (Denmark) and 66 per cent (Russia), the average of all countries included being 35. Finland is the fourth in the top quartet consisting of four Nordic countries followed by Ireland and the Netherlands. The proportions of non-members rise – quite much in the Nordic countries – if churches and religious organizations are excluded but the order or countries will remain almost the same. There are only very minor

differences between the EU-countries and Non-EU countries included in the survey but the variations within both categories are big.

The order of countries resembles very much the list obtained in comparative studies concerning associational social capital and generalized trust during the last decade (or two) (see e.g. Wallace 2005). There is a lot of research evidence stressing the importance of a visible and well functioning system of voluntary associations for the development of generalized trust and solidarity in society (e.g. Wollebaek & Selle 2002). These kinds of civic structures, for their part, have contributed to the development of well functioning welfare states. This is one of the main directions where to look for roots of the special characteristics of Finnish traditions of collective action.

There is a lot of evidence pointing to the fact that association memberships and volunteerism, here defined as being active in associations, do not follow the same pattern (see Table 4).

Table 4. Belonging to and participating in different types of associations in different countries

Status of belonging: Political party

	Belong and participate	Belong, not participate	Used to belong	Never belonged
All	3	7	9	81
Finland	2	8	9	82
Sweden	3	7	14	76
Denmark	3	5	13	79
Norway	3	15	16	66
Germany	2	2	6	89
Holland	2	9	9	80
England	2	9	7	82
Ireland	3	8	5	85
Spain	3	3	5	89
Portugal	2	4	5	90
Russia	1	2	14	83
USA	15	27	4	53
Japan	1	4	5	90
Nordic countries	2	9	13	76
EU countries	2	5	8	84
Non-EU countries	4	9	9	78

Membership in political parties is quite similar in all countries included in the survey with the exception of the USA. One to three per cent of respondents are active members (= belong and participate) in parties and in addition seven to nine per cent (Finland, Sweden, Holland, England, and Ireland) or less are passive members. In the USA 15 per cent are active and 27 per cent passive members.

Status of belonging: Trade union etc.

	Belong and participate	Belong, not participate	Used to belong	Never belonged
All	7	16	22	55
Finland	6	50	17	27
Sweden	8	56	22	14
Denmark	14	55	21	10
Norway	13	40	22	25
Germany	6	11	28	54
Holland	6	24	19	50
England	5	15	33	46
Ireland	14	15	21	51
Spain	7	7	12	74
Portugal	4	8	15	73
Russia	6	15	45	34
USA	12	9	19	60
Japan	2	12	17	68
Nordic countries	10	50	20	19
EU countries	7	19	24	50
Non-EU countries	8	13	19	60

The Nordic countries are countries of wide and relatively active trade union memberships whereas in most of the countries the vast majority has never belonged to trade unions (in Spain, Portugal and Japan about three out of four, in the USA two out of three). In previous state-socialist countries many used to be (obligatory) members under Communism but are non-members at present.

Status of belonging: Church rel org

	Belong and participate	Belong, not participate	Used to belong	Never belonged
All	16	23	11	51
Finland	7	61	11	20
Sweden	7	54	11	28
Denmark	15	70	6	9
Norway	10	48	9	33
Germany	15	36	14	35
Holland	15	25	20	40
England	16	18	24	41
Ireland	56	20	8	17
Spain	9	7	9	75
Portugal	15	15	8	62
Russia	2	8	3	87
USA	40	22	22	17
Japan	3	5	3	88
Nordic countries	10	58	9	23
EU countries	13	26	9	51
Non-EU countries	19	20	12	50

The ISSP survey groups churches and religious associations into the same category irrespective of differences of religious systems between countries (state church system; different meanings of church memberships in catholic and protestant countries etc.). However, the low proportion of activists (seven %) shows clearly the high degree of secularization in Finland and Sweden (even compared with the other Nordic countries). The low percentage of activists in Portugal and Russia must be connected with the fact that all activism is at its lowest in those two countries.

Status of belonging: Sports group etc.

	Belong and participate	Belong, not participate	Used to belong	Never belonged to
All	20	9	23	47
Finland	23	17	31	29
Sweden	28	22	32	18
Denmark	41	11	36	12
Norway	28	16	39	17
Germany	29	12	26	33
Holland	43	13	33	11
England	22	6	33	39
Ireland	36	8	20	35
Spain	15	10	18	58
Portugal	7	7	16	70
Russia	4	3	20	73
USA	23	8	26	43
Japan	13	10	24	53
Nordic countries	29	17	34	19
EU countries	22	10	24	44
Non-EU countries	18	8	23	51

Activism in sports clubs and associations belonging in the "other associations" category is especially high in Denmark, Holland, Ireland and middle high in Sweden, Finland, England and the USA.

Status of belonging: Other voluntary assoc

	Belong and participate	Belong, not participate	Used to belong	Never belonged
All	12	7	14	68
Finland	16	20	15	49
Sweden	9	15	22	54
Denmark	26	16	22	36
Norway	20	18	25	37
Germany	8	4	5	83
Holland	20	6	19	56
England	12	5	22	61
Ireland	21	6	18	54
Spain	9	5	10	76
Portugal	5	4	8	82
Russia	2	1	9	88
USA	21	6	24	50
Japan	3	3	6	87
Nordic countries	18	17	21	44
EU countries	11	7	13	69
Non-EU countries	12	6	15	67

A new summated scale was formed using all questions concerning association memberships (5 types of associations) and different forms of association participation. Values for each type of association:

0 = never belonged
1 = used to belong
2 = belong but don't participate
3 = belong and actively participate

The sum values range thus from zero (minimum) to 15 (maximum) as all five association types are added together (see Table 5):

Table 5. Total association activity (a sum variable) in the countries included

Total association activity

Total association activity

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
All	19	9	13	15	10	9	8	5	4	3	2	1	1	0	0	0
Finland	6	2	7	11	15	12	13	11	9	5	4	2	1	0	0	0
Sweden	2	2	6	9	11	16	17	14	10	6	3	1	2	0	0	0
Denmark	1	1	2	4	10	11	12	15	14	11	9	5	3	1	0	0
Norway	2	3	6	9	11	14	13	11	11	7	6	3	2	1	0	0
Germany	10	8	18	19	13	12	8	5	3	2	1	1	0	0	0	0
Holland	4	6	8	14	14	13	12	10	7	5	4	2	1	1	0	0
England	12	11	12	14	12	10	8	8	5	3	2	1	0	0	0	0
Ireland	6	3	5	15	10	10	12	9	9	9	5	4	3	1	1	0
Spain	35	10	13	16	7	5	6	3	1	2	1	0	1	0	0	0
Portugal	38	10	15	14	8	6	4	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Russia	24	26	20	14	7	4	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA	8	5	8	13	9	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	4	2	1	1
Japan	38	15	15	14	7	4	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nordic countries	3	2	5	8	12	14	14	13	11	8	6	3	2	1	0	0
EU countries	19	9	12	14	11	9	8	6	4	3	2	1	1	0	0	0
Non-EU countries	19	9	13	15	9	8	8	5	4	4	2	1	1	0	0	0

We know from various international comparisons of association activity, generalized trust and various dimensions of social capital (see van Deth & Montero & Westholm (ed.) 2007; Wallace 2005) that no one reliable measure of total associational activity exists. Comparative studies have shown that the associational or social capital phenomenon is very complicated, multi-dimensional, historically and societally layered, making comparison very difficult. Therefore all explanations of different forms of social capital have been met by severe criticisms. However, quantitatively the most reliable comparisons in the field concern association memberships (even though also they have different role, importance and meaning in different countries, political systems and welfare regimes) on the one hand and generalized trust, on the other. All explanations using individual based data as a basis of making causal generalizations at an upper, national level usually are heading into trouble. There is very little evidence of the causal relationship between membership in associations and trust. It looks like the relationship is indirect and develops, partly as an unintended consequence of associations (c.f. Coleman 1988). All these problems refer to the need to study associational and social capital mechanisms in local interaction contexts taking into account historical, political and cultural factors.

In the previous and following sections I will try to identify some differentia specifica of Finnish associational features that can be measured quantitatively in an international survey frame.

Table 6 describes the volume of associational activity in different countries or the volume of actors' associational social capital (see Kivelä & Siisiäinen 2007). This associational potential can be used as a means of system integration in various ways as suggested, for example by Putnam and his followers. Same volume of associational capital can also have very different influence in different regimes of governance (or hegemony). It is also important to notice that the figures are only rough measures of associational capital connecting some (and ignoring other) dimensions of the phenomenon.

Table 6. Averages of total association activity in different countries

	Total association activity (average)
All	3.69
Finland	5.33
Sweden	5.74
Denmark	7.06
Norway	5.99
Germany	3.63
Holland	5.09
England	3.92
Ireland	5.74
Spain	2.43
Portugal	2.24
Russia	1.90
USA	5.69
Japan	1.80
Nordic countries	6.05
EU countries	3.69
Non-EU countries	3.68

The mean of EU-countries and all included countries is 3.69. At the top is Denmark followed by Norway, Sweden and Ireland, the USA, Finland and The Netherlands These countries, perhaps in slightly varying order, tend to show highest levels of associational capital in all studies of this kind.

What makes Finland different: conclusions and ensuing questions to research

In studies using more developed measures of associational activity than above, more nuances about differences between countries have been revealed. First factor, creating distinctions between countries, divides association participation to formal memberships (no action) and active membership. Countries at the top on both lists include Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands whereas Finland is high only on the membership list and a little bit lower on the one measuring active or working memberships (see Baer 2007; c.f. Wallace 2005; c.f., however Curtis & Baer & Grabb 2001).

Second divide separates countries whose citizens have high level of bridging social capital (e.g. associations connecting persons with different class or stratum background, belonging to different age groups, females and males etc) from countries with high levels of bonding social capital (contacts with relatives, friends, neighbours, work colleagues outside working time). Finland, again, is situated in the middle whereas many countries with low levels of bridging social capital or generalized trust score high in bonding social capital (for example Portugal and Latvia).

With the assistance of the results from different international projects on social capital and association memberships, a preliminary "location" of Finland or the Finns (high, medium, low) on various associational dimensions can be attempted. In various studies countries have been ordered on the basis of the scores measuring different dimensions of social capital such as generalized trust, volume of activeness of association memberships, participation and social networks (see Table 7).

Table 7. The location of Finland (Finns) on different comparative lists based on various measures of forms of social capital

Feature of SoCa/ participation	High	Medium	Low
number of association memberships	-1990s (Siisiäinen 1999; Morales 2001; Curtis & Baer & Grabb 2001) -2004 (Wallace 2005; Baer 2007)		
generalized trust	Inglehart 1999; Wallace 2005; Kankainen 2007		
obeying laws as a sign of good citizenship	2004 (Wallace 2005)		
meeting colleagues outside work time			2004 (Wallace)
meeting friends		2004 (Wallace 2005)	
having somebody to discuss personal problems with		2004 (Wallace 2005)	
participation & activity & donations in/to organizations	2004 (Wallace)		
voluntary work for any organization			2004 (Wallace)
increase of "working memberships" in the 1990s			- decrease comp. to other social democracies (Baer 2007)
number of voluntary associations per population	Siisiäinen; the Johns Hopkins projects (see Salamon et al. 1999; Helander & Laaksonen 1999)		
corporateness of associations	Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001		

This summary of the results of a number of participation studies could be easily extended to other studies but the general picture would remain approximately the same. Finns have many memberships in associations, have high level of generalized trust and have relatively many other kinds of social networks at their disposal. On the other hand, it looks like Finns have not so many alternative channels in use as their "EU-compatriots". It also looks like political participation in Finland is not so closely (or "causally") connected with participatory values and attitudes (or vice versa) (c.f. Morales 2001, 26).

From this we can draw a general conclusion: **voluntary associations are exceptionally important for the Finnish way of advancing interests and organizing collective identities and in the totality of the Finnish type of social capital.** First, because there probably are more associations per inhabitant in Finland that in any country in the world (together with other Nordic countries) (Salamon et al. 1999; Helander & Laaksonen 1999). Second, Finns have many association memberships; and third, the mainstream of collective action has concentrated more in formal registered associations in Finland than – most probably – in any other country in the world. It means that even though actors in some other countries (e.g. Sweden, Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands) have as many – or even more – association memberships in average as the Finns, the relative weight value of association memberships in the total system of collective action or in the functioning of the mechanisms of system-integrative social capital is relatively bigger in Finland than in other countries.

Finnish studies have shed light on specialties of the associational life in the country and from these some questions to be studied comparatively can also be deduced. These include: first, the meaning or role of associations in the totality of actors' everyday practices and in the system of cross-cutting and/or overlapping local, national and international fields. Second, associations (civil society)–state relations which should be examined not only by means of combining individual-based survey-data and typologies of states (e.g. open – vs. closed state) or welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen: "liberal", "conservative",

"social democratic" [1990]; Brown & Kenny & Turner & Prince 2000; Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001) but also with the assistance of historical-sociological analysis. (3) Dialectics and mutual interaction between challenging social movements, formal associations (voluntary organizations) and the political (and welfare) subsystem. (4) Different meanings of social networks (forms of sociability) in different (political) cultures and problems associated with drawing conclusions from responses to survey questions. The survey results concerning Finland, for example, would become much more understandable when studied in the light provided by clarification of issues mentioned above. Here it suffices only to make few comments and thereby, hopefully, make it a little bit easier to understand where to look for answers to the question of what makes Finland different.

(1) Meaning of associations in the totality of everyday life

It seems that associations have different meaning in the totality of collective actions in different countries. There are countries and welfare regimes where associations do not have a very central role at all (e.g. Spain; Portugal). Also, in countries where citizens have many associations memberships the relation of members to associations seem to differ. In the Nordic countries associations are the most important way of acting collectively but in other Nordic countries – compared to Finland – people use more alternative networks like neighbourhood relations, relatives, friends (as measured by survey questions). It is my impression – with no specific evidence from association studies – that ethnographic and local studies concerning the role and functioning of different kinds of networks and interaction systems in connection with cultural deep structures would be needed.

The "promise" of the system of voluntary associations has – perhaps – been taken more seriously in Finland than in many other countries. It has been understood (to some extent, at least) as a guarantee for the fact that things are taken care or will be taken care in case of need. This is reminiscent of the relationship between association activity and

generalized trust shown in some of the new studies (Wollebaek 2007a; 2007b). On the basis of these studies and concrete historical analyses it can be argued that – especially in the case of the Nordic countries – the "mere" existence of a visible, extensive and effective system of voluntary associations covering different classes and social categories, is a very important factor spreading trust in society, not so much the activity of the members in associational life. This associational infrastructure can only be effective in the production of trust if it has been tested in the past and if it has proven to be efficacious and workable if needed. This is how the dialectics between social movements and voluntary associations and the development of the Nordic welfare states worked: associations initiating and demanding state reforms, states acting inclusively and – more or less – openly, thereby convincing a large part of citizens about possibilities to act via the state. And that is one of the main reasons why the Nordic states have been doing so well in international comparison of social capital and trust.

(2) State-centredness of collective action

During the 19th century the Finnish nationalist movements were state-centred compared to corresponding movements in many other countries (e.g. the Baltic countries). This feature is connected with the close relationship between core strata carrying these movements (bureaucrats; intelligentsia; clergy; teachers) and the state. (see Alapuro 1997). In Finland no proper feudalism developed but the close connections between clergy, the intelligentsia and high rank officials has given reasons to speak about "state-feudalism".

Finland's geographical position between bigger nations has brought about general political and military realism and caution which can also be seen in the Finnish model of collective action (avoidance of conflicts, reluctance to use actionist and confrontational forms, obedience to law; confidence in the value of acting openly and in the power of education in the repertoire of collective action (see Alapuro 1997; Siisiäinen 2004). Many of the most highly esteemed achievements of civil society

organizations (e.g. institutionalized welfare state solutions; the right – and in many cases obligation – for women to work outside home: two-bread-winner model) have been inscribed in state institutions and have, almost, been sanctified (c.f. Bergman 2002). These features have been embodied and symbolized in and by the form and template of the Finnish registered association (see Siisiäinen 2004; 2007). Finnish political system has been, at least in the era on neo-corporatism from the mid 1960s, quite open to challenging social movements.

The dialectics between social movements and the political (and welfare state) system has functioned rather effectively and made it possible for movements to have real influence on the development of the system. Movements have produced new associations (which have, on their part, initiated new movements) and these have been able to communicate with (and inside) state apparatuses – and thereby to become institutionalized and integrated into the system (see Siisiäinen 1994; 2007). This is how, at least from the perspective of system-integration approach, the Finnish corporatist system with intense representation of civil society organizations in state negotiation institution has developed. In Finland the level of "corporateness" is high which, according to Schoefer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (op.cit.) has a positive correlation with association activity. This dialectics has persuaded people to think that it is possible to influence the state and that this can be done with the assistance of the welfare state. This state of affairs has, however, started to change at the same pace as the welfare state system has been declining since the mid 1990s. But still, these facts have to be taken into consideration as explaining social backgrounds for Finnish fondness of associations. However, new associations and the new generation of association members are different which, most probably, tends to decrease of divergence of the Finnish association system from the average European one.

These questions should be studied together with the examination of the dialectics between (different types of) social movements, (different types of) voluntary associations and (different types of) welfare states shortly dealt with above.

(3) Cultural contextualization

Anthropological and cultural studies have made it common knowledge that formally same kind of artefacts or organizational templates can have and in most of the cases also do have different meanings for actors. This holds true also for social networks (forms of sociability) in different (political) cultures. Problems arise when mechanical conclusions are drawn from responses to survey questions. No doubt differences in social networks, for example which actors (alters) belong to a persons (ego's) network and what kind of resources a person can mobilize via her/his networks, is important and reasonable to study (see van der Gaag & Snijders 2005; Kivelä & Siisiäinen 2007). However, the functioning and the "real" meaning of the networks in actors' lives can only be revealed in the totality of the actor's life practices and in the locality where they take place. This raises – once again – the question what we are studying when we are studying social capital or working association membership in a standard international survey.

Conclusions

A general conclusion about the associational engagement of the Finns is that they are among the most active nations in the world as measured comparatively by association memberships – formal and working – and by measures of (Putnamian) social capital, especially trust and bridging social capital. In a closer look, the location of Finns on comparative lists depends on the scale (world – Europe – the EU - the Nordic countries). It looks that it is very difficult to get new fruitful results about association memberships or their relationships with trust (or solidarity) by means of survey research.

As to Finland, in can be concluded on the basis of several surveys that voluntary associations are of special importance to Finns, because first, there are so many associations in Finland relative to the size of

population; second, Finns have many association memberships; and third, because collective action is, probably in a unique way, channelled into voluntary associations and because there are less real alternatives to associations.

That is not, however, the whole picture. Associations should be studied in their social and historical environment and as parts of the totality of political system and culture. Associations and networks should also be weighted relative to other fields in actors' lives. The picture becomes even more complicated as associations as "collective actors" are examined first as parts of synchronic total or subsystem; and second as parts of diachronic systems or social fields struggling about stakes using their own capacities. In the latter perspective associations should be seen – not as static parts of a system but – as trajectories, as proactive or reactive, rising or declining, integrating or disintegrating actors. And these dynamic actors, for their part, act as mediators between individual actors lives or personal trajectories and societal subsystems on different levels, from local to international spheres. Therefore surveys that have yielded a lot of interesting results have to be complemented with studies of individual, social and collective practices all of which are connected with different forms of associational practice.

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Missing Link between Trust and Participation? A country comparison

Antti Kouvo

> "Is that just an accident, or is there really some necessary connection between association and equality?"
> (Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America)

Introduction

Possible benefits of associations have puzzled scholars of the sources and mechanisms of social capital. The reciprocal relationship between trust and civic engagement, the so-called Tocquevillean (1835) model has been an often-presented supposition in the social capital literature. Besides indicating the vitality of civil society in general, associations are believed to bring about a multitude of possible beneficial outcomes such as bringing together people from different backgrounds, enhancing trust in others and in public institutions and thus supporting political involvement and awareness. (Tocqueville 1981 [1835]; Putnam 1993: 2000; Brehm & Rahn 1997). However, several recent studies have questioned the importance of associations for the society as a whole. Several empirical findings, especially in Europe, have revealed that compared to other relevant determinants, the link between associational membership and its suggested outcomes such as generalized and institutional trust, is relatively weak (Freitag 2003; Kumlin & Rothstein 2005; Kouvo 2005).

The real importance of associations is also questioned because other forms of social life, such as family or other informal networks might have as great an impact on trust as formal associations, whose impact

on social capital is often rather limited at the individual level (Freitag 2003; Stolle 2003). However, the Tocquevillean model has also been updated, partly in response to this criticism. It is suggested that the effects of associational activity may have importance at the community or country level as so-called "rainmaker effects". This means that also non-members of associations may benefit from vibrant associational activity in certain region or country and thus the individual level relationships might not be easily observable. (van der Meer 2003; Putnam.) In other words, we should also take into account the external effects of associations on those that do not belong to them.

While the Tocquevillean model suggests a bottom-up mechanism between grass root social interactions and trust (society centered mechanism), it is also possible to emphasize fair and well-functioning social and political institutions as the most important determinants of trust in society (institution centered mechanism). This means that trust in society is generated from above by non-corrupted and fair public institutions. Both political and impartial institutions are considered fundamental sources of generalized trust in society. (Rothstein & Stolle 2003;)

This chapter revisits the relationship between associations and trust. However, to enrich our understanding of the issue, we approach this relationship from two perspectives at the same time by testing both the institution and society centred mechanisms. Self-reported confidence in government and participation in associations are used as independent variables in separate analyses. While we already know that the relationship between participation in associations and trust may be weak, also the possible "rainmaker effects" of associations are taken into account by analyzing the impact of national level associational activity on non-members of associations.

Trust and civic engagement

At the community level social capital may be shortly defined as a "societal resource that links citizens to each other and enables them to pursue their common objectives more efficiently" (Stolle 2003, 19). Despite disagreement on the exact definition among scholars, the elements of social capital are often defined and measured as trust, norms of reciprocity and interaction networks (Putnam 1993; Hooghe & Stolle 2003, 2). In this chapter we approach social capital through the interplay of trust in other citizens and government with networks that are created through associational memberships.

The definitions of trust and confidence relate primarily to the logic of trust, but we can also simply categorize trust from the point of view of the level on which it is placed, or as a continuum running through different levels (Misztal 1996, 72). Analytically speaking, trust may occur in "the isolated dyad of two actors, between individuals in the presence of third parties and between an individual and the collection of individuals" (Barber 1983; Paxton 1999, 98). The dependent variable, generalized trust expresses to what extent people rely on each other - also on those they do not personally know. This indicator is often seen as the most fundamental measure of the type of social capital that bridges even previously unknown citizens together. For example Putnam (2000, 137-139) argues that though this item certainly reflects some personal psychological characteristics, it is mostly based on actual personal experiences of others in surrounding society. Thus reporting distrust reveals something about the social environment the respondent lives in.

The second element, institutional confidence, focuses on actors and institutions such as politicians, officials and organizations. In most of the empirically oriented studies citizens' confidence in public institutions is supposed to be closely linked with generalized trust and civic engagement (see, eg., Brehm & Rahn 1997, Freitag 2003, Kouvo 2005; Paxton 1999; Oorschoot et al. 2006). It is also suggested that instead of being an outcome of generalized trust, the trustworthiness

of public institutions may function as a source of it. This explanation is based on the idea that the emergence of interpersonal trust necessitates that societal and political institutions provide a fair and efficient environment in which trusting or civic mindedness will be rewarded and not exploited. (Rothstein & Stolle 2003.) Thus we may argue that those who have confidence in institutions may end up also being civic and trusting each other.

Associations are considered one cornerstone of social capital. Those that belong to and participate in voluntary associations are supposed to have higher levels of trust in both other citizens and public institutions. This Tocquevillean relationship between trust and civic engagement is fundamental for the entire social capital theory. For example in the works of Robert Putnam (1993, 2000) it is assumed that civic engagement and generalized trust influence each other, and that together they promote confidence in institutions. As mentioned before, these assumptions have been challenged. First, it seems that, especially in Europe, the link between civic engagement and trust appears to be weak at the individual level while at the aggregate level country comparisons there is a strong connection between them. As we can see from the Figure 1, participation in associations and generalized trust are at the highest level in Nordic countries and lowest in Southern Europe, Russia and Japan. USA, Great Britain, Ireland and continental Europe situate themselves somewhere in the middle. The Figure is in line with already known macro-level correlations of participation and trust (see. eg. Newton 2001).

Figure 1. Memberships in at least one association and generalized trust. Percentages by country.



The less studied dynamics, however, is the possible "rainmaker effects" of associations. The term is based on the ideas of Putnam et al. (2000) arguing that the "rain" produced by civic engagement and generalized trust does not only affect active citizens but also inactive ones. Van der Meer (2003) has tested this mechanism with an elegant research design including both national and regional levels. The study gave only weak support on the idea of rainmakers at the country level, but at the communal level the density of associations was positively associated with generalized and institutional trust felt by those that do not participate.

The idea of this chapter is to diversify the picture of these previous studies with the ISSP data. At first, the impact of associational memberships and institutional confidence on generalized trust is analyzed at the individual level. Second, to detect possible rainmaker effects, the impact of national associational density on non-members is approached with analysis combining data from different levels of observation.

Research questions, data and methods

The aim of the chapter is to evaluate the importance of associational activity on generalized trust between citizens. At first the differences in associational activity and generalized trust between countries are presented in descriptively. After that, the relationship between associational activity and trust is approached by multivariate analyses. The empirical research questions are can be summarized as following:

1. What is the relationship between associational activity and generalized trust among respondents and how does it vary between different types of countries (society-centred explanation)?
2. What is the impact of institutional confidence on generalized trust (institution-centred explanation)?
3. What is the impact of associational density on non-members of associations (rainmaker-effects explanation)?

The data are from International Social Survey Program (ISSP) Citizenship dataset from the year 2004 (N=18 993) from 13 countries (Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, Netherlands, Great Britain, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Russia, USA, Japan).

Generalized trust is measured by agreement with statement "generally speaking people can be trusted." The originally four-step variable is dichotomized for the purposes of analyses ("You usually/almost always can't be too careful in dealing with people" =0; "People can usually/almost always be trusted"=1). This item is also probably the most popular measure of generalized trust or "faith in people" and was first published in the study of Rosenberg (1956).

Institutional confidence is measured by agreement with the statement "most of the time we can trust people in government to do what is right". This item is slightly problematic, since the term government may imply various different meanings in different countries. However, we can trust it to indicate citizens' confidence in officials or politicians. The item was originally a five-step variable but was categorized into three classes.

Membership indicates whether respondent is currently a member of association. Active and passive members are collapsed in the same category. Items on which this variable is based are used as a single general indicator of belonging to any association and separately representing memberships in different associations (political party, trade union, church, sports associations and "other" associations).

Socio-demographic variables *age* and *education* are used as demographic control-variables. There is some evidence of the presence of education and life cycle or cohort effects (Patterson 1999; Putnam 2000). These well-known determinants are used here to control the effect of other relevant variables.

Logistic regression is chosen as the method of analysis in order to evaluate the effects of the selected independent variables. In the analyses we apply multinomial logistic regression (MLR) procedure. In general, MLR can be recommended for the analysis of dichotomous dependent variables as well, because in most contemporary software applications it has many options not available in the binary procedure (e.g. Tabachnick & Fidell 2001, p. 521-523). The effects of the independent variables in the models are presented with the odd ratios (Expß). The pseudo-coefficients of the determination of the models are also reported in the tables (Nagelkerke Pseudo R^2).

Trust, associations and institutional confidence

The results of logistic regression analyses of explaining generalized trust in 13 different countries are presented in Table 1. When other determinants are controlled for, there is a significant link between generalized trust and association membership in Sweden, Germany, Ireland and Spain. However, in Norway, Finland, Denmark, Netherlands, Great Britain, Portugal and Russia this link is relatively weak.

Table 1. Generalized trust in selected countries. Logistic regression models, Odds-ratios Exp(β) presented

	Finland	Sweden	Denmark	Norway	Germany	Nether-lands	Great Britain	Ireland	Spain	Portugal	Russia	USA	Japan
Age													
-33	1.12	1.94**	2.26**	.99	1.64*	1.06	.47**	.64	1.05	.71	.70	.57**	1.40
34-52	1.19	2.40***	2.83***	1.54	1.50	1.09	1.08	1.09	1.07	.96	.80	.73	.94
53-69	.91	1.41	1.94**	1.35	1.35	1.14	1.24	.74	1.33	.95	1.12	1.05	1.09
70- (ref.)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Education													
Primary/less	.29***	.23***	.44*	.23***	.30***	.19***	.39***	.36***	.29***	.33***	1.34	.15***	.62*
Secondary	.42***	.42***	.71	.35***	.59*	.45***	.62*	.50***	.53***	.46***	1.01	.41***	.68*
Tertiary (ref.)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Institutional confidence	.34***	.27***	.45***	.37***	.40***	.38***	.34***	.51***	.52***	.56***	.71*	.27***	.24***
Disagree	.53***	.40***	.65*	.55***	.75	.55***	.50***	.76	.83	.75	1.02	.54***	.34***
Neutral	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Agree(ref.)													
Membership													
No	.90	.45***	.44*	.74	.61***	.86	.83	.49***	.75***	1.10	.94	.73*	.76*
Yes (ref.)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Nagelkerke Pseudo R	.11	.18	.07	.12	.11	.12	.11	.09	.07	.05	.02	.17	.07

*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

The finding is interesting, because in the macro-level descriptive analyses (Figure 1.), for example Nordic countries seemed to be pretty similar, but here we can see that the individual level link between generalized trust and association membership exists only in Sweden. It is also surprising that in the USA this association is non-significant.

Institutional confidence seems to explain generalized trust a lot better than association memberships. In all countries except Russia and Japan, confidence in governmental institutions seems to promote trust in fellow citizens very well. It is still possible that this is also because of the fact that these two types of trust are overlapping each other to a certain degree.

As a control variable, education seems to increase generalized trust as well. Those with higher education seem to trust other previously unknown citizens much more likely than low-educated. In most of the selected countries, differences between age groups are not statistically significant, though in Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain and USA age has some impact. When in these two Nordic countries younger generations seem to be more trusting, in Great Britain and USA the effect of age is the opposite. In fact, age has even stronger main effect on generalized trust, but controlling for education diminishes the significance of it in many countries. However, as studies on the relationship between age and generalized trust have shown (Torcal & Montero 1999; Robinson & Jackson 2001), the substantial between-country differences found here may stem equally from age, period and generation effects which are also more or less specific for each individual country.

In general, it is possible to see that the chosen determinants explain generalized trust in certain countries in a satisfactory way. However, for example in Russia, Japan and Southern Europe these relationships are less visible. It seems that though membership in association is an individual choice, it has only little impact on personal feelings concerning the trustworthiness of other people. Thus, to argue over the importance of associations on generalized trust, it might be useful to look also at the impact of associational life also on those that do not belong to them.

In Table 2 logistic regression models explaining generalized trust of non-members of associations in all 13 countries are presented. As in the case of all citizens, education and institutional confidence are also strong determinants of generalized trust of non-members of associations. The impact of age is, again, relatively weak.

Table 2. Generalized trust of non-members in 13 countries. Logistic regression, Odds-ratios Exp (β) presented

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Age						
-33	.89	.99	1.00	.92	.89	.88
34-52	1.00	1.10	1.12	1.05	.99	1.00
53-69	1.21	1.29*	1.28*	1.25*	1.20	1.22*
70- (ref.)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Education						
Primary/less	.43***	.48***	.49***	.45***	.42***	.43***
Secondary	.60***	.60***	.60***	.60***	.61***	.60***
Tertiary (ref.)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Institutional confidence	.51***	.52***	.54***	.53***	.50***	.54***
Disagree	.76***	.78***	.78***	.79**	.74***	.78***
Neutral	1	1	1	1	1	1
Agree (ref.)						
Memberships in country						
Any association	5.73***					
Political Party		4.17***				
Trade Union			3.94***			
Church				3.41***		
Sports etc.					16.01***	
Other						64.48***
Nagelkerke Pseudo R	.07	.04	.05	.05	.08	.08

*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

To examine the possible rainmaker effects of associations, the share of memberships in certain associations in each country was included in the model. All associational activity in the country seems to increase also generalized trust of non-members. The amount of memberships

in interest organizations such as political parties and trade unions as well as church are all important factors. However, the most important finding is that more loosely knit associations such as sport clubs are even more important for the level of generalized trust, also of citizens that do not belong to them.

The finding is in line with Granovetter's (1973) idea of "the strength of the weak ties". Various overlapping networks that are not interest-based might be even more important for the cohesion of society than more formal and interest based ones. It might be that sport and other leisure time associations gather people from more diverse backgrounds than political parties and trade unions. Thus they may also more effectively facilitate trust in previously unknown fellow citizens and thus build the "bridging" type of social capital between socially heterogeneous groups. However, we should still keep in mind that also the presence other types of organizations predicted trust of non-members relatively well.

Discussion

The analyses show that the relationship between association membership and generalized trust varies to a great degree between different countries. Results also confirm the previously known fact that at the individual level this relationship may be relatively weak. However, institutional confidence seems to predict well generalized trust in almost all countries in the sample. Does this mean that institution-centred explanation is absolutely right and associations have little to contribute as sources of generalized trust in society?

The whole picture is probably not as clear-cut. As the analyses done with non-members of associations revealed, the mechanism through which associations promote generalized trust in society is situated between macro and micro levels of society. Even when controlling for

institutional trust, living in a nation with dense associational network seems to increase the likeliness of trust for fellow citizens.

Some degree of caution is in order when interpreting results of these analyses that mix together information from both aggregate and individual levels. At first, the range of different types of associations available in our data might narrow and bias the picture of possibly even more diverse associational profile of some countries. Secondly, there is a risk of ecological or individualistic fallacies when inferences about the nature of individuals are based upon aggregate statistics collected for the group to which those individuals belong (see. Robinson 1950). However, in this chapter we have tried to minimize this risk by restricting the analysis only to those that do not belong to associations. As van der Meer (2003, 135) noted, if even among non-members a significant relationship is found, then there surely is some connection between associational density at the macro level and generalized trust at the individual level. It seems clear that effects of associations for the cohesion of society are not restricted only to those who are members. Even non-members and thus society in general benefit from vital civil society characterized by active joiners of associations.

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Divergent Citizenship

Raimo Blom

This chapter investigates different conceptions of citizenship. The ISSP survey included a set of questions concerning the respondents' perceptions of good citizenship. (see Appendix 1, q: 29). Thinking about the question theoretically, we discover that there are many different aspects, attributes and dimensions important for the idea of citizenship. Just to mention a few, the concept of citizenship entails various rights and obligations, which frame different relations to social and political action. Citizenship can also refer to different kinds of interrelationships between resources, social position and the realisation of rights in society. These, in turn, have implications to differences in relation to the possibilities to monitor and control the use of power in society. The scale of citizens' orientations can vary significantly, too, from local to global or cosmopolitan loyalties and sense of belongingness (Merton 1957, 387-420, Delanty 2000).

Many questions concerning citizenship were first dealt with in the political theory and philosophy of the rising bourgeoisie (from Hobbes to Locke and Rousseau, and already criticised by Marx and others; Blom 1982). In practice, those questions were posed during bourgeois revolutions, especially the French Revolution. The problems of basic citizen rights surfaced in early political theories. Questions in relation to public political power, such as Hobbes' Leviathan, also

came into attention. The latter type of question, in fact, concerns the citizen's relation to the absolute state power and the possibilities to control it. This question found its pragmatic solutions in the form of constitutions and different Fundamental laws. It was also settled in different theories of democracy. Moving into modern times, the list of basic rights was expanded from the right to private ownership and the basic freedom and political rights to other economic rights and to social and cultural rights.

People's conceptions of citizenship do not derive from legal theory. Thus, there is more to citizenship beliefs and values than merely rights and obligations. The following pages compare the citizenship beliefs in different countries using the ten-item scale of the ISSP data from 2004 (see Appendix 1). The questions deal with what can be expected of the good citizen. In fact, the survey concentrated on the perceived importance of different aspects in being a good citizen. This is one of the focal points of the survey. Moreover, variables measuring political and social participation were also included in the analysis.

The text proceeds as follows: first, the topics and methods are described briefly. The first question is how important the different aspects are for the good citizen. The purpose here is to construct a ranking list of the importance of different aspects of citizenship. A comparison is also made on the importance of the different citizenship elements in different countries. An analysis is then conducted on the main dimension of the "good citizen". The method used is factor analysis. The main descriptive task then follows. The countries are positioned in the factor space using the citizenship dimensions as pairs in the description. In the interpretation of the comparative country results, I am mainly interested in the differences among the EU-countries. The outer reference point consists of some non-EU countries (the United States, Russia and Japan) and the average ISSP countries. The special emphasis in the country comparison is Finland, as well as the Nordic countries. Finally, it is analysed whether there is any relation between the differences in citizenship beliefs and action in the capitalism and welfare state regimes presented in the literature. The references used

are Crouch and Streeck (1997), especially Boyer (1997) on the types of capitalism, and Esping-Andersen (1990 and 1999) in the case of welfare regimes.

The basis of Boyer's classification for types of capitalism is the distinctive forms of labour market relations, their institutional characteristics, and adjustments and the consequential advantages and disadvantages, respectively. The four types of capitalism are 'market-oriented' (USA, Canada and Britain), 'Rhineland or corporatist' (Germany, Japan), 'statist' (France, Italy), and 'social democrat' (Sweden Austria) (Boyer 1997, 90; table 4.6.).

Esping-Andersen separates three welfare regimes: 'liberal' (USA as modal example), 'social democratic' (the Nordic countries) and 'conservative' (Germany, Italy) (Esping-Andersen 1999, 73-). The original basis was the de-commodification of welfare or the decrease in the commodity nature of labour power. In the liberal model, few rights and a low level of de-commodification mean that the liberal welfare regime is almost completely Anglo-Saxon: it comprises the United States, Canada, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, and Britain. The social democratic welfare regime includes the Nordic countries, and the conservative model almost all the other countries. There are different variants inside the three welfare regimes and, in some cases, the situation has changed after Esping-Andersen's latter book. Thus, a valid starting point for the interpretation of the results is Esping-Andersen's three regime model.

The importance of citizenship elements

The idea of citizenship developed historically in different times. The most famous presentation of the matter is Marshall's contribution (1950). In Marshall's model, legal rights derive from the 17-18th centuries, political rights from the18-19th centuries and social rights from the 19-20th centuries. The institutions supporting citizen's different

basic rights, such as the parliament for political rights or the welfare state for social rights developed in various historical conditions. Nowadays, cultural rights have also gained an entirely new meaning in the global world (Pakulski 1997). Marshall has also been criticized (Turner 1997). It can be criticized by stating that his framework is not sensitive enough to the consequences of citizenship at the end product level, and to the distinction between the formal and substantial rights.

The different categories of citizen rights have different functions, and the rights are also often in conflict with each other. (Tuschling 1976, Blom 1982). These basic conflicts derive from the difficulties to construct a valid concept of legal state. Another reason is the dependence of all the other rights on the economic rights and social position. Because of the economic dependence, the concept of citizenship is always incomplete and impossible to realise in practice. David Lockwood (1996) speaks about two sets of social categories that can be unequal: classes and different citizen categories. The latter are identified through "their different capacities to exercise various rights, their social categorisation by rights themselves, and their motivation to extend and enlarge them". In an empirical study investigating the conceptions of the citizen, it is possible to see the emphases of the different aspects of citizenship and interpret the relation between different elements.

The next table summarises the perceived importance of different matters for the good citizen in the order of their importance in the entire ISSP data. The table presents the sums of the percentages of classes 6 and 7 on a 7-point scale (1-7) where 7 is "very important". The table also includes the same percentages in the Nordic countries, the EU-countries and the non-EU-countries.

Table 1. To be a good citizen: the importance of different matters (%)

	Total ISSP	Nordic countries	EU-countries	Non-EU countries
Always to obey laws and regulations	78	74	74	83
Never to try to evade taxes	73	68	70	76
Always to vote in elections	68	75	63	74
To help the people in [country] who are worse off than yourself	63	63	51	57
To try to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions	62	62	59	65
To keep watch on the actions of government	56	52	48	65
To help the people in the rest of the world who are worse off than yourself	45	36	42	49
To be willing to serve in the military at a time of need	44	43	36	51
To choose products for political, ethical or environmental reasons	34	29	33	35
To be active in social or political associations	27	14	20	34

The differences between the qualities that people find important for the good citizen are substantial. This means that in people's conception of citizenship there are different fields of importance. The difference between the importance of abiding the law and being active in the civil society is over 50 percentages. Tentatively, we can find three blocks according to the hierarchy of the importance of an aspect for good citizenship. The first group of important qualities includes obeying laws, not evading the taxes, voting, as well as trying to understand other people. Another category, of relatively high importance, includes

helping people who are worse off in one's own country and the rest of the world, keeping watch on the actions of the government, and being willing to serve in the military at a time of need. Finally, there are the qualities of low importance, political, ethical and environmental reasons for choosing the products, and being active in social and political associations.

There are substantial differences in the perceived importance of the good citizen's characteristics between the countries and country groups. Some differences between the country groups are noticeable. Examples of the differences between the countries are presented in the context of the factor-score comparison of the countries.

People in the non-EU-countries and all the ISSP-countries find all studied good citizen qualities more important than the respondents in the EU-countries. In choosing products for political, ethical or environmental reasons those country groups are at the same level. The difference is the most substantial regarding the perceived importance of helping people in one's own country. The importance of this aspect is lower in the EU-countries. The other aspects, in which the EU-counties are also clearly at a lower level than all the ISSP-countries or the non-EU countries, are keeping watch on the government, serving the military at a time of need, and being active in social and political associations.

The main finding is the all-around difference between the EU-countries and the non-EU countries. We can ask what the explanation is to this cleavage in the conceptions of necessary qualities for the good citizen. One possible explanation is need based. In the EU-countries, the citizens' position and citizen rights have, on average, been relatively stable for longer than in the non-EU-countries. Citizenship in non-EU countries creates the need for almost all the qualities of the good citizen mentioned in the study. It is worth noting that, in the case of the United States, most qualities of the good citizen are also considered especially important in comparison to other countries. This implies that in addition to the perceived need for further democratic development, also normative and cultural conceptions of the nature of good citizenship play a role.

The differences between the EU-countries and the Nordic countries are different in each issue. The Nordic countries value voting in elections and helping people in one's own country higher than the EU countries. Astonishingly, helping people who are worse off than you in the rest of the world is not seen as particularly important quality for the good citizen in the Nordic countries. This finding clearly goes against the image of the Nordic countries as exemplary and even altruistic members of the global community. In the EU-countries, serving in the military at a time of need and being active in associations are more important characteristics of the good citizen than in the Nordic countries. These results are not easy to interpret.

Dimensions of the good citizen

The dimensions and later measures (factor scores) were formed by using factor analysis. The data in the factor analysis were all the ISSP-survey respondents (n = 52 550). There were 8632 missing cases, a total of 16. 4%. The number of respondents in the final analysis was 43 918.

Three factors explained 57.7 percent of the variance. The eigenvalues were 3.4 (I factor) 1.3 (II factor) and 1.0 (III factor). The factor analysis of the good citizen's qualities that gave the best result in the varimax rotation was a solution of three factors.

Interpreting the factors is relatively easy, even if the loadings of two variables were split into two factors. The first factor is called **Political citizenship**. In it, the activity in associations gets the highest loading. It is, actually, a proxy for activities in the civil society. The following two variables, voting in elections and keeping watch on the government, are political obligations included in the concept of the good citizen. The last aspect in the first factor is choosing products for political, ethical or environmental reasons. The core of this variable is ethical or moral. All in all, the first factor is political citizenship with key responsibilities associated with the concept. All these variables have a strong moral ele-

ment in common with the choosing product variable. Thus, the first factor links together political and moral elements in its content. The division of a part of the loadings to the law-abiding citizen also in a way shows the importance of moral elements in the first factor.

The second factor is the dimension of **Social citizenship**. The main loadings are on the variables concerning helping those who are worse off than the respondents themselves in the rest of world or in one's own country. The variable "understanding" does not have any clear place in any one factor. For obvious reasons, it gets minor loadings both in the political citizen and in the factor of social citizen.

The third factor is **Law-abiding citizenship**. The core in it is the law-abiding person who never tries to evade taxes. Smaller and related moral loading on the third factor comes from choosing products for political, ethical or environmental reasons. It can be said that the the term "subject" meaning an individual being under central state power, as opposed to an autonomous citizen subject (Althusser 1971) finds its expression here.

Table 2. Rotated factor matrix of the importance of the qualities of good citizen

	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III
Active in associations	.725		
Keep watch on government	.710		
Vote always in elections	.618		.407
Choose products for political			
ethical or environmental reasons	.587		
Help less privileged/world		.856	
Help less privileged/own country		.834	
Understand other opinions	.453	.455	
Always obey laws			.837
Never try to evade taxes			.818

Table 3. The loadings in the non-rotated factor matrix

Contact with politicians	.723
Contact media	.704
Attend political meeting or rally	.697
Take part in demonstration	.680
Sign a petition	.677
Boycott certain products	.669
Donate money or raise funds	.636
Join an Internet political forum	.589

The loadings were very even. The factor explained 45.3 percent of the joint variance of the variables. Contact with politicians variable is slightly higher than the other variables, and donating money and especially joining an Internet forum are lower than the loadings of the other variables. The factor score scale of these items is called **Participation**.

The comparison of countries

The factor scores above presenting three dimensions of good citizenship and the factor of Participation are used in the comparative analysis. The theoretical background for the analysis and interpretation of the comparative results is the differentiation between countries according to the types of capitalism and the welfare state regimes. The results are presented in the following figures. The factor scores for each country are marked in a two-dimensional space. The constant dimension in the country comparisons is Political citizenship. It is the dimension that explains the greatest part of the joint variance of "What it takes to be good citizen" variables. Each of the three other dimensions is presented in turns, paired with it one by one. The main purpose is to

Figure 1. Political citizenship and social citizenship (means of factor scores; central point = total ISSP)



investigate how the countries' position changes depending on the two dimensions used at a time.

If we start with the viewpoint of Finland, we can see that the country is different from any other country in the analysis. The main reason is the low importance of the political citizenship in the Finns' conceptions of the good citizen. The importance of the political citizenship is lower in Finland than in other countries. Finland is, in large part, below the other Nordic countries. Among the other Nordic countries, the distinctions are not substantial. Sweden is slightly above

Denmark and Norway. Nearest to Finland, then, are Great Britain and Germany.

Despite Finland, Great Britain and Germany being on the weak side and Portugal and the United States on the strong side of the political citizenship, the differences in the strength of the political citizenship between countries are not extensive. Ireland and Spain, as well as the entire group of the non-EU countries are at the same level with the Nordic countries other than Finland.

As regards social citizenship, a small group of countries is considerably nearer to the strong end of the social citizenship than the others. All the other countries are more or less at the same level. The exceptions are Spain, Portugal and Ireland in which the social citizenship is at a higher level than in the other countries. The totality of the non-EU countries is mildly on this side of the average of the ISSP countries. In the dimension of social citizenship, Finland is above the weakest countries. In this respect, Russia, Sweden and Japan are even slightly weaker than Finland.

What do the results in figure 1, then, reveal about different larger 'citizenship regimes'? The two-dimensional picture refers to the following conclusion. First, there is the block of countries in which Sweden and Denmark are together with the Netherlands. United States is also close to this group. The latter result is slightly difficult to understand from the point of view of welfare regimes or types of capitalism as the Nordic welfare state regime differs remarkably from the Neo-liberal US model.

A group slightly less tight than the one mentioned above consists of Japan, Russia, Germany and Great Britain. The entire group of the EU-countries, on average, belongs in this category. Of the remaining countries Portugal, like Finland in the opposite direction, is clearly distinct from the other countries. The closest neighbours of Portugal are Ireland and Spain which are relatively close to each other. The entire group of the non-EU countries is relatively close to Ireland and Spain.

All in all, the clearest result can be seen in the group of the Nordic countries, excluding Finland. It makes sense that the Netherlands is

a part of this group. The opposites of the Nordic group are Germany and Great Britain, and on the other side, Ireland and Spain. Finland and Portugal, as each other's opposites, are the lone ones in terms of the political and social citizenship.

It is also possible to provide an example of the difference between the countries. For this purpose, I use the variable "Keep watch on government" from the first factor. It has a high factor loading and is seen as relatively important for the good citizen.

Using two classes in the "very important" end of the variable, we see that there is a clear differentiation between countries. At the top, there is the United States. Other countries that perceive keeping watch on the actions of the government more important than other coun-

Figure 2. Good citizen obeys laws



tries are Sweden, Ireland, and Portugal. USA is 19 percent above the average in the ISSP countries and the other top countries mentioned some ten percent above the average. The clearly lowest figure (nearly a half below the average) is in Finland. Finland is also clearly below the Nordic countries, especially Sweden.

There is a change in the composition of the citizenship groups when Law-abiding citizenship is substituted for Social citizenship. The group around the Nordic countries (excluding Finland) changes its form. Thus, Spain joins Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands in their category. Denmark is now further from the group than earlier. It can still, however, be said to have stayed in the near neighbourhood. The

Figure 3. Political citizenship and law-abiding citizenship



average of the EU countries is, in fact, almost within the same distance from the Nordic cluster as Denmark, while Ireland and the average of the non-EU countries are relatively close to these countries.

What is left of the countries after the large Nordic group? Germany remains in its old place, alone. Great Britain has changed its position because of the greater Law-abiding citizenship than in Germany. Finland also stays in its place far from the other countries. Portugal and the United State are at the opposite end from Finland in the high Political citizenship and higher Law-abiding citizenship. In the Law-abiding citizenship, the United States together with Great Britain are the law-abiding countries. On the same side with them are also Russia and Japan with their position changed to the right compared to the earlier country picture.

The formation of the country categories is not very different compared with the country groups in the picture above where the Social and Political citizenship were the axes. Replacing Social citizenship with Law-abiding citizenship provides a manner of opposite picture on country groups and positions.

The last picture of the country groups is the Political citizenship examined together with the more action oriented measure of Political and Social Participation.

The comparative positions are now different compared to the earlier analysis. Russia and Japan are far from the other countries. The average of the non-EU countries also relocates to this side. The distance between Japan and Russia is also relatively long. The group of Nordic countries including the Netherlands is very clear. Spain, Ireland and United States can also be seen as a part of this county category in a larger sense. Finland, Great Britain and Germany are relatively far from the Nordic group, Finland of course being the most distant country. Still, it should be remembered that in Participation, Great Britain, Finland and Germany are relatively close to the large Nordic group of countries. The demarcation line is between Russia, Japan and the non-EU countries, in this order, and all the other countries.

Figure 4. Political citizenship and participation



Conclusion: Divergent Citizenship

The results reveal two points. First, there is a clear, relatively consistent ranking as regards the characteristics expected from the good citizen by the respondents. Secondly, almost all characteristics are perceived as more important in the countries outside the EU. The possible interpretation here is the longer stable period in the citizenship position in

the EU countries than in the other parts of the world. The perceived importance of the citizenship characteristics depends on the need. This can mean that there is more willingness to make an effort for the better realisation of citizenship in the countries outside the EU.

The dimensions of the good citizen's qualities are relatively clear. The main dimension is the Political citizenship. It is followed by the Social citizenship and the Law-abiding citizenship. The first dimension is very wide. It includes moral demands for the good citizen's action. The second factor is about helping people in more disadvantageous position than the respondents themselves. This factor reflects the feeling of collective responsibility, whereas the third factor concerns the respect for law. Considering the historical layers of the citizenship rights, the third dimension refers to the historically oldest layer. The second factor is associated with newest developments, and the first dimension has some connotations of the moral kind, together with the Law-abiding citizenship

When the countries are positioned in the space in which the axes are the factor score of the political and social citizenship, the main result is distinguishing the block of Nordic countries (excluding Finland). In the neighbourhood of this larger 'Nordic' group we can find the United States, Japan and Russia, i.e. all the countries selected to be the criteria for the analysis of the EU-countries. Portugal and Finland, the countries on the opposite sides of the factor space, are clear non-members of the Nordic group. Ireland and Spain are also relatively far from the group of Nordic countries. The reason for Finland's separate position is the low scoring in the Political citizenship and, for Ireland and Spain, the high scoring in the Social citizenship. Portugal is also higher in the Political citizenship than other countries.

Combining the law-abiding citizenship with the political citizenship in the picture, the positions do not change considerably from the earlier findings. Now, the United States are farther than Portugal from the Nordic group of countries, and there is a longer distance between Germany and Great Britain than in the earlier picture. This is due to Great Britain's higher score in the Law-abiding citizenship. Finland is relatively low on both axes.

Adding Participation to the analysis transforms the country positions. The larger and tighter collection of countries is now around the Nordic countries and the Netherlands. Farthest from them, due to a low scoring in participation are Japan and Russia. Russia is the most distant country in low participation. Germany, Finland and Great Britain are close to the main group of countries in participation but due to the low scores in political citizenship they do not belong in the group around the Nordic countries. In Participation, Finland is slightly above the weakest countries. The participation is slightly higher in Finland than in Ireland, Spain, Great Britain and Portugal, as well as in the EU counties on average.

It could be asked, what the results reveal about the unity of the EU countries. The main result is that there is a relatively clear block of countries around the Nordic focus. The political citizenship, which is also the most important dimension of the 'good citizen', results in a tight group of Nordic countries in connection with the social citizenship. The other two analyses of country positions, the Political citizenship with the Law-abiding citizenship, and the Political citizenship with Participation, refer to an even larger gathering of countries around the Nordic focus.

The analysis of countries with the main citizenship axes as coordinates do not provide any clear groups of countries other than the Nordic group. The comparison of the results to the types of capitalism or welfare state regimes weakly refers to some new developments. The Netherlands is very clearly at the centre of Nordic group of countries. Finland does not belong in the group. Great Britain and Germany are a possible example of a conservative block. The United States as the modal type of liberal welfare regime is relatively separate. Portugal is also separate because of the strong commitment to social citizenship.

The EU countries differ from the non-EU countries. In the non-EU countries, the Social citizenship is more important than in the EU countries. The same is true also with the Law-abiding citizenship. The results also show the special status of participation as action-bound criterion of citizenship. Here, the difference between Russia

and Japan is clear. In these countries, political and social activity is not considered important. In Finland, the participation is at the level of the other countries.

All in all, the results reveal many differences between countries with different welfare regimes. However, much depends on the criteria of citizenship. From the European point of view, and especially in the Nordic countries, a critical question is the low perceived importance of Social citizenship and helping people worse off. The EU countries are weaker in Social citizenship than the non-EU countries, and in the Nordic countries, the situation is worse that in the other EU countries.

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Still Citizen vs. State? Post-Communist Prospects for Democracy in Europe

Mikko Lagerspetz

During the past two decades, the European subcontinent has gone through a profound geopolitical restructuring – larger than has ever before taken place there without warfare.[1] Among other things, the fall of Real Socialism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia brought several newly independent countries on the map of Europe. But even more important than the emergence of new or re-established states was that an end was put to the former division of Europe and to the bipolar world. The removal of the dividing line between the power blocs of the Cold War opened way for an eastward enlargement of Western-based international organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), along with the transfer of capital, institutional models and political discourses. The political system that was previously (by Western observers, not by the official Marxist-Leninist ideology or by the concerned populations themselves) called Communism was now replaced by something that became depicted as Post-Communism.

As such, the concept of Post-Communism is not uncontested. The best way to find a working definition for it is probably by referring to commonalities within a set of societies that, despite their varying cultural and historical backgrounds, share several decades' experience of a unifying political system with totalitarian ambitions, the popular

rejection of it, and the specific challenges that arise from a rapid simultaneous transformation of economics, politics and social and cultural life (see, e.g., Holmes 1997: 15-21).

The aim of the present chapter is to investigate some of the ways in which specificities of Post-Communism can be thought of being revealed by an international comparison of the ISSP 2004 survey results.

Remarks on Post-Communist civic culture

By now (and by 2004 already, when the survey to be discussed in this chapter was done), several of the formerly Real Socialist Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have become members of both the EU and the NATO, and others are seriously negotiating on membership. The rule of law, liberal democracy and capitalism are characteristics of these societies[2] in the same way as they characterise Western Europe. It is justified to ask, whether it any more makes sense to attach to them such a label as Post-Communism. The term can be seen as misleading: The new EU member states and the Candidate countries are, in large, confronted with issues that they share in common with other EU members. As put by the Finnish-Estonian political scientist Kristi Raik (2003: 20), "[t]here is probably already more variation among the Western, 'old' democracies than between some Western countries and the most successful CEECs. Meanwhile, all of them are faced with similar challenges posed by globalisation, and in Europe by European integration, for the functioning of democracy on a national level." Moreover, the label of Post-Communism can even be seen as derogatory; as a stigma attached to societies and people, who despite the continuing existence of many severe problems also have every right to be proud of what they have already accomplished in terms of political, economic, cultural and social development within an extremely short period of time.

The subject of this chapter is Post-Communist civic culture. However, its aim is by no means to argue that the shared Real Socialist past will forever remain the key feature for understanding the development of CEE societies. What will be maintained is, however, that the concept of Post-Communism is instrumental in pointing at the continuous effect on politics and society that a shared historical experience necessarily has; it is of course probable that with time, its explanatory power will be gradually reduced. Here, we could refer to the analogous concept of Post-Colonialism, which can be useful when discussing common traits between societies that share the same kind of history of subjugation to an external power centre – without insisting that this is the only possible perspective. The latter concept has its specific uses when criticising discourses and practices of colonial rule and neo-colonialism, or when seeking to understand the cultural practices of the decolonised world. Importantly, postcolonial criticism has also been able to gain wide acceptance to the idea of studying literature and other art forms as connected with the social structure and power relations in their respective societies, thus bringing down old disciplinary boundaries (Moore-Gilbert 1997: 8). In the same way, the focus on historical continuities that necessarily results from the adoption of the concept of Post-Communism serves to highlight the mutual dependency between cultural, social, political and economic developments, none of which can be properly understood without taking into account the others.

The interconnectedness of different spheres of development becomes visible within the realm of what can be called civic, or political culture (here, I treat the two terms as synonymous). The concept itself can be defined in several different ways; it is closely related to those of political participation and legitimacy, but of course, identical with neither of them. On the empirical level, a researcher can observe different patterns of political participation (or non-participation); there are methods of making judgements on the legitimacy of a political system or government. In contrast, political culture cannot be directly observed, but is rather something that the researcher has to construct

from scattered pieces of evidence. It can be understood as an underlying pattern, creating a predisposition of the society and individuals to perceive and produce political action in a certain way. Such a view of political culture points at it being rooted also in things rather distant from institutional politics. Authority relations in the family and between colleagues, religious beliefs, or historical narratives may serve as examples of phenomena connected with it. Importantly, political culture provides the members of society with a range of social roles and identities, which can be more or less diverse, with various types of relationship with political institutions and centres of authority. The roles and identities adopted by citizens will, in turn, influence how they behave. Both political action and how it is perceived are guided by a set of culturally defined roles, practices and ideas of reality. Inasmuch as they have relevance to politics, power, and authority, they can be said to be a part of political culture (Lagerspetz 1996: 29-31).

In the present analysis, comparisons will be made mostly between respondents in Western Europe and in the Post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Both geographical concepts require some clarification. Among the countries participating in the ISSP 2004 survey, "Western Europe" (WE) can be said to include Norway, Switzerland, and those countries that were EU members before 2004, with the exception of the former GDR. "Central and Eastern Europe" (CEE) will, in turn, refer to the former GDR, Bulgaria, and the countries that became members of the EU in 2004, with the exception of Cyprus. Russia will be treated as a separate case.

The division applied diverges somewhat from the often-used division between the "old" and the "new" EU members, and the non-members. The reason for this is precisely the search for continuities and specific traits of political culture that was discussed above. The CEE, as defined here, can be said to consist of countries and regions that became parts of the Socialist bloc during or immediately after the Second World War, and that by 2004 could be regarded as consolidated democracies in the sense that a return to authoritarian rule seemed excluded; in the sense that democracy had become "the only game in town" (Linz &

Stepan 1994). As to Russia and its Southern and Eastern allies in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), they are certainly a part of the Post-Communist region and have much in common with their Western next neighbours. However, both Russia's size and the insecure prospects of democratic development under and after President Putin's administration give reason to treat it in the present analysis as separate from (other parts of) Central and Eastern Europe.

In the following, we will first take a look at what the survey material can tell us about the relationship people have with institutional politics in CEE and compare it with how people think about it in Russia and in WE. In what senses does the legitimacy of democratic institutions and political power differ between the regions? And a related question: What is the attitude of citizens in different regions towards the plurality of interests and opinions in their society? Next, we will consider the ideas people have of alternative ways of exerting political influence, through the creation and use of non-institutional channels. After that, their reported activity in non-institutional civic participation will be discussed. Finally, some possible explanations will be suggested for the findings; they will, on one hand, be related to the legacy both from the Real Socialist era and from a more distant past. On the other, they will also be discussed as reflecting a general tendency in the Western world that could be referred to as a late modern (or post-modern) change of political participation patterns.

Institutional politics

The revolutionary change of late 1980s–early 1990s meant the abandonment of planned economy in favour of market economy; however, the change of political regime can be said to have been even more important. It was "freedom" and "democracy", not "market" nor "capitalism" that became the leading slogans of the revolutionary process. Multiparty systems and competitive elections were introduced and new

(or thoroughly revised) constitutions created throughout the region. Popular expectations regarding the new democratic institutions were high, and democracy became associated with a promise of growing material welfare as well. After initial euphoria and high expectations it became clear, however, that a change of political regime as such gave no guarantee of the state being better able to tackle the manifold problems accompanied by the economic transition (cf., e.g., Simon 1996). As a rule, the voter turnout declined rapidly in elections following the first full-fledged democratic elections in each country (see Berglund & al. 2004).

On one hand, the CEE societies have been able to avoid the temptation of a return to an authoritarian regime; even if political crises are not uncommon, they have been settled within the frameworks of the existing democratic constitutions. On the other hand, the popular legitimacy of institutional politics seems constantly to be lower than it is in the old democracies of WE. This conclusion can be drawn from a large number of former surveys, such as the Eurobarometer, and it is once again confirmed by results of the ISSP 2004 survey (see Table 1).

Table 1. Legitimacy of institutional politics in different European regions, selected indicators

Good citizen always votes		
	Total 1-3 (disagreement), percentages	Total 5-7 (agreement), percentages
WE	9.0	83.0
CEE	19.0	67.0
Russia	13.2	76.9
Honesty of latest elections		
	Very or somewhat dishonest	Very or somewhat honest
WE	4.6	85.7
CEE	14.0	54.6
Russia	31.1	38.5
People like me have no influence on what government does		
	Agree or strongly agree	Disagree or strongly disagree
WE	59.7	34.1
CEE	69.1	16.2
Russia	60.6	25.2
Democracy in my country today		
	Total 0-3 (works poorly), percentages	Total 7-10 (works well), percentages
WE	11.2	53.2
CEE	31.6	20.5
Russia	34.8	17.0
Democracy in my country in 10 years' time		
	Total 0-3 (works poorly), percentages	Total 7-10 (works well), percentages
WE	17.3	30.3
CEE	20.5	44.7
Russia	24.5	40.7

In CEE and Russia, voting is much less clearly considered a characteristic of a good citizen than it is in WE. This difference in attitude is related to how people in general tend to perceive the functionality of the institutions of political participation: a much larger percentage than in the WE – in Russia as large as 31.1 – were of the opinion that the latest elections in their country had been "very" or "somewhat" dishonest. Agreement with the statement, according to which people like the respondents themselves have no influence on what their government does, can be said to reflect political alienation. While more than a third of the respondents in WE countries disagreed with the statement, the share of those who disagreed ranged from around one quarter in Russia to less than one sixth in CEE.

In one aspect the results cited above run contrary to what could be expected. Due to their different geographical, political, cultural and economic proximity to WE, one could expect that the attitudes displayed by CEE citizens would be closer, and those of Russian citizens less close to those in WE. As we will see, this will often be the case when other issues are at stake. Here we see, however, that the legitimacy of political institutions in Russia, even if lower than in the WE, still is higher than in the other post-communist countries. A possible answer could refer to the greater continuity of the state apparatus in Russia. In those CEE countries that had newly won their independence, the post-revolutionary governments were in charge of creating new institutions from scratch; even those governments who had inherited an existing state apparatus were nevertheless politically compelled to give symbolic signals of having abandoned old practices of administration. In both types of cases, the state apparatus could be perceived as an ephemeral actor whose legitimacy is not supported by habit and can, thus, easily be questioned. It can be added that the legitimacy of the former, Communist regime was also probably much higher in Russia than it was in the other countries in its sphere of influence; in the latter, Communism was largely perceived as just another name for foreign (i.e., Russian) domination. As can be seen now, distrust towards the former regime has led to a more general attitude of distrust against government of

any kind – to a perceived contradiction between "ordinary citizens" and the state.

In their overall assessment of the functioning of democracy in their country today, both Russian and CEE respondents are much more skeptical than are the Westerners. However, the skepticism of today is balanced by an equally striking difference in the perception of democracy's future perspectives by respondents in different regions. While the WE citizens in average expect that democracy in their country will in ten years' time work less well than it does today, citizens of Post-Communist countries see forward to an improvement. Their narrative of democracy is that of development and consolidation, while the Western one is about decline.

Unity and pluralism

Perhaps the most fundamental of the senses in which the economic, political and social order of Real Socialism diverged from Western liberal democracy was its treatment of pluralism and difference. According to the official ideology, the interests of the working class were represented by the Communist Party and they were identical with the interests of the State. Whatever other interests there were, could only be the interests of the class enemy. In a similar vein, the cultural and media policies of the regimes were directed at the creation of the Socialist Man, whose consciousness would be in correspondence with his role in building up a socialist society. Again, deviations from this intellectual and moral unity would be either bourgeois remnants – such as the practise of religion –, or something worse. As Václav Havel (1992: 167-171) argues, the very practice of branding some people as "dissidents" shows how important it was for the regime to sustain the image of the socialist nation as a unified whole.

To what extent this unification of society was successful, is of course a matter to be discussed. No doubt, the ambitions were higher than

what actually was reached. The countries that became Sovietised under the Second World War or immediately after that, received a shorter and less thorough experience of the regime than did Russia itself; among other things, they avoided some of the worst atrocities of Stalin's rule, such as the terror of 1937-1938. The lessons from the few previous decades of a beginning of a Capitalist modernization were a resource that was not available for the population in Russia. In CEE, there certainly was a cultural inertia that slowed down the unification process. It can be thought, however, that human activity is never totally uniform or totally predictable, and that from this, a pluralism necessarily arises at least at the level of people's everyday experiences. Thus, a society can never be totally unified; the question to be asked is, whether and to what extent the unavoidable pluralism is acknowledged and supported by social institutions and discourses.

Of course, the unifying pressures of market economy and the mass media of capitalist societies can be equally effective in ensuring the hegemony of a leading class and suppressing radical opposition; in fact, they are probably even more effective, as was proven by the fall of Real Socialism through popular uprisings. But the unifying method of Capitalism is different, based on the "repressive tolerance" of the political system (Marcuse 1969) and the commodification and standardization of difference through the market and media. In short, Real Socialism denied pluralism, while Capitalism has found ways of institutionalising it as part and parcel of the system itself.

Table 2. Ideas on unity and pluralism in different European regions, selected indicators

Good citizen understands other opinions

	Total 1-3 (disagreement), percentages	Total 5-7 (agreement), percentages
WE	5.7	84.2
CEE	11.3	72.1
Russia	10.7	74.0

Good citizen serves in the military if needed

	Total 1-3 (disagreement), percentages	Total 5-7 (agreement), percentages
WE	38.1	47.7
CEE	28.5	57.1
Russia	11.6	78.6

Government respects and protects the rights of minorities

	Total 1-3 (not important), percentages	Total 5-7 (important), percentages
WE	3.7	90.7
CEE	5.6	86.5
Russia	6.7	75.8

Should government restrict democratic rights when needed?

	No	Yes
WE	80.9	19.1
CEE	74.5	25.5
Russia	68.4	31.6

Should public meetings by religious extremists be allowed?

	Definitely or probably allowed	Definitely or probably not allowed
WE	24.5	75.5
CEE	18.3	81.7
Russia	9.0	80.9

Should public meetings by racist people be allowed?

	Definitely or probably allowed	Definitely or probably not allowed
WE	18.2	81.9
CEE	12.6	87.5
Russia	6.7	93.4

Table 2 gives an overview of some indicators reflecting present attitudes towards unity vs. pluralism in three different regions in Europe. The differences between WE, CEE and Russia are clear and follow the

general pattern, in which tolerance and pluralism are more valued in the West and less so in Russia, whereas CEE tends to fall between the two extremes. It is noteworthy that the Western respondents are more lenient even towards religious extremists and racists, despite the fact that such movements are themselves hostile of the pluralist and tolerant society that surrounds them.

Ideas of participatory democracy

There are some fundamental differences in the experiences that WE, CEE and Russian citizens have of political activity. What the Westerners have and what the other Europeans lack is the habitualization of participation in a liberal democratic political system; what both Russians and Central Europeans have and Western Europeans lack is a recent experience of suppression by and resistance against an authoritarian government. Finally, what among them all is unique for Central Europeans is the memory of revolutionary mass movements being able to overthrow the previous regime. In comparison with the CEE countries, the Russian democratisation process had much more of the character of reform imposed from above.

Initially, the Central and Eastern European "dissidents"[3] and oppositionist movements had no access to institutional channels of political participation. Their ways of influencing society included balancing on the verge of what was accepted by the authorities; visible personal acts of courage; and creating networks among the like minded. A strategy of this type corresponded to a view of political activity as firmly rooted in the actors' personal moral qualities and in the everyday life, even the intimate sphere – that of the habermasian *Lebenswelt* (Habermas 1991). Again, as put by Václav Havel (1992: 210) in his famous essay from 1978, "The Power of the Powerless", the new "post-democratic" political system should be aimed at…

> "a rehabilitation of values like trust, openness, responsibility, solidarity, love. I believe in structures that are not aimed at the technical aspect of the execution of power, but at the significance of that execution in structures held together more by a commonly shared feeling of the importance of certain communities than by commonly shared expansionist ambitions directed outward. There can and must be structures that are open, dynamic, and small; beyond a certain point, human ties like personal trust and personal responsibility cannot work. […] Rather than a strategic agglomeration of formalized organizations, it is better to have organizations springing up ad hoc, infused with enthusiasm for a particular purpose and disappearing when that purpose has been achieved."

And some years later, in 1984, Havel (1992: 271) expressed the same goal when saying…

> "Yes, 'antipolitical politics' is possible. Politics 'from below'. Politics of man, not the apparatus. Politics growing from the heart, not from a thesis."

Here, we can hear the anti-institutionalism of a "dissident" intellectual mixing with that of a "Little Man" like the Good Soldier Švejk, and also with ideas similar to those of the New Social Movements of the 1970s and 1980s in the West.

According to the survey results it would seem that a similar attitude continues to characterise the ways in which respondents in CEE see their relationship to channels of political participation (see Table 3).

Table 3. Ideas on direct civic participation in different European regions, selected indicators

Right for civil disobedience acts		
	Total 1-3 (not important), percentages	Total 5-7 (important), percentages
WE	28.2	56.1
CEE	8.6	79.7
Russia	10.6	74.1
Citizens involved in decision making		
	Total 1-3 (not important), percentages	Total 5-7 (important), percentages
WE	4.4	90.0
CEE	3.3	90.9
Russia	3.3	90.8
Should public meetings be allowed for people who want to overthrow government by violent means?		
	Definitely or probably allowed	Definitely or probably not allowed
WE	12.0	88.0
CEE	16.6	83.4
Russia	8.1	91.9
Good citizen keeps watch on government		
	Total 1-3 (disagreement), percentages	Total 5-7 (agreement), percentages
WE	11.0	74.3
CEE	24.3	55.4
Russia	14.4	56.9
Good citizen is active in associations		
	Total 1-3 (disagreement), percentages	Total 5-7 (agreement), percentages
WE	37.6	40.1
EE	47.7	29.6
Russia	31.2	35.4

The right for civil disobedience acts was clearly perceived as more important by respondents in CEE than either in Russia or WE. The difference becomes even more dramatic if we consider only those respondents who considered this right as "very important", i.e., who chose the answer category 7 on the seven-point scale. Their percentage in WE, CEE and Russia was 22.8, 42.7 and 37.8, respectively. A similar

remark can be made about the next question about the importance of citizens being involved in political decision making. The percentage of respondents rating it "very important" in WE, CEE and Russia differ clearly, being 42.7, 54.7 and 52.1, respectively. Central Europeans are also more willing than others to allow public meetings for people who want to overthrow government by violent means.

Against this background it seems astonishing, that two possible aspects of civic involvement – "keeping watch on government" and "being active in associations" – are not considered particularly important by the same CEE respondents. Critical of state institutions, the respondents do not seem to have much trust in institutionalised channels for direct civic involvement, either. This side of the Post-Communist anti-institutionalism has some important practical consequences, which will be discussed in the next section.

Practices of direct civic participation

In her famous treatment of 1951, Hannah Arendt (1951/1994) depicted totalitarian states as mass societies of atomised individuals. In the circumstances of an all-embracing surveillance and control by the state, people no longer formed groups and associations typical of more complex societies, as they were afraid of trusting anybody but themselves and their immediate family. Arendt seems to confirm the observation by Tocqueville (1856/1955) a hundred years earlier: It is not important for a despot to be loved by his subjects; the important thing is that they do not love each other, either. In Arendt's own words (1951/1994: 21), "Bolshevik rulers [had] succeeded in creating an atomized and individualized society the like of which we have never seen before [...]."

Despite transitions to democracy, including freedom of association, the survey results show the persistence of a difference between the Western and Eastern parts of Europe with respect to their populations'

willingness or ability to participate in joint action in order to influence society (see Table 4). When the three regions discussed here are compared, the differences seem again to follow a Western-Eastern axis, in which WE and Russia represent the opposite ends and CEE is situated in between. In comparison with Russia, CEE countries have by now enjoyed some more years of relative stability, which certainly is one of the prerequisites for voluntary associations and other institutionalised forms of civic involvement to develop. It could also be repeated here that the Communist regimes of CEE had a shorter time available for making reality of their totalitarian ambitions than the Bolsheviks had in Russia. For this reason, the CEE citizens have been more able to make use of the possibilities now re-opened.

Table 4. Practical experience on direct civic participation in different European regions, selected indicators

Forms of political participation by respondent during the past year or in a more distant past			
Form of participation	WE	CEE	Russia
- Sign petition	60.3	27.8	15.0
- Boycott a product	39.0	10.7	6.6
- Participate in a demonstration	30.6	17.9	25.0
- Attend a political meeting or event	29.4	22.2	19.1
- Contact a politician	21.5	11.0	11.3
- Donate or raise funds	50.7	25.1	16.0
- Contact media	13.7	6.2	6.0
- Join a political internet forum	5.0	4.0	1.8
Belonging to an organization (active and passive members)			
Type of organization	WE	CEE	Russia
- Political party	9.4	4.5	3.0
- Church or religious association	46.9	30.2	10.0
- Sports or cultural organizations	40.1	26.1	7.5
- Other voluntary associations	24.9	9.7	2.6

Taking into account the short time period and the awkward point of departure, the recovery of organisational activities seems remarkably rapid in CEE, but less so in Russia. It should be noticed that differences between the three regions are smallest when we consider those forms of participation that require relatively less organising and long-

term personal involvement – i.e., participating in demonstrations, political meetings and Internet fora. Here we cannot avoid recalling recent discussions about a possible erosion of social capital in the West, which manifests itself in peoples' diminishing willingness to engage themselves in joint action for common good (e.g., Putnam 2000). Such a development would lead to a decline of membership in political parties and voluntary associations, of fundraising etc.; i.e., of precisely those forms of participation that are now less well developed in CEE and Russia. The feared development does not seem to have gone very far in WE, at least yet; but again, it is not impossible that the problem of citizens' lacking engagement in common issues now visible in CEE and Russia can be seen as anticipating a more general tendency present in late modernity.

Conclusions

The data and arguments presented above include some interesting paradoxes. Despite democratisation, citizens of post-communist countries continue to distrust their state and the new democratic institutions. They see civil disobedience as an important democratic right; this parallels the importance that the "dissidents" and revolutionary movements of the 1980s attributed to direct civic participation. At the same time, relatively few people do in fact involve in such activities, at least less than in WE; and the idea of a pluralist society in which different interests can be expressed still gains less acceptance than it does in the West. Explanations to these phenomena are manifold and related both to history, to the present social situation, and to global trends that have already been briefly discussed above.

The first aspect of Post-Communist civic culture discussed here can be summarised as the constellation of Citizen vs. the State. That is, the state is still – after more than fifteen years of political democracy – by many being regarded as the business of "others than ourselves".

This perception of state as an alien force is clearly a heritage from the past. It is also clearly an idea that is widespread among the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In his analysis of Czech national identity, Ladislav Holy (1996: 25) quotes an allegedly widespread popular saying from the decades before the 1990s, stating, "anyone who does not steal[4] is robbing his family." This points at a separation between the individual and public morals, repeatedly described by analysts of the Real Socialist political and economic system (e.g., Hánkiss 1988: 27). Not surprisingly, both the revolutions of 1988-1991 and the previous resistance were often perceived of as a controversy between the "society" or the "nation" and the "state" (Holy 1996: 10; Szajkowski 1997: 157). It should also be noted, that the "nation" or "society" rising to oppose the oppressing regime was itself understood as unified.

It may be however, that the experience of the state as distinct both from the individual and his or her cultural identity can be traced even further to the period of "national awakenings" in CEE. During the course of the 19th century, the "nations" of the region were constructed in opposition to the multinational empires of the Hapsburgs, the Romanovs and the Ottomans. Here, we should recall the distinctiveness of the Central and East European nation-building processes from those of Western Europe. Whereas the French-inspired Western nationalism aimed at creating a culturally united "nation" within the boundaries of an existing political entity, the German type of nationalism prevailing in the Central European region had to define the "nation" as a socio-cultural entity before it had achieved political reality as a state (Jenkins & Sofos 1996: 15). Hence, the individual identity produced by the national awakenings could not be that of a citizen, but that of an inheritor of a linguistic and cultural tradition.

In sum, both the pre-1918 and pre-1989 experiences of subjugation under a foreign ruler contribute to a mentality that is more successful in creating revolutionaries than citizens. Critical action aimed at overthrowing a government and civic involvement aimed at building up democratic institutions can both be regarded as aspects

of civil society, but as Alain Touraine (1985: 755) has remarked, they require widely different capacities. Evidently, civic involvement needs at least some type of institutionalised structures in order to be effective. In CEE, non-governmental organizations have developed during the 1990s and 2000s at a relatively fast pace, even if their strength still is clearly weaker than in the WE. Could they develop into agents of such "politics from below" that were suggested by Havel, and that have also been discussed by such Western European sociologists as Ulrich Beck (1994)? One important challenge for the emerging activities consists of coming into terms with the popular attitudes towards unity and pluralism discussed in this chapter.

Where does this leave the institutional channels of political democracy? It should be stated first, that despite wide-spread skepticism towards political institutions in CEE and in Russia, a clear majority of the population in both regions oppose any restriction of democratic rights by the government and are, in fact, optimistic about the future of democracy in their countries (cf. answers to these questions as reported in tables 1 and 2). The problem is not about people opposing democracy as such. At the same time it is also obvious that the creation of democratic institutions in the Post-Communist countries has taken place in an epoch, which has throughout Europe been characterised by a trend towards weaker party organizations, more unstable party systems and a reduction of political debate to media campaigning focused on party leaders (Hedin 2001: 50). The new democracies cannot avoid being influenced by this trend. But whereas the modern democratic institutions have been somewhat able to resist it in WE, supported by their already won position in citizens' minds and habits, they are more fragile in the East. George Schöpflin (1993: 274) makes an important point:

> "The greatest damage done by communism […] was the destruction of institutions. […] The role of institutions in politics is not merely to represent individuals, but also to provide the necessary distance between them and to establish codes of conduct and political ground rules in which there is a degree of detachment, routine and predict-

> ability. In the absence of this politics easily becomes a matter of personal passions, interactions and relations."

This analysis points to the crucial impact that institutional structure has for the formation of political culture. But in the "personal passions, interactions and relations" that may impair democratic consolidation we also see the reverse side of what Havel described as an ideal to strive for: "Politics 'from below'. Politics of man, not the apparatus. Politics growing from the heart, not from a thesis". The idea of non-alienated politics will continue to attract people in all parts of Europe. Maybe the most important challenge for democracy of the future will consist of creating or (re)opening institutional channels for "politics growing from the heart".

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Endnotes

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2. Here, we are not referring to all Post-Communist countries in Europe; the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and especially Russia will be discussed below. In the terminology of this chapter, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) includes those European countries in which a Communist (or maybe more accurately, Real Socialist) regime was introduced during the 1940s. Thus, it includes Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but no other previous parts of the Soviet Union. Most of the CEE countries, but not all (Albania and the countries in former Yugoslavia) were members of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON. The CEE countries that participated in the ISSP 2004 survey were Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, East Germany, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Hence, not all CEE countries, but all the main geographic subregions were represented.
3. As to the quotation marks around "dissidents", please be reminded of Havel's argument referred to in the previous section!
4. (that is, from the state-owned employer)

Conclusions: EU as a Political Entity? Citizenship and Participation in EU countries

Raimo Blom & Annamari Konttinen

The chapters in this book contribute to the research tradition of citizenship, social networks, social capital and social and political participation – as well as in the heyday that the tradition has now enjoyed for more than a decade. They do that by providing an extensive portrait of, particularly European, citizenship, and by covering phenomena such as citizens' notions of the significance of citizenship and the characteristics of a "good citizen", trust in political institutions and the functioning of the entire democratic system, as well as a variety of forms of social and political participation and association activity, together with cognitions such as sense of efficacy that form the foundation for feelings of belongingness to a society as well as rationale for social and political participation. The latter tie the newer stratum of social science research with the tradition of study of political efficacy, sense of belonging and alienation, started in the US in the1950s, and with roots in Tocquevillean thinking.

The ISSP Citizenship data makes also possible larger scale comparisons between the EU countries and non-EU countries, within the limits of ISSP-membership and participation in the Citizenship module (see Appendix 2). The results show relatively large variety and sharp contrasts, also between European countries. One can, however, also observe notable similarities among them. The analysis starts with

the question of the special nature of Finland. The location of Finland in the conceptual grid of aspects of "good citizenship" corresponds to Finland's position in the theories of types of capitalism and welfare regimes. Regime analysis is also consistent with the grouping of other countries in this grid. The main focus in the analysis was in the differentiation of EU-countries as well as in looking for the least common denominator: the signifiers of a "European" citizenship.

While the survey method constrains the study to methodological individualism, where phenomena such as social capital or trust are reduced to quantifiable and measurable qualities and perceptions of individuals, the comparison of nations opens perspectives that transcend this limitation: we can observe different citizenship regimes and their constitutive elements such as generalized trust or sense of political efficacy or forms of participation in their cultural and historical contexts. The special treatment given to Finland in some of the chapters of this book is, we hope, an example of such in-depth treatment.

The New Boom of Citizenship Studies in the 1990s

A new wave of studies emerging early in the 1990s has created many more or less ambitious typologies and categorizations of countries based on empirical generalizations. Quite often this has happened at the cost of older theory based typologies, many of whom were developed in the 1950s, some even in the classical period of sociology around the turn of the 19th and 20th century.

As the new boom started, most attention was paid to the different aspects of social capital as formulated by Robert D. Putnam (1993; 1995): trust, voluntary associations and social networks of bridging social capital that brings together people from different social backgrounds (Putnam 2000). This analysis led to empirical typologies based mostly on survey findings. Countries were first roughly grouped into those whose citizens had many association memberships (e.g. the

Netherlands; the Nordic Countries; Ireland) and those whose citizens didn't belong to the same extent (see e.g. Morales 2001; Curtis et al. 2001; Siisiäinen 1999; Wallace 2005; Baer 2007). Putnam adopted this typology to differentiation between regions within nations, too (1993; 2000). The differences that he found between countries have presented themselves in approximately the same form in subsequent studies (with small fluctuations caused by methodical and operational choices).

A new dimension in participation research was opened by making a distinction between formal membership and working membership (e.g. Curtis et al. 2001). On working membership dimension, the USA and Canada, for example, rank high, whereas some countries of high formal membership show lower figures (e.g. some Nordic countries, Ireland) (op.cit. 792-793). A step further is made by Dekker and van den Broek (1998; 2005; see Stroemsnes & Wollebaek 2006; c.f. Morales 2001) who develop a typology using the percentage of association memberships in the population and the percentage of volunteers among members as variables. This results in three different types of civil society: (1) the parochial (few members, high percentage of the members as activists); typical representatives to be found among the Southern European countries. (2) active civil society (high proportion of members + high percentage of volunteers among members); typical countries in North America; (3) broad civil society (relatively high membership figures + modest proportions of volunteering); the Nordic countries, West Germany, and the Netherlands.

Another widening of this social capital perspective on associations and social networks has been the examination of both bridging (especially associations) and bonding networks (e.g. relatives, friends, community networks). The inclusion of these bonding "memberships" disperses the country groupings based on association activeness figures alone. Some countries seem to have both high association membership figures and social contact figures (e.g. meeting friends) (the Netherlands, Sweden), while some countries rank low in association memberships but high in friendship and other social networking activities (Bulgaria, Cyprus), whereas some countries with high memberships are located

clearly lower on the list of meeting friends and other informal forms of networking (e.g. Finland) (see Wallace 2005).

Trust and high number of association memberships have correlated highly on country level ever since they have been measured since early 1990s (see Warren [ed.] 1999; Inglehart 1999; Wallace 2005). Generally speaking, the top ten "trusting" nations consist of citizens in – mostly protestant – welfare states (Nordic countries, some central European countries, some English-speaking countries). The relationship between association memberships and trust is one of the most studied sociological problems around the turn of the Millennium. The differences between countries seem convincing at the macro level whereas at the individual level, most of the researchers tend to think that there is not enough evidence about the positive effect of association memberships on the level of trust (see Siisiäinen and Kouvo in this volume). As many researchers, especially in the Nordic countries, have noted, the relationship between trust and association membership on individual level seems to be more or less spurious and "the scope of the voluntary sector […] appears more important than activity level for the aggregate level of social capital and civic engagement" (Stroemsnes & Wollebaek 2006, 15).

In can be concluded – especially from the results of many Scandinavian studies – that the role of broad, visible and widely known system of voluntary associations is of utmost importance for the creation of social capital and trust. And second, the role of the public sector and state institutions (the Nordic welfare state institution) as well as various forms of neo-corporatism (study circles, tripartite state commission with trade union representation, tradition of large citizens' movements etc.) belong to the most central background factors in the explanation of the high level of social capital in the Nordic countries (see Rothstein 2001; Trägårdh 2007). Third, the relationship between broad system of voluntary associations and the (welfare) state as well as general knowledge about the effectiveness of this dialectics has been very important in the creation of the sense of security among citizens as the basis for social capital. This is connected with the historical devel-

opment of specific types of relationships between civil society and the state, and with different kinds of political opportunity structures (e.g. open vs. closed state; inclusionary vs. exclusionary state to challenging movements) (see Kriesi et al. 1995).

On the basis on these kinds of findings, it seems well grounded to conclude that

(1) research has to take the macro level more seriously into focus as the context of micro relations between individual association memberships and social capital;

(2) state and welfare regimes need to be included among the independent "causal factors" in the explanation of the differences (or similarities) between countries;

(3) state – civil society relations need to be theoreticized and typologicized as a general basis for more detailed comparisons between countries;

(4) this stresses the importance of historical analysis: (a) of state – civil society relations; (b) of conceptual and rhetorical analysis of civil society in different countries (e.g. Trägårdh 2007; Brown et al. 2000).

(5) 15 years after the Putnamian turn, some of the partly forgotten "classical" themes dealt with in theories about the relationship between (interest) associations and the political system should be reinstated in the frame of reference of (regulation of) conflicts (e.g. Dahrendorf 1957), relation between organized and non-organized interests (e.g. Schattschneider 1960; Bachrach & Baratz; see Blom 1981; Siisiäinen 1985; 2004; Blom & Siisiäinen 1992), relationships between inequality structures (classes), other discourses of difference and voluntary organizing (discussions about sociological pluralism; see Siisiäinen 1986).

In making theoretical typologies, a central decision concerns the level of generality. Very general typologies (c.f. Weber's discussion about the relationship between religions and the development of capitalism or Marx's analysis of the modes of production that preceded capitalism)

can only form the first, abstract point of departure for developing more concrete classifications. On the other hand, if a more empirically based typologizing classification tries to follow too closely the empirically depicted reality, the theoretical usefulness and fruitfulness will be lost. It then resembles a small-scale map, which copies its geographical object too keenly and becomes useless in orientating oneself.

The typologies utilized here are the first step in specifying the characteristics of the Finnish case. They help us to first place Finland in a more general category among European welfare political regimes; and second, help make distinctions within the more general, "Nordic (Scandinavian) type". General, theoretically grounded typologies are needed to open all survey figures which can be "attained" in so many different ways (c.f. China's high scoring in international comparisons of trust, see Inglehart 1999); difficulties in interpretations of the Johns Hopkins study of the non-profit sector (c.f. Salamon et al. 1999).

We have found Eva Schofer and Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas' syntheticizing typology a fruitful basis for our analysis. Building on a thorough meta-analysis of empirical studies, Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas conclude that there are two distinctions that account for much of the variation of voluntary association memberships among nations in terms of the number and types of associations that people join: (1) between statist versus non-statist (sometimes called "liberal") societies, and (2) between corporate versus non-corporate societies (2001, 806). Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas' interpretation of their results emphasize the differences on the societal, structural (or "macro") level and thereby adds evidence to the ideas that have risen in many new Nordic studies (see Rothstein 2001; Wollebaek & Selle 2002; Ilmonen 2007).

Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas also stress the importance of classical sociological theories of the field and of the historical analysis of collective action as well as attitudes and behavioural patterns leading to participation: these practices and attitudes do not develop independently from their "dialectical" and historically grounded relations with different kinds of institutions. Institutional means to pursue

civic engagement, on their part, are constrained by political structures. Political structures "serve as social sites where perceptions and ideas about actorhood and sovereignty are played out, institutionalized, and constructed as 'legitimate'" (Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001, 810). This all gives support for understanding the relationship between associations (and other forms of social and political participation) as dialectical interaction between constraining and/or enabling "dual" opportunity structures and challenging or consensual movements and associations (see Tarrow 1989; Siisiäinen 1990).

Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas build their typology on the work done by neo-institutionalists and regime theoreticians. The most central ideas are derived from Gösta Esping-Andersen's typology that distinguishes between liberal, social-democratic and conservative regimes (1990; op.cit. 810-811). The basic variables of the new typology are defined as follows:

(1) *Statism* describes the different ways of deriving political legitimacy in modern societies (the state vs. civil society). In statist countries, like France and Germany, "the state constitutes a separate and superior order of political governance that derives much of its legitimacy from a well-developed bureaucratic elite […] and is therefore often subject to some form of state control". In Anglo-Saxon countries, by contrast, the state derives "its legitimacy from its function as the representation of civil society, which is considered to be the principal locus of public life" (op. cit. 811). In Scandinavia states, also support and act benevolently toward associations but the boundaries between the state and civil society are more blurred (op. cit. 812).

(2) *Corporateness* is the second variable of the typology bringing some central ideas of theories of corporatism back to the fore: "polities vary in the way in which social actors are incorporated… Some social systems assign sovereign "actorhood" to private persons and typically locate interest representation in individuals – with group action being legitimate *only* as the embodiment of individual wishes. Other systems assign a higher moral purpose to organized groups, empowering individuals chiefly as members of broader collectives that have specific

"rights and functions" (op. cit. 813). As a modern representative of a corporate society, Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas take up Sweden as distinguished from its opposite, the Anglo-Saxon nations representing individualistic political cultures (op. cit. 814). By cross-tabulating these two variables, a new typology utilizing older Jepperson's (1992) ideas is obtained (op.cit. 817):

Figure 1. Variation in National Polity Structure; Statism versus Corporateness

Degree of Corporateness	Degree of Statism	
	Low	High
Low	**United States,** B itain, Canada	**France,** Italy, Sp in, Portugal, Latin America
High	**Scandinavian (Nordic) countries**	**Wilh lmine Germany,** postwar Germany, Austria, Central and Eastern Europe, Japan

It is easy to locate Finland in this typology in the same category with the other Nordic countries as a non-statist and corporate country. There are also some other theoretically based attributes that could be added as complementary aspect to the typology. Finland can be regarded also strong and as an inclusionary state in its relations with challengers (c.f. Kriesi et al. 1995).

The background for the analysis of the types of capitalism is the French regulation school (Aglietta 1973, Lipietz 1987, and as general review Jessop 1990). In our analysis the starting point is not the whole institutional structure of regulation but only the main features of the structural differentiation of capitalism. The theory used is that of Boyer's (1997). We can proceed by investigating the foundation of Boyer's types.

The basis of Boyer's classification for types of capitalism is the distinctive forms of labour market relations, their institutional characteristics and adjustments, as well as the consequential advantages and disadvantages, respectively. The four types of capitalism are 'market-oriented' (USA, Canada and Britain), 'Rhineland or corporatist' (Germany, Japan), 'statist' (France, Italy) and 'social democrat' (Sweden, Austria) (Boyer 1997,90).

Esping-Andersen distinguishes three welfare regimes: 'liberal' (USA as modal example), 'social democratic' (the Nordic countries) and 'conservative' (Germany, Italy) (Esping-Andersen 1999, 73-). The original basis was the de-commodification of welfare or the decrease in the commodity nature of labour power. In the liberal model, few rights and a low level of de-commodification mean that the liberal welfare regime is almost completely Anglo-Saxon: it comprises the United States, Canada, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, and Britain. The social democratic welfare regime includes the Nordic countries, and the conservative model almost all other countries. There are different variants inside the three welfare regimes and, in some cases, the situation has changed after the publication of Esping-Andersen's 1999 book.

De-commodification of welfare, the basic feature of Esping-Andersen's regime typology has certainly changed. Labour market relations are more fragmented and insecure than earlier and their mode of regulation is changing. In a similar way, the de-commodification of welfare and welfare state have been under new pressures. (Julkunen 2001, Esping-Andersen et al. 2002). For example Esping-Andersen (2002, 25) describes a transition where welfare is "externalized to market" and "internalized in the family" We can add to the picture also Manuel

Castells' (1996) contribution and the question of new informational mode of capitalism or the multitude of world-scale transformations called globalization. Globalization sets both new limits to nation states and new demands for global citizenship.

Regime analysis has experienced many challenges and further developments, which give new significance for the whole regime idea. A good example is the work of the group Globalization, Gender and Work Transformation. Their book (Walby et. al. 2007) Gendering the Knowledge Economy. Comparative Analysis provides many critical questions as well as important answers. From our perspective, the most interesting matters are 1. the different dimensions, often dualities, used in the definition of the types of capitalism, 2. the institutions used in classification of (gender) regimes, and 3. the place of the types of regulation in the analysis, for example in the regulation of gender relations.

In the literature, there are well-known distinctions between corporatism and liberalism (Crouch 1982), liberal market and coordinated economies (Hall and Soskice 2001) and institutionally thin and thick societies (Streeck 1992). Walby (2007, 13) says that capitalist production regimes differ on series of a dimensions, and many dualities need still further subdivisions (for example corporatism or the nature of regulating institutions). In the case of 'citizenship regimes', the relevant institutions are both the official institutions supporting the democratic system and also the socio-political institutions regulating the use of citizenship rights. Also Streeck's (1992, 37) distinction between institutionally thick and thin societies can be relevant in the analysis of citizenship regimes. Still, in the case of associations as institutions we must notice that there is a danger of tautological explanations.

Our analysis does not move on the level of regulation of organizations and practices. However, we know well that welfare state regimes and the actual regulation differ a lot. Walby's idea of the move from domestic to public formation of welfare and gender relations can have analogical use in the sphere of citizenship analysis. A good example regarding the regulations related to the gender regimes is the com-

parative analysis of Lenz (2007) that unites the levels of nation-state, European Union and UN and the global structure. In the work of the research group mentioned above, globalization forms a highly important context. For example, the background for Lenz' analysis is the 'magic triangle' of Altvater and Mahnkopf (2000; Lenz 2007, 111). In Altvater's and Mahnkopf's model the levels and codes relevant for research are supranational organizations/nation states with the code of power and decision-making, transnational corporations following the code of the market, and civil society following the code of negotiation and communication. The levels presented above are analogous to an extent with the conceptual differentiation of citizenship. 'Cosmopolitan citizenship' (Delanty 2000) comes to the level of supranational organizations. The global companies use and are also benchmarking corporate citizenship (Sklair 2001) and the civil society with the concept of 'civil' as the root of citizenship.

The comparative analysis of Lenz (2007) shows among other things the difference between German corporate capitalism and Japanese hybrid corporate capitalism. In the German case the level of nation-state is dominant. In the case of Japan, corporatism works at the enterprise level. The other example is the US which is totally separated from international regulation of UN and other bodies concerning global equality norms and gender regulations. Both examples are as such relevant for comparative citizenship analysis. More generally, the example refers to the need of clearly defined multi-level analysis, which also understands the different codes used in different sectors. In relation to our book this is mainly the next step of citizenship research.

What are we actually doing when trying to find the differentiation of social and political participation according to regimes or systems? Let's start once more from the basics. The conceptual background of our analysis is formed by the types of capitalism and the welfare regimes. In addition, some differentiating features of political system like the degrees of statism and the degree in corporateness (in earlier typology, page 176) and also the nature of civil society and its relation to the state and politics must be considered.

Let's go back to the original presentations of Boyer and Esping-Andersen. The basis of Boyer's classification for types of capitalism are the distinctive forms of labour market relations, their institutional characteristics and adjustments, and the consequential advantages and disadvantages, respectively. The four types of capitalism are 'market-oriented' (USA, Canada and Britain), 'Rhineland or corporatist' (Germany, Japan), 'statist' (France, Italy) and 'social democrat' (Sweden, Austria) (Boyer 1997,90; table 4.6.).

The types or regimes in question are relatively stable and longer lasting and historically based on definite types of class relations, political structures and coalitions. They are not subject to immediate political changes or conjunctures. If they were, for example present Finland and Sweden with their right-wing governments would not be very good examples of social democratic regimes. Still, there remains the question of the possibility of change. To determine whether a regime shift has occurred or not, we must ask if the decisive factors have changed?

The very basic structural conditions, forms of labour market relations that are dealt with in Boyer's typology or de-commodification of welfare in Esping-Andersen's regimes have certainly changed. Labour market relations are more fragmented and insecure than earlier, and their mode of regulation is changing. In a similar way, the de-commodification of welfare and welfare state has been under new pressures. (Julkunen 2001, Esping-Andersen et al. 2002.)

After seeing the obvious limits of regime analysis we can notice that in many ways our regime based analysis of social and political participation is also a test of the usefulness of "regime type" concepts in the analysis of the differentiation of countries.

One theoretical step closer to the Putnamian concept of (system integrative) concept of social capital could be found on the home field of Putnam, from the American theory of sociological pluralism (Bentley, Schattschneider, Lipset). In this tradition, the relation between the reproduction of the structures or inequality (class interest), the forms of voluntary organizing and political democracy are analysed in a way that could fill in some of the gaps found in Putnamian analyses (see Siisiäinen 2004b).

The concepts of citizen and citizenship have many dimensions and aspects. The adequacy of regime analysis depends on what approach to citizenship we have. If we look at the regimes of social and political participation, the regime analysis is very limited.

If we take as example the means of participation scores by countries, the regime picture is unclear. The Nordic countries have scores between 525 (Finland) and 551 (Denmark). At the top there is Canada (572) and New Zealand (567). USA is on the level of Nordic countries (550). But on the same level there are Austria, France, Australia, Germany, Netherlands Portugal and Uruguay, all between 520 and 550 scores. This tells that in non-associational participation there are no clear regimes, at least regimes following the welfare – state typologies. At the bottom of the scale are earlier socialist countries Hungary (414) and Bulgaria (428) and Russia (438), and on the other hand some Asian and Latin American countries like Philippines (422) and Chile (433). The form of political system and political culture with the socio-economic development level of the country unite to form the background of the means of participation scores.

If we go to deeper analysis of social inequality of participation, the picture changes once more. The effects of social position on participation are of top significance. Measured by education, the social position has a clear effect on social and political participation in every country. The level of education and participation correlate positively in all countries. The correlation is highest in Germany and USA, and very clear also in Norway. The education has the lowest effect on participation in Finland. Thereby Finland is also in this respect different than the other Nordic countries. It has higher social equality. The same kinds of results concern also the effects of gender and age on social and political participation (Siisiäinen & Blom 2008).

Figure 2. Participation by level of education



The main conclusion from the analysis is that more educational equality is needed if we want to create a more democratic society in terms of social and political activity and possibilities to influence on social conditions. This concerns both associational activity and other forms of participation.

In taking into account associational membership as well as different forms of socio-political participation, we will clearly see that citizenship is a cultural matter and that it is also strongly related to moral consciousness and to value related conceptions of good citizenship. All these aspects can be reasons and motives of action.

Finally it must be said that even now the core of any citizenship conception is citizenship rights. These rights are more or less related to other aspects of citizenship. As experienced matters or practical means they are central in the examination of citizenship. It can be added that in the times of economic crises as nowadays the significance of rights acquire further importance.

In the formation of identity citizenship is important but there are also other factors which have the same or even bigger influence on identity than citizenship as such. A Finnish study based on the ISSP Citizenship data of the year 2005 show that the occupation and region has bigger influence on identity than the citizenship (Oinonen et al. 2005). In other circumstances, the ethnicity, race, religion and also generation can be significant in identity formation.

Our analysis gives results that have some wider significance to the direction of the analysis of democracy and power, for example the differences in degrees of equality of participation between countries according to education, gender and age groups. The relatively clear differentiation of countries according to the types of welfare regimes and the degree of statism and corporativeness as such is meaningful evidence about the wide scale of different socio-political possibilities. Secondly, the wide differences according to social position using education as the indicator tell that although the ordinary people's real possibilities to influence political decisions are very limited everywhere, there are those who do not have those possibilities at all or only have them to

a very limited extent. Large parts of population have no possibilities to influence the society and politics, even though the assumptions of participatory concepts of democracy state differently. This is why the results are good evidence about the state of participation in different countries but relatively weak evidence about the state of democracy, power and hegemonic relations. Therefore it can be emphasized that research on participation cannot take place in a vacuum.

EU as a Political Entity? Cosmopolitical Convictions or Nationalist Thinking?

The citizenship model of Europe has experienced heavy transformations as well as significant blows in the last few decades. The foundations of ideals of equal participation rights and welfare rights have been tried by different resource allocation battles. Also the rise of neo-liberalism has tended to reinforce differences instead of alleviating them. New Europeans, immigrants and members of new EU countries are often in a weaker position. The Nordic welfare model has suffered, especially in the recession-ridden 1990s to the point that some wonder if the paradise is already lost.

In Marshall's model of citizenship, legal citizen rights were born first, in the 17th and 18th centuries, political rights in the 18th and 19th centuries, and social rights in the 19th and 20th centuries. The institutions supporting citizens' different basic rights, such as the parliament for political rights or the welfare state for social rights, followed the development of principles defining them. Nowadays, cultural rights have also gained increased significance in the globalized world (Pakulski 1997).

The different categories of citizen rights have been dealt with in an uneven manner in this book. The more established legal rights have only been given fleeting attention, while political rights have been discussed at length. A perspective that has repeatedly manifested itself is the dependence of the realization of political rights on social rights:

important political perceptions such as sense of political efficacy are still unevenly distributed among different segments of societies. One could go as far as to state that all the other rights depend on the economic rights and social position. Because of the economic dependence, the concept of citizenship is always incomplete and impossible to realize in practice.

Some limitations to the realization of citizen rights have been brought about by globalization: the nation state, while still an important locus of political identity, has lost some of its significance as the guarantor of citizen rights. These ideas resonate with the work of a number of contemporary writers such as Heater (2002) on 'world citizenship', Falk (1994) and Urry (2000,172-86) on 'global citizenship', Hutchings and Dannreuther (1998) and their contributors on 'cosmopolitan citizenship', Soysal (1994) on 'post-national citizenship', and Kaldor (2003) and Keane (2003) on 'global civil society' in that they see identifications, networking and mobility that crosses national borders as a force that is permanently going to change the way we conceptualize citizenship.

The most influential normative perspectives upon the ethical character of global civil society are liberal cosmopolitanism and nationalist thinking. Within international political theory, the main alternative to cosmopolitan arguments is usually regarded as provided by moral theories that call upon the continuing significance of national boundaries in relation to political community.

These kinds of perspectives tend to drive us to see things as either-or: either we have bonds with as well as obligations to others, irrespective of our nationality; or the nation-state defines our sense of political. Overcoming this dualism and seeing alternative notions of belonging, and of exercising rights and obligations is a remarkable challenge both for theoretical and empirical social research. In EU, divergent political cultures are wise to cherish diversity while looking for what unites us all.

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Appendix 1: ISSP 2004 Citizenship Basic Questionnaire

FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE

CITIZENSHIP 2004

There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a good citizen. As far as you are concerned personally on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it:

	Not at all Important						Very Important	Can't Choose
1. Always to vote in elections	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2. Never to try to evade taxes	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
3. Always to obey laws and regulations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
4. To keep watch on the actions of government	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
5. To be active in social or political associations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
6. To try to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
7. To choose products for political, ethical or environmental reasons, even if they cost a bit more.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
8. To help people in (COUNTRY) who are worse off than yourself	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9. To help people in the rest of the world who are worse off than yourself	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
10. To be willing to serve in the military at a time of need	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

There are a number of groups in society.

11. Should religious extremists be allowed to hold public meetings?

Should definitely be allowed 1
Should probably be allowed 2
Should probably not be allowed 3
Should definitely not be allowed 4
Can't Choose 8

12. Should people who want to overthrow the government by force be allowed to hold public meetings?

Should definitely be allowed 1
Should probably be allowed 2
Should probably not be allowed 3
Should definitely not be allowed 4
Can't Choose 8

13. Should people prejudiced against any racial or ethnic group be allowed to hold public meetings?

Should definitely be allowed 1
Should probably be allowed 2
Should probably not be allowed 3
Should definitely not be allowed 4
Can't Choose 8

Here are some different forms of political and social action that people can take. Please indicate, for each one,

- whether you have done any of these things in the past year,
- whether you have done it in the more distant past,
- whether you have not done it but might do it
- or have not done it and would never, under any circumstances, do it.

	Have done it in the past year	Have done it in the more distant past	Have not done it but might do it	Have not done it and would never do it	Can't choose
14. Signed a petition	1	2	3	4	8
15. Boycotted, or deliberately bought, certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons	1	2	3	4	8
16. Took part in a demonstration	1	2	3	4	8
17. Attended a political meeting or rally	1	2	3	4	8

	Have done it in the past year	Have done it in the more distant past	Have not done it but might do it	Have not done it and would never do it	Can't choose
18. Contacted, or attempted to contact, a politician or a civil servant to express your views	1	2	3	4	8
19. Donated money or raised funds for a social or political activity	1	2	3	4	8
20. Contacted or appeared in the media to express your views	1	2	3	4	8
21. Joined an Internet political forum or discussion group	1	2	3	4	8

People sometimes belong to different kinds of groups or associations. For each type of group, please indicate whether you,

- belong and actively participate,
- belong but don't actively participate,
- used to belong but do not any more,
- or have never belonged to it.

	Belong and actively participate	Belong but don't participate	Used to belong	Never belonged	Can't Choose
22. A political party	1	2	3	4	8
23. A trade union, business, or professional association	1	2	3	4	8
24. A church or other religious organization	1	2	3	4	8
25. A sports, leisure or cultural group	1	2	3	4	8
26. Another voluntary association	1	2	3	4	8

There are different opinions about people's rights in a democracy. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it:

	Not at all Important						Very Important	Can't Choose
27. That all citizens have an adequate standard of living	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
28. That government authorities respect and protect the rights of minorities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
29. That government authorities treat everybody equally regardless of their position in society	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
30. That politicians take into account the views of citizens before making decisions	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
31. That people be given more opportunities to participate in public decision-making	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
32. That citizens may engage in acts of civil disobedience when they oppose government actions.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Can't Choose
33. People like me don't have any say about what the government does	1	2	3	4	5	8
34. I don't think the government cares much what people like me think	1	2	3	4	5	8
35. I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing (COUNTRY).	1	2	3	4	5	8
36. I think most people in (COUNTRY) are better informed about politics and government than I am.	1	2	3	4	5	8

Suppose a law were being considered by [appropriate national legislature] that you considered to be unjust or harmful.

37. If such a case arose, how likely is it that you, acting alone or together with others, would be able to try to do something about it?

Very likely 1
Fairly likely 2
Not very likely..... 3
Not at all likely 4
Can't choose 8

38. If you made such an effort, how likely is it that [appropriate national legislature] would give serious attention to your demands?

Very likely 1
Fairly likely 2
Not very likely..... 3
Not at all likely 4
Can't choose 8

39. How interested would you say you personally are in politics?

Very interested 1
Fairly interested 2
Not very interested 3
Not at all interested 4
Can't choose 8

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Can't Choose
40. Most of the time we can trust people in government to do what is right	1	2	3	4	5	8
41. Most politicians are in politics only for what they can get out of it personally	1	2	3	4	5	8

42. How often do you think that people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, and how often would they try to be fair?

Try to take advantage almost all of the time 1
Try to take advantage most of the time 2
Try to be fair most of the time 3
Try to be fair almost all of the time 4
Can't Choose 8

43. Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

People can almost always be trusted 1
People can usually be trusted 2
You usually can't be too careful in dealing with people 3
You almost always can't be too careful in dealing with people ... 4
Can't Choose 8

44. When you get together with your friends, relatives or fellow workers, how often do you discuss politics?

Often 1
Sometimes 2
Rarely 3
Never 4
Can't choose 8

45. When you hold a strong opinion about politics, how often do you try to persuade your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views?

Often 1
Sometimes 2
Rarely 3
Never 4
Can't choose 8

Now we would like to ask your opinion about international issues.

46. Thinking about the United Nations, which comes closest to your view?

The United Nations has too much power 1
or
The United Nations has about the right amount of power .. 2
or
The United Nations has too little power 3
or
Don't know what the United Nations is 4
or
Can't Choose 8

47. Which of these two statements comes closer to your view?

In international organizations, decisions should be left to national government representatives 1
or
In international organizations, citizens' organizations should be involved directly in the decision-making process 2
or
Can't choose..... 8

48. Which of these two statements comes closer to your view?

If a country seriously violates human rights, the United Nations should intervene 1
or
Even if human rights are seriously violated, the country's sovereignty must be respected, and the United Nations should not intervene 2
or
Don't know what the United Nations is 3
or
Can't choose 8

Thinking now about politics in (COUNTRY), to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Can't Choose
49. Political parties encourage people to become active in politics	1	2	3	4	5	8
50. Political parties do not give voters real policy choices	1	2	3	4	5	8
51. Referendums are a good way to decide important political questions.	1	2	3	4	5	8

52. Thinking of the last national election in (COUNTRY), how honest was it regarding the counting and reporting of the votes?

Very honest 1
Somewhat honest 2
Neither honest or dishonest 3
Somewhat dishonest 4
Very dishonest 5
Can't choose 8

53. Thinking of the last national election in (COUNTRY), how fair was it regarding the opportunities of the candidates and parties to campaign?

Very fair 1
Somewhat fair 2
Neither fair nor unfair 3
Somewhat unfair 4
Very unfair 5
Can't choose 8

54. Thinking of the public service in (COUNTRY), how committed is it to serve the people?

Very committed 1
Somewhat committed 2
Not very committed 3
Not at all committed 4
Can't choose 8

55. When the public service makes serious mistakes in (COUNTRY) how likely is it that they will be corrected?

Very likely 1
Somewhat likely 2
Not very likely 3
Not at all likely 4
Can't choose 8

56. How widespread do you think corruption is in the public service in (COUNTRY)?

Hardly anyone is involved 1
A small number of people are involved 2
A moderate number of people are involved 3
A lot of people are involved 4
Almost everyone is involved 5
Can't choose 8

On the whole, on a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is very poorly and 10 is very well.

	Very Poorly										Very Well	Can't Choose
57. How well does democracy work in (COUNTRY) today?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98
58. And what about 10 years ago? How well did democracy work in (COUNTRY) then?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98
59. And how about 10 years from now? How well do you think democracy will work in (COUNTRY) then?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98

60. Here are some views regarding (COUNTRY'S) political system. Which of these statements is closer to your view?

Under no circumstances should democratic rights be restricted by the government..... 1
or
When the government thinks it is necessary it should restrict democratic rights. 2
or
Can't choose 8

OPTIONAL

On average, how often do you:

	Every day	3-4 days a week	1-2 days a week	Fewer than 1-2 days a week	Never	Can't choose
61. Read the political content of a newspaper	1	2	3	4	5	8
62. Watch political news on television	1	2	3	4	5	8
63. Listen to political news on the radio	1	2	3	4	5	8
64. Use the Internet to obtain political news or information	1	2	3	4	5	8

Now we have some questions about your relations with other people. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it for you personally:

	Not at all Important						Very Important	Can't Choose
65. When you meet people for the first time, how important is it that you do or say something to show that you have respect for them?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
66. When you meet people you strongly disagree with, how important is it to do or say something to show you tolerate them?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

TRANSLATION NOTES
(Numbers refer to questions)

1. **Elections** refer to those held for public officials.

2. **Evade** has the connotation of illegality in not paying taxes owed, and does not mean "avoid", since "tax avoidance" is not illegal.

3. **Regulations** refers to the operationalization of laws into specific provisions having direct applicability to everyday life.

4. **Keep watch** means exercise vigilance in observing government, with a view to pointing out unwarranted actions or ensuring that proper actions are conducted. **Government** refers to elected and non-elected state authorities. It is not specific to "The Government" in places where that refers to the party in power.

8 & 9. **Worse off** means having a lower standard of living.

11. **Religious extremists** means people who have religious beliefs far from the mainstream. The term usually means these people are not content to simply hold these beliefs, but try to impose them on others.

Preamble to 14-21. **Social action** means public activity intended to produce some kind of impact on the society at large, or a segment of it.

Coding for 14-21. If more than one response, code the more participative one (that is, the one closer to the left end of the scale.)

18. **Civil servant** should be translated with the appropriate term for the public service. Do not use the term "bureaucrat."

28 & 29. **Government authorities** refers to public officials, both elected and non-elected (i.e. employees).

28. **Minorities** are those groups which, because of their lesser numbers in society, are often identified as needing special attention.

54-56. **Public service** should be translated with the appropriate term (see note on 18) for government officials. Do not use the term "bureaucracy."

Appendix 2: ISSP 2004 Data

ISSP 2004

ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) is a continuing programme (since 1984/1985) of cross-national social science surveys conducted in ISSP member countries. At the moment, there are 45 member countries. At the time of ISSP 2004 survey on Citizenship, 38 countries were members:

Australia
Austria
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
Flanders
France
Germany
Great Britain
Hungary
Ireland (Republic)
Israel
Japan
Latvia
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Uruguay
USA
Venezuela

Sampling and data collection

ISSP surveys are based on national representative samples. Most countries employ samples between 1000 and 2000 respondents. The total size of ISSP 2004 sample is 52 550. Of the 38 countries that participated in ISSP 2004 survey, some followed slightly different sampling methods than others. Two countries, Brazil and Venezuela used quota procedures, and eight: Brazil, Chile, Cyprus, Latvia, the Philippines, Russia, Spain and Uruguay, used substitution of different kinds. Finland and France had a lower age cut-off at 15 years, Japan, the Netherlands, and South Africa had a cut-off at 16 years; all other ember countries had a cut-off at 18 years of age. Six countries reported an upper age cut-off (Finland at 74, Flanders at 85, Latvia at 75, Norway and Sweden at 79, and Venezuela at 80.

Essentially the ISSP questionnaires are administered as face-to-face interviews or in a self-completion format. The number of times that respondents were contacted varied from country to country; this contributes to differences in response rates, from 15% to 95%.

List of authors:

Annamari Konttinen
Lecturer
Centre for East Asian Studies
University of Turku, Finland

Antti Kouvo
Senior Fellow
Department of Sociology
University of Turku, Finland

Harri Melin
Professor
Department of Sociology and Social Psychology
University of Tampere, Finland

Martti Siisiäinen
Professor
Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy
University of Jyväskylä, Finland

Raimo Blom
Professor Emeritus
Department of Sociology and Social Psychology
University of Tampere, Finland

Mikko Lagerspetz
Professor
Department of Sociology
Åbo Akademi University, Finland